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Abstract
This dissertation examines the supply of external audit services in the
UK during the period from 1991 to 1995. The increasing dominance of the
audit services market by a small number of international firms has been
a matter of public concern in recent decades. Fears have been expressed
about the implications of greater concentration in the supply of audit ser¬
vices. These fears include: the creation and strengthening of oligopolistic
structures, the resulting potential for price fixing arrangements, a reduction
in consumer choice, an escalation in conflicts of interest for auditors; and,
the potential failure of self-regulation of the audit profession. In addition,
the pricing practices of audit firms, exemplified by the charging of large
firm premiums and low-balling, have reinforced public anxiety about the
professionalism of auditors.
These developments in the audit services market and the issues sur¬
rounding them provided the backdrop to this study and defined its major
objectives. The latter are threefold. First, to examine the extent of con¬
centration in the audit services market during the period from 1991 to 1995
(in the wake of the mergers between Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young,
and between Coopers & Lybrand and Deloitte, Haskins & Sells). Second, to
analyse changes in the level of audit prices during the relevant period. Third,
to provide a theoretical framework to explain audit prices in a competitive
environment. The investigation of these three related subjects rested sub¬
stantially on a statistical analysis of data on audit fees. This data was
collected from a variety of sources including Datastream and FT Extel.
The major findings of the study are as follows. The analysis of the struc¬
ture of the audit services market revealed that there was a small increase
in concentration during the five year period. It was discovered that it was
caused by companies who switched from small audit firms to the [then] 'Big
Six' audit firms, together with newly listed companies which chose a 'Big
Six' auditor. It was these tendencies which accounted for the increase in the
market share achieved by the 'Big Six'. The result was that by 1995, 75% of
the fully listed and USM companies were audited by the 'Big Six'. Contrary
to expectations, the increased concentration observed in the supply of au¬
dit services did not appear to translate into oligopolistic pricing behaviour
among large audit firms. Over the five-year period studied, there was, on
average, a 9% decrease in inflation-adjusted audit fees. In accord with the
third objective of the dissertation, a theoretical framework was developed
which attempted to explain the differences in the prices charged by audit
firms according to factors such as audit quality, specialisation, and audit
firm size. Empirical tests were performed which give partial support to the
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Auditing is an area which has been subject to considerable public scrutiny
in recent years. Following business collapses such as Polly Peck Interna¬
tional and Maxwell Communications Corporation in the 1990s, there has
been growing concern about the effectiveness of auditing. Questions have
been raised over the issues of regulation of auditors and auditors' indepen¬
dence. Self-regulation of auditors, which has been the traditional form of
accounting regulation in the UK, has not been well received by the public.
The form of auditing regulation has always been a discussion topic. For
example, in November 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry issued
a consultation document entitled "A Framework of Independent Regulation
for the Accountancy Profession". Labour MP Austin Mitchell attacked the
framework which he characterised as "mafia regulating the mafia" (account-
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ingweb, 14 June 2000).
Public concern about the auditing profession is based on a number of
features of the profession. One of them is the market dominance by a few
large international firms. In the UK audit services market, Moizer and Tur-
ley (1987) identified nine dominant audit firms in 1972. Mergers between
audit firms resulted in domination by the so called "Big Eight". They
were, namely, Arthur Andersen ("AA"), Arthur Young ("AY"), Coopers
& Lybrand ("CL"), Deloitte, Haskins & Sells ("DHS"), Ernst & Whin-
ney ("EW"), KPMG, Price Waterhouse ("PW") and Touche Ross ("TR").
Then came the two mega mergers between AY and EW in 1989 and be¬
tween CL and DHS in 1990. The merged firms respectively were known as
Ernst & Young ("EY") and Coopers & Lybrand. As a result, the Big Eight
was reduced to the "Big Six". Further amalgamation in July 1998 between
Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse to form PricewaterhouseCoopers
("PwC") resulted in the domination of the "Big Five". There has also been
merger talk between EY and KPMG although this subsequently collapsed.
Pong (1998) noted that if the merger had gone ahead, the market share by
the four firms, AA, EY-KPMG, PwC and TR, would have increased to 76%
as measured by the total number of audits and 93% as measured by the total
audit fees. The implications for the audit services market of greater concen¬
tration include the creation and strengthening of an oligopolistic structure,
the resulting potential for price fixing arrangements, a reduction in consumer
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choice, an escalation in conflicts of interest for auditors and a potential fail¬
ure of self-regulation.
Some audit pricing characteristics, in addition to high market concen¬
tration for audit services, reinforce public concern about auditors' profes¬
sionalism. For example, it is generally considered that the big audit firms
charge higher audit prices than smaller audit firms. Critics of the profes¬
sion will see this audit fee premium as a monopoly rent for the large firms.
Low-balling is also a well known audit firm pricing practice. It refers to the
situation where an auditor tenders an initial fee which is below the exist¬
ing audit fee and also usually below projected cost in the hope of winning
an audit. The problem with this competitive pricing strategy is that the
auditor needs to generate enough income from the client in future years to
compensate for the initial costs of low-balling. When conflicts between the
auditor and the client arise, the auditor may compromise in order to secure
his/her future audit income. In recent years, it has come to the attention
of the public that a major source of income for the audit firms is from their
consultancy business. This again may result in an auditors' independence
being questioned. When conflict arises between auditors and their client in
the course of their audits, audit partners may succumb to pressure to secure
future consultancy services from the client.
This dissertation is designed to make an additional contribution to re¬
search studies on the supply of audit services. It investigates concentration
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in the audit market and some pricing behaviour during the period from 1991
to 1995. This period was chosen as a continuation of the work by Beattie and
Fearnley (1994), who looked at concentration changes from 1987 to 1991, a
period during which there was substantial increase in audit services market
concentration. However, the work extends beyond mere replication of the
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) research. In addition, it looks at some audit
pricing behaviour and at price changes during a period when there was an
increase in auditor concentration. Furthermore, it attempts to provide an
economic analysis of audit firm pricing strategies.
The layout of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 surveys research
studies on concentration in the audit services market and the pricing of audit
services. It highlights the contributions and weaknesses of the literature as
a basis for future research work. First, it considers research studies on
concentration changes in the UK and the reasons for these changes. Second,
it outlines an audit pricing process framework where existing audit pricing
literature could be properly placed. It then proposes directions for some
future research.
Chapter 31 analyses concentration changes during the period from 1991
to 1995. By analysing auditor concentration from 1991 to 1995 and exam¬
ining the impact of auditor changes on concentration, it extends the UK
work of both Beattie and Fearnley (1994) and Peel (1997). Auditor changes
1A version of Chapter 3 has been published as Pong (1999). See Appendix A.
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during this five year period are analysed into those involving a switch from
a small firm to a Big Six firm (and vice versa), and those involving a switch
within the Big Six. This analysis is of particular importance as evidence of
numerous client changes among the Big Six would throw some light on the
nature of competition in the already highly concentrated audit market. This
chapter then provides an analysis of auditor concentration within industry
groups. Restrictions in the choice of auditors within an industry group would
indicate a heightened potential conflict of interest for auditors who provide
both audit and management consultancy service to two or more compet¬
ing companies. In addition, it investigates the incidence of audit specialists
by applying a market share test within each sector. Specialist auditor has
become a dominant force in the supply of sectoral audits and as such has
a potential to extend considerable influence over audit pricing within that
sector. This chapter finally assesses the most commonly used methods of
concentration measures in prior studies. These methods all involve the se¬
lection of an audit market (population of companies), a measure of market
power, and a concentration index; factors which are often neglected in the
interpretation of the results of concentration studies.
Chapter 4 analyses some audit firms pricing characteristics and provides
some insight into their competitive behaviour. It investigates the change
in audit fees during the period from 1991 to 1995, a period of increasing
concentration in the UK audit market. Compared to earlier studies, the
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main contributions of this chapter are that first, it uses data which covers
a wide range of industry sectors and audit firms. This data sample is much
larger and more contemporary than that of previous studies. Second, it
analyses the changes made in audit fees by individual Big Six firms, medium
sized firms and small firms within the UK. This analysis gives visibility to
pricing behaviour at a micro level and so improves our understanding of the
audit market operation.
Chapter 5 develops and tests a theory of competitive behaviour by audi¬
tors which explains differences in audit prices among audit firms in terms of
audit quality, specialisation, auditor size and changes in the audit services
market concentration. The basis of the theory is that both the size of an
audit firm and its specialist knowledge of typologies of auditee are important
dimensions of competitiveness in the audit services market. Both of these
characteristics give supply side benefits to the audit firm through respec¬
tively economies of scale and uniqueness in service provision. An audit firm
with competitive advantage based on these characteristics can increase its
market dominance and/or can earn higher than normal industry economic
profits.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarising the re¬
search findings and results of Chapter 2 to Chapter 5, and by pointing to a
future research agenda for which this dissertation provides a foundation.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Yardley, Kauffman, Cairney and Albrecht (1992) surveyed research stud¬
ies on the supply of audit services. They structured their review around a
framework adopted from the industrial economics literature and based on
the premise that market structure affects company behaviour (for example,
pricing policy) which in turn affects company performance (Clark, 1985;
Martin, 1994; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Tirole, 1994). Although business
economists have substantially developed these ideas in an extensive litera¬
ture, its application to the audit services market has been very limited. The
reason for this is that most of the relevant audit firm information1 is not
available to researchers. Audit firms, which are traditionally partnerships2,
are not required by the law to produce publicly available financial state¬
ments. Thus, given limited data availability, empirical research on the audit
services market, as Yardley et al. (1992) identified, has related mainly to
Recently, some audit firms such as KPMG and Ernst & Young have made their audited
financial statements publicly available.
2The provision that audit firms can be incorporated under the Companies Act 1989
came into effect in October 1991.
16
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auditor concentration (audit market structure) and pricing of audit services
(audit firm behaviour) rather than to the performance of the suppliers (au¬
dit firms). The study of the relationships between market structure, firm
behaviour and firm performance, which have been the subject of many eco¬
nomic research studies, has been non-existent for the audit market. This
chapter will review the literature which does exist on audit markets. First,
it will cover the literature on audit market structure, that is, concentration
studies and second, it will review the literature on auditor pricing behaviour.
Finally, it will look at the literature on the link between these two aspects
of audit service supply.
2.1 Audit Market Structure
2.1.1 Audits of Listed Companies
Market structure is often depicted in a concentration measure. The degree
of supplier concentration of the audit services market is the extent to which
a relatively small number of audit firms account for a significant proportion
of the total audit work carried out. The level of supplier concentration is of
interest because it can be an important determinant of audit firms' market
behaviour - a theme in the literature of the theory of industrial organisation.
A high degree of concentration may result in an oligopolistic market where
supply is dominated by a small number of large firms. The larger firms
within an oligopolistic market may collude and this behaviour will result in
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a social welfare loss (Clark, 1985; Martin, 1994; Scherer and Ross, 1990).
An example of audit firm collusion was found in Italy. The Big Six3 were
fined a total of US$2.3m by the competition authority for anti-market prac¬
tices which occurred between 1991 and 1998. The firms admitted that they
consistently distorted competition in the Italian accounting services market,
in particular by "standardising and co-ordinating to win clients" (Financial
Times, 14/12/1998, Accountancy International, 03/2000).
Yardley et al. (1992) have summarised the many studies of auditor con¬
centration in the US (for example Burton and Roberts, 1967; Zeff and Fos-
sum, 1967; Rhode, Whitsell and Kelly, 1974; Schiff and Fried, 1976; Dopuch
and Simunic, 1980; Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher,
1982; Tomczyk and Read, 1989; Tonge and Wootton, 1991). In the UK,
studies of auditor concentration have been less common. The major studies
are Briston and Kedslie (1985), Moizer and Turley (1987, 1989), Beattie and
Fearnley (1994) and Peel (1997). Results of concentration studies in the UK
(Briston and Kedslie, 1985; Moizer and Turley, 1987; Beattie and Fearnley,
1994; Peel, 1997) are summarised in Table 2.1. The concentration measure
in Table 2.1 was based on audit firms with the largest number of clients. For
example, C6 showed the percentage of companies audited by the six largest
audit firms. Although the concentration ratios (C4,Ce,Cs and C20) in 1972
3Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Price Waterhouse
and Touche Ross.
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Table 2.1 Auditor Concentration 1968-1995
Study Sample Year c4 c6 C8 C20
Briston and Kedslie (1985) All domestic listed 1968 0.207 0.250 0.287 0.389
Moizer and Turley (1987) FT500 index 1972 0.369 0.442 0.501 N/A
Briston and Kedslie (1985) All domestic listed 1978 0.326 0.406 0.462 0.657
Moizer and Turley (1987) FT500 index 1982 0.421 0.539 0.626 N/A
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) All domestic listed (inc. USM) 1987 0.434 0.546 0.643 0.828
Beattie and Fearnley (1994) All domestic listed (inc. USM) 1991 0.589 0.723 0.793 0.900
Peel (1997) All domestic listed 1995 n/a 0.782 n/a n/a
Sources:
Beattie and Fearnley (1994, Table 1),
Moizer and Turley (1987, Tables 1 and 2) and
Peel (1997, Table 2)
Cn means percentage of companies audited by the n largest firms
were higher than those of 19784, the results indicated a pattern of increas¬
ing concentration from 1968 (Cq: 25%) to 1995 (Cq: 78%). The reduction
in the total number of auditors in the domestic listed companies audit ser¬
vices market, from 1109 in 1968 (Briston and Kedslie, 1985) to 166 in 1991
(Beattie and Fearnley, 1994), provided additional evidence of increasing au¬
ditor concentration. The studies have also reported that market leadership
was stable: membership of the groupings of the largest audit firms had not
changed (Table 2.2). These findings provided evidence that there was likely
to be increasing disparity in size between large and small firms (Pong and
Turley, 1997).
There were three factors underlying the increase in auditor concentra¬
tion: audit firm mergers, voluntary realignments and the auditor distribu-
4The observed higher concentration ratios were due to smaller sample sizes used in
Moizer and Turley (1987).
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Table 2.2 Top UK Audit Firms in 1972-1995
Ranking 1972 1982 1987 1991 1995
1 PW DHS PMM PMM KPMG
2 CL EW DHS CL CL
3 DHS PW PW EY EY
4 PMM PMM EW PW PW
5 EW CL AY TR TR
6 TM TM TR BH AA
7 TBM TR BH AA n/a
8 TR AYCM CL GT n/a
9 AYCM AA GT RR n/a
Sources:
Beattie and Fearnley (1994, Table 3),
Moizer and Turley (1987, Tables 1 and 2) and
Peel (1997, Table 2)
AA: Arthur Andersen; AY: Arthur Young; AYCM: Arthur Young McClelland Moore; BH: Binder
Hamlyn; CL: Coopers &: Lybrand; DHS: Deloitte, Haskins & Sells; EW: Ernst & Whinney; EY:
Ernst & Young; GT: Grant Thornton; PMM: Peat Marwick Mitchell; RR: Robson Rhodes; TBM:
Turquands Barton Mayhew; TM: Thomson McLintock; TR: Touche Ross
tion of newly listed companies (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994). Merging of
audit firms, in particular the mergers between the Big Eight firms, was the
main reason. Examples of mergers during the period included Peat Marwick
Mitchell's merger with Thompson McLintock in 1987, followed by Ernst &;
Whinney with Arthur Young in 1989. In 1990, Coopers and Lybrand merged
with Deloitte Haskins &; Sells, Kidsons with Hodgson Impey, and Spicer &
Oppenheim with Touche Ross (Boys, 1989a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l, 1990).
Although auditor switching was another reason for the increase in auditor
concentration, it occured infrequently and was not therefore a major factor.
Pong and Whittington (1994) noted that during the ten year period from
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1981 to 1988, on average, the probability of any audit in any year being
in the hands of a new auditor was only slightly over 2%. For the years
from 1988 to 1991, the frequency of auditor switching increased slightly and
ranged from 3.8% to 6.1% (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994). There was evidence,
that on balance, more companies switched from hiring a small audit firm to
hiring a Big Six firm than vice versa.
Finally, the distribution of audits of newly listed companies tended to
favour the Big Six. Indeed, there was some evidence which suggested that
the Big Six monopolise new listings:
the big six firms acts as accountants to 85% of the new issues on the
London Stock Market .. the four leading firms - KPMG, Coopers &
Lybrand, Ernst & Young, and Price Waterhouse - alone accounted
for over two-thirds of the 180 companies that gained a listing in 1994
(Accountancy Age 02/03/95).
Moizer (1997, 68-69) noted two economic theories which could explain
why companies making an initial pubic offering would choose a Big Six
auditor:
According to signalling theory, when companies make IPOs [initial
public offerings], the issuer has private information about the com¬
pany's future prospect that is unavailable to prospective investors. One
way that entrepreneurs can signal their private information about fu¬
ture earnings is their choice of auditors ... The monitoring costs theory
is based on the limited information available to prospective investors
to assess the validity of the entrepreneur's claims. Since IPOs tend to
be made by small companies with limited operating histories, investors
must rely heavily on the content of the entrepreneur's self-disclosures
in order to evaluate the performance and future prospects of the com¬
pany. The monitoring costs theory implies that different levels of audit
quality would be demanded by companies depending on their owner¬
ship structure and financial leverage. When agency costs are high,
management and the underwriters are likely to desire a higher quality
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audit in order to add more credibility to the financial statements and
to the prospectus. Financial statement credibility, which is enhanced
by association with a reputable auditor, reduces monitoring costs.
The change in auditor concentration has led to a situation where "audit
services have reached the limit of a tight oligopoly, which is characterised by
few rivals, stable market shares and medium-to-high entry barriers" (Beattie
and Fearnley, 1994, 308). In 1995, the Big Six controlled more than nine
out of ten of the top 500 company audits (Accountancy Age 02/02/1995).
Although there was clear evidence of increasing audit market concentration,
it was less clear whether the increased market concentration had any effect
on the nature of competition in the audit services market. For example, two
reports commissioned by the European Commission have both concluded
that audit service markets in Europe were not anti-competitive and that
audit firms were not behaving in a way which was contrary to the public
interest, despite the high market shares of individual suppliers (NERA (Na¬
tional Economic Research Associate), 1992; Buijink, Maijoor, Meuwissen
and van Wittelootstujn, 1996).
2.1.2 Industry and City Markets
In addition to audits of quoted companies, Peel (1997) examined auditor
concentration ratios across the unquoted and private companies. He noted
that although some of the auditor rankings varied across the three different
pic sub-markets (quoted, unquoted and private), the relative rankings in
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relation to the whole pic (quoted and unquoted) and private pic sub-markets
was identical - that was, KPMG, followed by Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst &
Young, Price Waterhouse, Touche Ross and Arthur Andersen. Company
size was found to be a key determinant of supplier concentration. Peel
(1997) suggested that the observed variations in Big Six market shares across
different pic sub-markets and size ranges might be indicative of product
differentiation and audit specialisation.
Moizer and Turley (1989) analysed changes in auditor concentration ra¬
tios for different client industries from 1972 to 1982. They found that the
market share held by the largest four audit firms varied across different
client industries. For example, in 1982, the largest four audit firms in the oil
industry sector had complete market domination in the provision of audit
services. However, the largest four audit firms in the building and con¬
struction sector had only a 45% market share. Variations of auditor con¬
centration across different client industries could suggest the existence of
audit specialists within industries. Craswell et al. (1995) analysed auditor
industry specialisations for all 23 Australian Stock Exchange industry clas¬
sifications. They determined auditor specialisation by first considering the
overall number of companies - a minimum of 30 companies per industry
was a precondition for industry specialisation. Then, a threshold of 10%
of market share based on either the number of clients in the industry or
the percentage of total audit fees in the industry was required in the indus-
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 24
tries for a specific accounting firm to be designated an industry specialist.
Based on their definitions of audit specialist, they identified, for example,
that Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand and Peat Marwick were specialists
in gold mining audits; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells and Price Waterhouse in
building materials and Touche Ross in investment and financial services.
Francis, Stokes and Anderson (1999) investigated a geographical variant
of market leadership. They found that, in Australia, the national audit mar¬
ket leader might not be the city-specific market leader. They demonstrated
that a city-level unit of analysis was useful by re-examining the 1989 merg¬
ers creating Ernst &; Young and Deloitte Touche. They concluded that the
primary effect of the Ernst & Young merger was to increase market shares in
cities in which the pre-merger firms (Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young)
already had significant market shares. This resulted in an increase in the
number of cities in which the merged firm achieved top ranking. In contrast,
the primary effect of the Deloitte Touche merger (between Deloitte, Haskins
& Sells and Touche Ross) was an expansion of the number of city-level mar¬
kets in which the merged firm had significant (though not leading) market
shares.
2.1.3 Methodological Issues in Measuring Concentration
Yardley et al. (1992) identified several limitations in previous US studies.
First, there was a definitional problem concerning the scope of the audit
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services market. For example, some studies only considered the top 500
industrial companies listed in the Fortune Directory (Dopuch and Simunic,
1980) while others used all companies listed on the New York Stock Ex¬
change (Tonge and Wootton, 1991). There was also a similar definitional
problem in relation to industrial classifications. Second, there was the dif¬
ficulty of identifying and formulating surrogates for auditor size. Lacking
audit fees information in the U.S., total assets or sales of auditees were used
to measure size of auditors. Third, early studies were unable to disaggre¬
gate group audit fees into amounts paid to holding company auditors and
subsidiary company auditors. Fourth, the choice of a concentration index
was not explained.
The definitional problem concerning the audit services market has also
been relevant to various studies in the UK. Measuring the concentration
of the audit services market first requires a definition of the market. For
example, organisations may purchase audit services voluntarily or because
of a statutory requirement and, strictly speaking, when calculating auditor
concentration, both types of audit should be included. However, informa¬
tion for voluntary audits is not publicly available. Researchers might thus
have to limit the study of auditor concentration to cover only the supply
of statutory audits to public listed companies. In this regard, Beattie and
Fearnley (1994) included all the fully listed and USM companies. Some
researchers narrowed the market size further by selecting only a limited
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number of largest listed companies. For example, Moizer and Turley (1989)
used the FT500. Limitations of the market in this way introduces some arbi¬
trariness to the research. Recently, however, Peel (1997) examined auditor
concentration ratios across all corporate sub-markets, that is, the quoted
and unquoted pics, and private companies. Thus the major UK studies are
based on different market delineation. When comparing their results, this
difference must be taken into account.
The second and fourth of Yardley et al. (1992)'s limitations were dis¬
cussed by Moizer and Turley (1987). In the case of the former, they observed
that the main measures used to calculate the level of concentration in the
past have been the number of audits (Briston and Kedslie, 1985; Beattie and
Fearnley, 1994) and the level of audit fees (Moizer and Turley, 1989). Audit
fee income was considered by them to be the most appropriate measure of
the size of the market as this represents a good measure of the output of the
auditor. Since larger companies would tend to have larger fees, a measure
based on number of audits will understate the real value of the firms' market
shares (Moizer and Turley, 1987). A measure based on the number of audits
does, however, facilitate analysis of shifts in concentration due to auditor
changes and it is also consistent with the regulatory regime developed by
the three Chartered Institutes5, which focuses on the absolute number of
listed clients of each audit firm (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994).
5The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, The Institute of Char¬
tered Accountants in Ireland and The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 27
Moizer and Turley (1989) also looked at the effects of different concen¬
tration indices. They measured auditor concentration in terms of market
share by the largest firms (Cn) and by the Herfindahl index {H)\
n
E Si
Cn = jr- (2.1)
k
E sf
H = 4 (2.2)
(E^)2
i
where k is the total number of audit firms in the market, n is the number
of largest firms and Si is the size of audit firm i.
Concentration index Cn measures market share by the largest n firms.
Since a concentration index aims to summarise the number and size distri¬
bution of competitors within an industry, H is better than Cn, as Cn only
takes into account market share by the n largest firms and thus ignores the
rest of the firms in the market. In addition, there are some further desir¬
able properties of a concentration index6. Although the Herfindahl index
satisfies the requirements of all these desirable properties while Cn does not,
Cn is still widely used because it is simple to calculate and its meaning is
easy to understand. However, many studies have found these alternative
concentration measures to be highly correlated.
6See Chakravarty (1995), Chapter 1.
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2.2 Pricing of Audit Services
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In 1980, the Journal of Accounting Research published a seminar article en¬
titled "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" by Professor
Dan Simunic. This article has been a stimulus for a stream of international
academic research in the area including Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes
(1986), Craswellet al. (1995) in Australia; Firth (1985) in New Zealand; Tay¬
lor and Baker (1978), Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993), Pong and Whit-
tington (1994), Gregory and Collier (1996) in the UK; Palmrose (1986a,b),
Francis and Simon (1987), Simon and Francis (1988) and Gist (1992) in the
US. Research on the topic of pricing has examined a variety of issues includ¬
ing: the competitiveness of the audit services market; economies of scale of
the big accountancy firms; product differentiation and audit specialisation
of audit firms; and the practice of low-balling by firms to solicit new clients.
Before reviewing the literature on pricing of audit services, an attempt
is first made to describe a process of audit pricing. Such a process is not
found in the literature, but is a useful way to locate and categorise the
relevant literature and to provide insights into areas of potential research.
This section then proceeds to summarise the specific issues arising from the
pricing of audit services. These comprise audit fee models, large audit firm
premium, non-audit fees and low-balling.
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2.2.1 The Pricing Process
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This section attempts to describe the process of pricing of audit services.
Through the exercise of locating previous research studies within the process,
it highlights areas of neglected research. Casual empiricism suggests that
the setting of an audit price can be conveniently divided into three processes
(Figure 2.1): technical, charging and recovery.
Technical Process
An auditor determines the amount of required audit work according to the
characteristics of the auditee, for example, the size, complexity and risk of
the auditee. The larger the size and complexity of an auditee, the higher
the amount of audit work required (although clearly there will be economies
of scale for larger clients). Similarly, if a company business is risky, the
auditor will need to seek additional assurance before forming an opinion on
the auditee's financial statements (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Simon, 1987;
Chan et al., 1993; Cullinan, 1997).
The amount of audit work required depends on the extent of help that
an auditor can get from an auditee. An auditee which has established an
internal audit department and/or audit committee may help to reduce the
amount of audit work carried out by the external auditors. For example, an
internal audit department of an auditee may help the auditor by providing
useful breakdowns and schedules of transactions. This reduces the amount
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Figure 2.1: The Audit Pricing Process
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of audit effort required by the auditor. In other words, to a certain extent,
external audit work can be substituted by internal audit work7. Another
effect on the amount of audit work required is the setting up of audit com¬
mittees within an auditee. Audit committees are given the responsibility for
reviewing the financial statements and the accounting principles and prac¬
tices underlying them, liaising with the external and internal auditors, and
reviewing the effectiveness of internal controls. For the external auditors,
reporting to an audit committee will enhance the external auditors' inde¬
pendence since the external auditors can communicate directly with those
directors who are not actively engaged in the management of a company
(Collier, 1997). Audit committees are usually composed of non-executive
directors in addition to executive directors. Unlike the executive directors,
the non-executive directors are not remunerated on the basis of the perfor¬
mance of the company and do not have the same incentive as the executive
directors to mislead shareholders by inflating financial performance8.
7If the price of external audit decreases, an auditee may purchase more external audit
services to replace internal audit staff, and vice versa (Simunic, 1980).
8However, it can be argued that audit committees would increase the amount of audit
fees paid by companies. This is because audit committees are appointed by shareholders
to monitor the performance of the directors. One monitoring measure is to ensure that
the financial statements are prepared from a sound accounting system. Audit committees
may prefer more vigorous checks on the system and may therefore, purchase additional
audit work from their auditors. This extra demand on audit services lead to higher fees
paid to auditors. This issue is testable empirically.
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Charging Process
The work will then be allocated to staff of appropriate experience. Com¬
monly among audit firms, staff are categorised into partners, managers,
seniors and juniors (O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein, 1994). Different firms may
use a different mix of staff for the same job because of differences in audit
methods and techniques. Within firms, a change in audit method over time
may also result in a change in the use of staff mix. In practice, the staff
categories used may well depend on staff availability at the time of audit.
The translation of the amount of audit work into hours of work is com¬
plicated. Often, a staff time budget is set in the audit planning stage when
the audit partner or manager has some idea of the amount of fees to be
received for the job9.
Normally, each category of staff charges the client at a pre-determined
hourly rate. This will include allowances for overhead costs and profit mar¬
gins. There has been suggestion that in the UK, the chargeable rate of a
staff member is approximately 2 times of the cost of that staff member10.
Not much is known about the pricing objectives of audit firms and how the
chargeable rates are determined11. However, it is reasonable to assume that
9Lower fees as a result of the competitive pressure in the audit services market may
sometimes result in an unreasonable budget which may threaten audit quality (Kelley and
Margheim, 1990; Otley and Pierce, 1996).
10Based on a conversation with Professor Ian Percy, University of Aberdeen and chair¬
man of the Accounts Commission in Scotland (former senior partner of Grant Thornton
and president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland).
nPricing objectives in British manufacturing industry can be found in Shipley (1981).
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the chargeable rate is likely to be decided by partners who will take into
account factors additional to the cost of staff like the objectives of the firm,
for example, profit maximisation, the level of non-direct labour costs and
the rates of competitors.
Recovery Process
An auditor will review actual client charges in comparison with the cost
of the total staff time spent on the job. The amount of this cost actually
recovered depends on a number of factors. Sometimes, a fixed fee has been
agreed in advance during a competitive bid. At times, an auditor may charge
a lower than cost fee in order gain market share. This includes strategic entry
to new market niches. Such behaviour is known as low-balling (DeAngelo,
1981; Simon and Francis, 1988; Magee and Tseng, 1990). The amount of
recovery may also depend on the relationship of the auditor with the auditee;
the qualities of the particular engagement partner such as negotiating skills,
ability to sell and build a relationship with the auditee; and the ability of
the auditee to pay. Finally, there have been allegations that auditors may
consider charging a lower price in the expectation of higher consultancy fee
income from the same client. The effect of consultancy services on audit fee
income has been studied in Simunic (1980), Palmrose (1986b) and Ezzamel,
Gwilliam and Holland (1996). These research studies are summarised in
Section 2.2.5 (page 46).
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Although there are several important steps in the pricing process, tra¬
ditionally, studies have looked at the pricing of auditing services as a single
process. Most investigate the relationship between the auditee / auditor
characteristics and recovered audit fees. More recently, however, researchers
in the US have benefitted from the help of some audit firms which have pro¬
vided data on staff time spent on audit assignments (Davis, Ricchiute and
Trompeter, 1993; O'Keefe et al., 1994). These studies provide insights into
the technical process of pricing by giving visibility to the amount of audit
work for any given set of auditee characteristics.
The rest of this chapter reviews the specific issues which have been
addressed in the audit fee pricing literature: audit fee models, Big Eight
premium (technical process), non-audit services and low-balling (recovery
process).
2.2.2 Audit Fee Models
Assuming that the auditee and auditor were jointly and severally liable to
financial statement users for losses attributable to defects in the audited fi¬
nancial statements, Simunic (1980) argued that in a competitive market, an
auditor would charge a fee which equals to the total costs of producing the
audit. The total costs were composed of two parts: the actual costs of au¬
dit work and the auditors' share of potential losses by users attributable to
defects in the audited financial statements. Simunic hypothesised that po-
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tential losses could be proxied by size and complexity of the auditee and that
the auditors' sharing ratio of losses could be surrogated by the profitability
of the auditee. Subsequent studies, e.g. Chan et al. (1993), attempted to
identify other proxies for the potential losses and the sharing ratio, but the
classification of the proxies into the two categories was not specified.
A commonly used audit fee model has the following basic form:
k I
log Fi = a + SSi + PjCij + ^2 @jAi,j + ei (2-3)
1=1 j=k+1
where Fi is the amount audit fees paid by company i
Si is the size of company i
Cij is characteristic j of company i
Aij is characteristic j of company i's auditor and audit engagement
a is a constant
(3j are coefficients
ei is the error term
While variable St is a measure of the size characteristic of a company,
variables Cij are measures of the complexity and risk dimensions of a com¬
pany so far as the auditor is concerned. It is believed that an increase in the
size, complexity or risk of a company will lead to an increase in the amount
of audit work and therefore to an increase in audit fees. These auditee
characteristics are normally proxied by a variety of accounting variables.
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Commonly used proxies include total assets for size; number of subsidiaries,
stock to total assets and debtors to total assets for complexity; and prof¬
itability for risk. Reasons for using the proxies can be found in Chan et al.
(1993) which is based on interviews with partners in four Big Eight firms.
Nevertheless, some proxies can be ambiguous, for example, profitability is
often used to proxy risk of a company, but it might also be a surrogate for
the willingness of a company to pay audit fees and risk may, on occasion, be
negatively correlated with profitability where poor performance threatens
survival.
Variables Aij proxy the characteristics of a company auditor and the
particular audit engagement. They are used especially for the detection of
specific dimensions of the auditor. For example, a Big Six variable to see
whether the Big Six charge a premium, a specialist variable to see whether
audit specialists charge higher fees and a change of auditors to see whether
there is price cut in the initial engagement.
The form of model used is of interest. Simunic (1980) used asset deflated
audit fees as the dependent variable, and thus implicitly assumed interaction
between size and other independent variables:
k I
Fi = SH<* + E + E &Aj) (2.4)
j=1 j=k-f-1
Using ordinary least squares, Simunic (1980) first measured 5 by regress¬
ing logF; against log5i. Then, he used the asset deflated audit fees as the
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dependent variable and estimated the a and /3s.
Subsequent studies including Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes (1986),
Palmrose (1986a), Chan et al. (1993) etc, used a logarithm form (the 'loga¬
rithm form') directly:
k I
(a"t X) A? J+ X) 0jAi,j)
Ft = Sfexp J=1 t=*+i (2.5)
Pong and Whittington (1994) made two changes to the model: first,
instead of using an exponential form, they preferred a quadratic equation
involving Si and Sf. Compared to the logarithm model, they considered
that the quadratic model provided model flexibility and extracted more in¬
formation from the data. In addition, they proposed that interaction should
be allowed for all variables (the 'quadratic interaction model'). O'Keefe
et al. (1994) also suggested that previous models were not reasonable be¬
cause the elasticity of fees12 with respect to size should change with changes




Fi = expa Si j=1 j=k+1 (2.6)
However, they concluded that their empirical results were not sensitive
to the choice of functional form used.
12In O'Keefe et al. (1994), number of audit hours was used as the dependent variable.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 38
Copley, Gaver and Gaver (1994, 1995) argued that a simultaneous equa¬
tion model should be used because ignoring the simultaneous endogeneity of
audit fees and audit attributes engenders problems of parameter identifica¬
tion and estimation bias, which prevents meaningful interpretation of vari¬
able coefficients (the 'simultaneous equation model'). Copley et al. (1995)
considered the demand for auditor reputation as a function of exogenous
client characteristics and marginal audit fees. They considered that the
price (marginal fees) at which an audit firm is willing to supply is a function
of exogenous client and audit firm characteristics, and auditor reputation13.
These studies suggest a need to document the results obtained by each of
the four methods: the logarithm model, the quadratic interaction model, the
logarithm interaction model and the simultaneous model. When the models
are applied to the same set of data, comparison would become possible. This
has never been explicitly disclosed in publications although O'Keefe et al.
(1994) mentioned that the results of their study were not sensitive to the
choice of model used. They did not, however, present the results of their
sensitivity analysis. If O'Keefe et al. (1994)'s claim is generally held then
the choice of model is unimportant and a model which appeals to intuition
is perhaps the best choice.
Since different industry characteristics might have impact on audit prices,
13Auditor reputation is not observable and Copley et al. (1995) suggested two methods
to construct auditor reputation - one based on the number of clients and the other is based
on classification of firms into Big Six and non-Big Six. However, marginal fees is also not
observable and they arbitrarily set fees as a function of auditor reputation and client size.
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it has been suggested that analysing audit fee models for specific industries
could provide a richer understanding of the determinants of audit fees (Cul-
linan, 1997). Finally, models looking at the change in fees over time should
also deserve attention. Using a derivative form of the logarithm model, Ma-
her, Tiessen, Colson and Broman (1992) looked at changes in fees. Unlike
the logarithm model which explains about 80% of the variance of the data,
the derivative form has an adjusted R-square of 0.31 only. The determinants
of fee change are likely to be complex and thus not readily susceptible to
general, aggregate study. This is highlighted by Hay and Morris (1991, 171)
who noted that "often overlooked is the fact that the factors determining the
level at which price is set and the factors determining whether and by how
much it will be altered may be very different, thus requiring different types
of analysis and generating different pictures of how prices are determined".
2.2.3 Big Six Premium
Empirical study of product differentiation in the audit services market can be
difficult because the quality of an audit is not observable. Studies beginning
in the 1980s have therfore attempted to find out indirectly about the nature
and degree of product differentiation between the Big Eight (then Big Six
and now Big Five) and non-Big Eight. These studies include Simunic (1980),
Francis (1984), Palmrose (1986a), Francis and Stokes (1986), Francis and
Simon (1987) among others. All the studies incorporated a dummy variable
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into an audit fee model to distinguish Big Eight and non-Big Eight. Moizer
(1997, 67-68) suggested that a Big Eight premium could be justified by
the following considerations: a higher quality Big Eight audit; a Big Eight
name attached to the financial statements; a higher chance of getting claims
fully settled from Big Eight if the audit goes wrong; and an oligopoly price
charged by the Big Eight.
Simunic (1980) tested the competitiveness of the audit services market
and found that the big audit firms did not charge fees higher than that of
small audit firms. He concluded that the hypothesis that price competition
prevails throughout the market for audits of publicly held companies could
not be rejected.
Three assumptions were made in Simunic (1980) to analyse competition,
product differentiation and economies of scale in the large auditee market.
First, the small auditees market was competitive. Second, if economies of
scale existed, it would be applicable to all production, not just related to
specific market segments. Third, product differentiation, if it existed, should
be observable in both large and small auditee markets. Table 2.3 summarises
the analytical framework of Simunic (1980).
However, Francis and Stokes (1986) noted that Simunic's analytical
framework suffered from the fact that product differentiation, as reflected
by higher Big Eight prices, may be confounded by the presence of Big Eight
economies of scale (e.g. scenarios [3], [6], and [9]) or of diseconomies of scale
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Table 2.3 Simunic (1980) Framework
Large auditees Small Auditees
B8 > B8 B8 = B8 B8 < B8
B 8 > B8 [l]C,Pa [2]Mft [3]M,SC
B8 = B8 [4]C,P,Dd [5]Ce [6]M,SC
B8 < B8 [7]C,P,Dd [8]C,D/ [9]C,S®
Sources: reproduced from Francis and Stokes (1986, Table 1)
B8 = Big Eight audit prices
B8 = non-Big Eight audit prices
C = competitive pricing among large auditees
M = monopolistic pricing for large auditees
P = Big Eight product differentiation
S = Big Eight economies of scale
D = non-Big Eight dis-economies of scale
"B8 > B8 in both market segments indicates that pricing is competitive throughout
the market, and because B8 > B8, the higher price indicates B8 product differentiation
throughout the market.
'since prices are the same in the small market segment and B8 > B8 in the large
segment, B8 monopolistic pricing exists in the large segment of the market.
cjB8 < B8 in the small segment indicates that scale economies exist for large producers
throughout the market, but because B8 > B8 in the large segment, B8 monopolistic
pricing exists in the large segment.
dB8 > B8 in the small segment indicates B8 product differentiation throughout the
market, but since B8 < B8 in the large segment, the B8 have diseconomies of scale (higher
prices) in the large segment.
eB8 = B8 in both market segments indicates a competitive structure with no product
differentiation or scale economies.
fB8 = B8 in the small segment indicates competition throughout the market and
B8 < B8 in the large segment indicates the B8 have diseconomies of scale (higher prices)
in the large segment.
gB8 < B8 both segments indicates competitive pricing throughout the market and
because B8 < B8 scale economies favour large producers throughout the market.
for non-Big Eight firms in the audits of large auditees (e.g. scenarios [4],
[7], and [8]) (Francis and Stokes, 1986, 384). Other assumptions made by
Simunic (1980) were also subject to challenge. For example, the definition of
a large auditee market was questioned. Also, if two auditee markets existed,
why could economies of scale and product differentiation exist in one market
but not in the other.
Using Australian companies' data, Francis (1984) found that the Big
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Eight had significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. The
result held for both large and small auditee markets. Francis and Stokes
(1986) attempted to reconcile the differences between Simunic (1980) and
Francis (1984). They suggested that the difference in definitions of small
and large auditees might explain the differences in the results of the two
studies. They therefore used the largest 96 and smallest 96 publicly traded
non-finance companies to represent respectively the large and small auditee
markets. The study reported that although there was a Big Eight premium
for the small auditees sample, the premium was not found in the large
auditees sample. Similarly, Palmrose (1986a) reported that there was a
Big Eight premium for the small auditees but not for the large auditees.
Francis and Simon (1987) further investigated the small auditee market and
reported that a Big Eight premium existed and that the premium existed
with respect to both second-tier national firms and local/regional firms.
To conclude, results in the US have been mixed. In the UK, Chan
et al. (1993), Pong and Whittington (1994) and Gregory and Collier (1996)
reported the existence of a Big Eight premium, but no differentiation was
made between large and small auditees in these studies. In reviewing the
international audit firm premium in twelve countries, Moizer (1997) noted
that a top tier fee premium of between 16% and 37% existed. The relevant
research studies in various countries including Australia, the UK and the
US are summarised in Table 2.4.
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A review of research on the Big Six premium suggests at least two pos¬
sible research extensions. First, studies which investigate competitiveness
of the audit services market rely on an unscientific division of the large and
small auditees markets, mostly based on total assets or turnover of the audi-
tees. The division is important because interpretation of results is based on
the assumption that the small auditees market is competitive. However, it is
apparent that the audit market for companies below a certain size may not
necessarily be competitive. This market can still be dominated by a group
of large firms. One neglected method of division is the use of concentration
indices which are often employed in business and economics studies of mar¬
ket competitiveness. Unless there is evidence that the defined small audit
market is not highly concentrated, the assumption that it is competitive is
of some dubiety. Second, another aspect of audit premium studies is their
concentration on the price difference between the Big Six and the non-Big
Six. The categorisation of firms in the audit market deserves more attention
because the Big Six have dominated the audit market of listed companies.
There might be audit pricing variations among the Big Six. There has also
been some casual empirical observation that they do charge fees differently.
For example, Accountancy Age (17/11/94) noted that Savoy Hotel paid
Coopers & Lybrand audit fees of £211,000 when City Centre Restaurants
only paid Ernst & Young £52,000, when their level of sales was very similar.
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2.2.4 Industry Audit Specialists
Palmrose (1986a) and Craswell et al. (1995) examined the Big Eight pre¬
mium and suggested that it was due to industry specialisation in addition
to the influence of the Big Eight brand name. Both studies assumed that an
auditor was a specialist in an industry if the auditor had achieved a certain
market share in that industry. The market share in Palmrose (1986a) was
based on total turnover of the clients of the auditor, while the market share
in Craswell et al. (1995) was based on either the number of clients in the
industry or the percentage of total audit fee income in the industry.
Palmrose (1986a) introduced the idea of the audit specialist into the
audit fee model. Her study showed that specialist auditors did not charge
higher fees than non-specialist auditors. Craswell et al. (1995) studied brand
name reputation and industry specialisation by the Big Eight auditors. They
tested, first, that specialist Big Eight auditors would have higher audit fees
than non-specialist Big Eight auditors and second, that Big Eight auditors
would have higher audit fees than non-Big Eight auditors. They showed
that, on average, industry specialist Big Eight auditors earned a 34% pre¬
mium over non-specialist Big Eight auditors, and that the Big Eight brand
name premium over non-Big Eight auditors averaged around 30%.
Palmrose (1986a), Simunic (1980) and Gist (1992) reported a negative
relationship between regulated industries and fees. Gist (1992) argued that
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the observed results might be due to scale economies and/or specialisation
effects which accrue to audit firms in dealing with the regulatory complexi¬
ties faced by clients14.
2.2.5 Consultancy Services
Consultancy services income represents a substantial proportion of the to¬
tal income of an accountancy firm. Ezzamel et al. (1996) reported that
income earned by audit firms from non-audit work for quoted clients aver¬
aged nearly 90% of the levels of audit fee earnings in 1992/93. Accountancy
Age (08/06/1995) noted that in 1994/95, five of the Big Six had tax and
consultancy fee income higher than audit and accounting fee income. This
raises one potential problem. Auditors' independence may be compromised
for economic returns as auditors may concede to disagreements in order that
they can continue to provide consultancy services to the client. This is un¬
desirable as it can reduce the quality of auditing. Thus, there has been a
suggestion that auditors should not provide both auditing and consultancy
services to a client. The counter argument is that provision of both services
increases audit efficiency. For example, information acquired from consul¬
tancy services may enhance the production efficiency of an audit. However,
if the resulting cost savings are retained in whole, or in part, by the auditor
they benefit from the accrual of an economic rent, this may create incentives
14However, he also argued that since regulation demanded greater auditor expertise,
one would expect that auditors would price in order to recover their investment incurred
in generating that expertise. Therefore, a positive relationship should be observed.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 47
for the auditor to compromise with its client (Simunic, 1984).
Simunic (1984) argued that companies chose a mix of audit services and
a standard for their internal control to produce financial statements of good
quality and do so to minimise the overall cost. Given the same quality
of financial statements, the additional purchase of audit services reduces
the amount spent on maintaining the standard of internal controls, and
vice versa. His study reported that the purchase of management advisory
services from the auditor is associated with a significant increase in the
audit fees. He explained that this result would arise if the production of
auditing generated knowledge useful for management advisory services or
if the production of such services reduced the marginal cost of auditing
and audit demand was relatively elastic. Simon (1985) and Ezzamel et al.
(1996) reported similar results. Palmrose (1986b) also provided evidence of
a positive relationship between fees for audit services and non-audit services.
However, this relationship was observed whether the non-audit services are
supplied by the incumbent auditing firm or by another public accounting
firm. She suggested that non-audit services purchasers might require more
audit effort, and results of Davis et al. (1993) were consistent with the
suggestion.
Beck, Frecka and Solomon (1988, 62) noted that market participants
were aware of the incentive effects associated with management advisory
services involvement on auditors' independence. The signalling value of the
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 48
audit would thus be attenuated and there would be an increase in agency-
cost. Recognising this problem, audit committees (managers) will restrict
auditors' management advisory services involvement in order to reduce the
agency costs that would be imposed upon the firm. Whether there has
been a decrease in management advisory services by auditors can be tested
empirically in the UK. Companies are now required by law to disclose the
amount of consultancy fees paid to their auditors. This provides a further
research opportunity.
2.2.6 Price cutting in initial audits
Low balling occurs when an auditor tenders an initial fee which is below
projected cost in the hope of winning an audit. This is believed to prejudice
auditor independence, since the auditor needs to retain the audit for several
years to recover the full costs incurred in the setting up and conducting the
audit under a low balling regime. However, it is not immediately obvious
that, having incurred an initial fixed cost, the auditor should be in a worse
competitive situation than in the absence of such costs, since any competitor
for the audit would incur similar costs.
Medium sized audit firms have been consistent critics of the Big 6 prac¬
tice of low balling. Tim Richmond of Pannell Kerr Forster said that "our
clients regularly receive phone calls from other firms willing to do the work
for a lot less than we do" (quoted in Financial Times 16/05/91), and Jim
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Gemmell of Clark Whitehill Association said that "without a doubt low
balling does exist, although it is marginally better than it was" (quoted in
Accountancy Age 09/11/95). BDO Stoy Hayward's loss of Royal Automo¬
bile Club to Price Waterhouse and the subsequent row prompted an inquiry
by the ICAEW. A working party was set up and headed by an independent
outsider, Miss Elizabeth Llewellyn-Smith, principal of St. Hilda's College,
Oxford. It found no evidence at all that large audit clients were damaged
by competitive pricing (Financial Times 09/11/95). However, John Wosner
of Pannell Kerr Forster disagreed and considered that "given the timescale
the working party could not explore the question of the independence of
the audit and the provision of other services" (quoted in Accountancy Age
09/11/95).
The results of Llewellyn-Smith were consistent with those of DeAngelo
(1981) who demonstrated that low balling did not impair independence,
rather it was a competitive response to the expectation of future quasi-
rents to incumbent auditors. DeAngelo (1981) maintained that there was an
inherent auditor independence problem that arose from audit start-up costs
which gave incumbent auditors a technological advantage over competitors.
The auditee also needed to incur cost if it switched to another auditor. The
technological advantage of the auditor and the switching costs of the auditee
provided opportunity for the auditor to earn future quasi-rents. The future
quasi-rents, in turn, induced low balling. One problem inherent in this
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situation was that new auditors, once hired, had an incentive to retain their
incumbency in order to realise future quasi-rents and this might lessen their
independence. However, based on this argument, low balling for the initial
audit can be seen to represent a competitive response to future rents accruing
to incumbents. Low balling did not cause future rents to occur. Magee
and Tseng (1990) also showed that the value of incumbency to an auditor
presented a threat to independence only under limited circumstances.
However, theoretical arguments based on a psychological perspective can
be advanced to show that the auditor might feel unduly dependent on the
support of the management of the auditee firm where low balling has been
used to obtain an audit. Simon and Francis (1988) stated that
"in the audit context of price cutting, a considerable investment is
made to obtain a new client. So the prior decision to discount the
audit fee could motivate the auditor's desire to not lose the client, even
in the presence of serious auditor-client disagreements. This desire to
not lose the new client, because of the prior investment commitment
[although it is a sunk cost and should not be relevant], could lead
to an additional auditor independence problem during the period of
investment recovery, over and above normal independence problems."
Francis (1984) tested for price cutting behaviour by audit firms in the
first year of audit engagement. He found no evidence of such behaviour.
However, in contrast, Francis and Simon (1987) did find that initial engage¬
ments were priced significantly lower than continuing engagements. Further
investigation in Simon and Francis (1988) demonstrated the existence of a
significant fee reduction in the initial engagement year. It averaged 24% of
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normal fee levels for ongoing engagements. An average fee reduction of 15%
for each of the next two years was also evident, but by the fourth year of
the new auditor, the fee had increased to normal levels of continuing en¬
gagements. Gregory and Collier (1996) found that within a period of three
years from a change of auditor, there was a significant audit fee reduction
(22%). Whilst some fee reduction (9%) was also observed for four to five
years after the change, the results were not statistically different from zero
and therefore, were consistent with the results of Simon and Francis (1988).
Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) and Pong and Whittington (1994) also iden¬
tified a tendency for new auditors to charge less, on average, than incumbent
auditors.
Craswell and Francis (1999) noted there were competing theories of ini¬
tial engagement audit pricing. DeAngelo (1981) predicted that initial en¬
gagement discounts in all fee setting decisions would occur while Dye (1991)
specifically predicted that discounting would not occur in settings where
audit fees were publicly disclosed. Results of Craswell and Francis (1999)
supported Dye's argument. They found no fee discounting in Australia,
where audit fees were publicly disclosed, except when the initial engagement
was an upgrade in audit quality from non-Big Eight to Big Eight auditor.
They argued that the observed initial audit fee discount for upgrades to Big
Eight auditors was consistent with the economic theory of discount pricing
of higher-priced, higher-quality experience goods. This is done as an induce-
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 52
ment to purchase where information asymmetry exists between buyer and
seller regarding product or service quality. However, in the UK where audit
fees were also publicly disclosed, Gregory and Collier (1996) found initial
fee reduction for companies changing from one Big Six to another Big Six
auditor.
2.3 Market Structure and Pricing
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) looked at the effect of auditor concentration
on audit pricing. They collected data on 140 life and health companies,
and 101 property and casualty insurance companies over a period of five
years. An auditor concentration variable - the market shares of the three
largest providers of audit services within an industry, was added to the stan¬
dard audit fee model. They reported that audit fees were negatively related
to industry concentration. The result was contrary to their expectation
that high concentration would be associated with reduced price competi¬
tion. However, they noted two possible limitations in their study: first, only
two industries were examined and second, the sample period covered a rel¬
atively short time period, during which the concentration ratios exhibited
only limited variability in each industry.
Doogar and Easley (1998) developed a theoretical model of undifferenti¬
ated price competition which closely predicted audit market concentration
in the US. They argued that relative incremental costs of the same audit job
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 53
across audit firms was the only supply consideration in a price competition
situation. They then provided an incremental cost function based on several
disputable assumptions. First, audit firms were assumed to produce audits
using a two-factor Cobb-Douglas technology with one fixed (partners) and
one variable (staff) input. The total endowment of partners could not be
varied in the short run. Second, the demand for staff and the optimal lever¬
age (that is, staff-to-partner ratio) were endogenously determined by the
firm's cost minimisation objective. Third, auditors clients were assumed to
choose auditors based solely on price, quality differentiation was assumed to
play no role in the market. Fourth, firms were assumed to use a constant
returns to scale technology that exhibits diseconomies of scale in the short
run when the supply of one factor of production is constrained.
Based on their incremental cost function, they simulated an audit mar¬
ket. Their found that the market shares for the Big Six in the simulated
audit market were statistically indistinguishable from actual market shares
for the Big Six. The simulation procedure was as follows (Doogar and Easley,
1998, 239):
When the market opens all firms have empty client rosters. In each
round an unassigned client is randomly selected for assignment. Each
audit firm bid its incremental cost and the client is assigned to the
lowest bidder. After all jobs are assigned, we check to see whether
there are any dissatisfied clients. A client is dissatisfied when the
incumbent auditor's incremental cost is higher than the incremental
cost of at least one rival for the same job. ... As long as there is a
dissatisfied client in the market, we calculate the dissatisfaction score
and move the client to the auditor with the lowest incremental cost
of auditing that client. ... When a dissatisfied client moves from one
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auditor to another, the firms that gain or lose a client experience a
change in their sum job sizes. We then recalculate all incremental
costs for all clients and identify a new most dissatisfied client, until no
client remains dissatisfied.
There is considerable scope for further research in this area. Research
results so far have suggested that the supply side of the market for audit
services takes the form of an oligopoly15 : it has a core of six dominant firms
and a competitive fringe. Although there has been a substantial amount of
economic literature on oligopoly pricing theories16, the theories have not
been applied to studies of the audit services market. For example, two eco¬
nomic models may be relevant to the pricing of audit services: the Bertrand
model and the dominant-firm model.
In neo-classical non-collusive oligopoly models, companies may compete
with each other by changing either the quantity of goods produced or the
selling price of the goods. Cournot's model analyses the former while the
Bertrand model looks at the latter. In the case of the audit services market,
the Cournot model is not applicable. This is because an audit firm cannot
produce an audit before it is appointed by a company. That is, sales take
place before production. Audit firms, therefore, cannot compete by varying
the quantity of audit services to be produced. Rather, they compete on the
1501igopoly lies between monopoly and perfect competitive market. Scherer and Ross
(1990, 17) noted that "although pure monopoly ends and oligopoly begins when the
number of sellers rises from one to two, it is difficult to specify exactly where oligopoly
shades into a competitive market structure. The key to the distinction is subjective -
whether or not the sellers consider themselves conscious ..."
16See Shapiro (1989) for a review of oligopoly pricing theories.
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price of audit services.
Equilibrium in the Bertrand model is quite different from equilibrium
in the Cournot model. While the Cournot model emphasises the market
structure as the critical element in determining market performance, the
Bertrand model predicts competitive market performance if as few as two
producers supply a standardised product. However, if the assumption of
product standardisation is relaxed, price-setting models highlight the degree
of product differentiation as a determinant of market performance (Martin,
1994, 38-39). Such pricing models may be worth pursuing in the study
of audit services market as each of the Big Five has its own audit methods
which may result in differentiated audit quality both amongst them and
between them and other smaller audit firms.
Under the dominant-firm model, there is a dominant company or a cartel
of companies with a competitive fringe or the followers. The dominant firm
model is thus applicable to the study of audit services market in which there
is a core of Big Five with a fringe of medium and small audit firms. Followers
are viewed as price takers. Each rival firm is assumed to be so small relative
to market demand that it views changes in its output as having no effect on
price.
If the dominant firm does not have a cost advantage over the fringe and it
charges a price above the cost, the fringe will expand and the market share
of the dominant firm will decrease in the long run. In order to maintain
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its position and charge a price higher than the minimum cost, barriers of
entry are important to the dominant firm. Some forms of barriers to entry
include absolute cost advantage, e.g. superior patented production methods,
talented management, scale of economies, product differentiation and sunk
costs (Scherer and Ross, 1990, 360).
In addition to the two economic models, Porter (1998a,b) and Besanko,
Dranove and Shanley (2000) provided an economics of strategy perspective
which was relevant to auditing research. They argued that competitive ad¬
vantage was achievable only if a firm could create more economic value than
its rivals could. They defined value-creation as the difference between the
value that resided in the product (quality) and the value of the inputs that
were sacrificed to make that product (cost). Firms with cost and/or quality
advantages could develop strategies to achieve a gain in market share and/or
a higher profit margin. This perspective is relevant to the audit market be¬
cause it is considered that large audit firms have a cost advantage and that
there are audit specialists who provide higher quality audit products.
2.4 Conclusion
A review of the literature in audit market structure showed that there has
been substantial increase in concentration in the audit services market, es¬
pecially in the late 1980s. This change in market structure potentially facil¬
itates cartel collusion which can lead to higher audit prices. A review of the
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literature in pricing of audit services, however, detected some contradictory
signals. First, there is the competitive behaviour of initial engagement price
cuts. Second, premium fees charge by large and/or specialist audit firms
may represent monopoly rents, although they may also represent higher
quality audits offered by these firms. These developments in the audit ser¬
vices market and the issues surrounding them thus provided the backdrop to
this dissertation. The rest of this dissertation is to achieve three objectives.
First, in the wake of the mergers between Ernst & Whinney and Arthur
Young in 1989 and between Coopers & Lybrand and Deloitte, Haskins &
Sells in 1990, it examines the extent of concentration in the audit services
market during the period from 1991 to 1995. Second, it analyses changes
in the level of audit prices during the period. Results will provide some
indication on the competitiveness in the audit services market. Finally, us¬
ing an economic strategy perspective, it provides a theoretical framework
to explain audit prices (including large audit firm premiums and specialist
premium) in a competitive environment.
In addition, by reviewing the literature on the process of audit services
pricing, a perspective is provided on where research has been concentrated
and where it has been neglected. Consequently, this chapter provides a
framework for future research in the area. It has also summarised the re¬
sults of research studies concerning some specific issues in the pricing of
audit services. These comprise, the form of audit fee models, Big Six pre-
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mium, non-audit services fees, low-balling and market concentration of audit
services. From this analysis, research (some of which will be dealt with in
this dissertation) along the following lines is proposed:
1. Research studies have concentrated on the relationship between the
technical process and the amount of fees recovered. Research studies
should also look at the inter-relationships between the technical, the
charging and the recovery process. This will provide a better under¬
standing of audit prices17.
2. Various empirical audit fee models have been used and a study to
compare the results obtained from these different models is desirable.
This will enable us to compare results of different studies.
3. Investigating product differentiation and the economies of scale within
the audit services market (as in Simunic, 1980) requires an analysis
of the differences between the large and the small auditee markets.
There is an assumption that the small auditee market is competitive.
Yet, the definition of the small auditee market used in research studies
has been arbitrary, usually based on assets or turnover of auditees. In
fact, what is important is the degree of competition which is poorly
proxied by size. Market concentration is a much better proxy for
competitivenss.
17The Big Six firms have been contacted to participate in this research but all of them
have declined the invitation.
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4. Attention should be paid to the pricing differences among the Big 6,
in addition to the differences between the Big Six and small audit
firms. Similarly, market concentration by individual firms should be
researched. This is because the audit services market is dominated by
the Big Six.
5. The effect of audit committees on audit and consultancy fees should
be investigated, as should the practice of low-balling in the 1990s.
The increasing competitiveness of the audit services market over time
should show an overall real decrease in audit fees and evidence should
be gathered on this point.
6. The recent publication of annual financial statements and reports by
some audit firms in the UK has provided data which should enable em¬
pirical research into the audit services market. At present, empirical
tests following the developments in the economic literature on indus¬






The recent merger between Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse on the
1 July 1998 to become PricewaterhouseCoopers is the latest manifestation
of the trend towards higher concentration in the supply of audit services
market1. A number of concerns derive from the degree of concentration2
which would result from large firm mergers. The implications of greater
concentration for the audit services market include the strengthening of an
oligopolistic supply with consequent enhanced potential for price fixing ar¬
rangements, reduction in consumer choice, and an escalation in conflicts of
interest. The last issue derives from an increasing number of instances where
an audit firm provides consultancy services to auditees. A special case of
1 There was also merger talk between Ernst & Young and KPMG but it subsequently
collapsed.
2Concentration in an industry refers to the extent to which economic activity is con¬
trolled by large firms.
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this arises where the same audit firm is consultant to two or more competing
client companies. Here the problem emerges as to how a company can en¬
sure that its auditors will not release useful information to its competitors in
return for consultancy fees. For example, Christopher Pearce, finance direc¬
tor of Rentokil Initial and head of the FD's One Hundred Group, confirmed
the fears of audit firm clients when he expressed the view that the pro¬
posed merger between Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse "reduces
competition and increases the potential for conflict of interest" (quoted in
Accountancy Age, 25/09/97).
Concentration is conventionally regarded as a significant dimension of
market structure because it plays an important role in determining market
power and hence business behaviour and performance (Clark, 1985; Mar¬
tin, 1994; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Tirole, 1994). High concentration in an
industry increases the likelihood of the formation of a cartel comprising an
association of firms which agrees, perhaps tacitly, to co-ordinate production
and pricing to increase the joint and individual profits of its members by
restricting output. However, concentration resulting from mergers may also
permit the achievement of economies of scale due to increases in firm size.
It has been argued that these efficiency gains can be related to a concentra¬
tion formula. Thus, concentration on the supply side has the potential to
influence the volume, price, variety and quality of audit services.
Using a much larger and more recent data sample, this chapter seeks
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through an investigation of the UK audit market concentration to provide
further contributions to the UK audit market literature:
1. It updates the findings of earlier studies. By analysing auditor con¬
centration from 1991 to 1995, it extends the UK work of both Beattie
and Fearnley (1994) and Peel (1997).
2. It examines the impact of auditor changes on concentration. Auditor
changes during this five year period are analysed into those involving a
switch from a small firm to a Big Six firm (and vice versa), and those
involving a switch within Big Six. The analysis of auditor change
among the Big Six is also much more detailed than that of previous
studies (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Moizer and Turley, 1989). This
aspect of the analysis is of particular importance as evidence of numer¬
ous client changes among the Big Six would throw some light on the
nature of competition in the already highly concentrated audit market
and could cast doubt on the idea of cartel formation by the Big Six.
3. It attempts to be innovative in its analysis of auditor concentration
within industry groups (Zeff and Fossum, 1967; Danos and Eichense-
her, 1982; Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Moizer and Turley, 1989).
Restriction in choice of auditors within industry group would indicate
a heightened potential conflict of interest for auditors who provide
both audit and a management consultancy service to two or more
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competing companies.
4. Another important issue related to auditor concentration within in¬
dustry groups is that of the audit specialist. It can be argued that
'[if] auditors develop industry specialisation by increasing their clien¬
teles, specialists could also achieve production economies and become
efficient, lower-cost producers of audits' (Craswell et al., 1995, 301).
Thus, the specialist becomes a dominant force in the supply of sectoral
audits and as such has a potential to extend considerable influence
over audit pricing within that sector. This chapter investigates the
incidence of audit specialists by applying a market share test within
each sector. This method has been used in many of previous studies
including Craswell et al. (1995) and Palmrose (1986a), but has not
been applied to current UK data.
5. This chapter assesses the most commonly used methods of concentra¬
tion measures in prior studies. These methods all involve the selection
of an audit market (population of companies), a measure of market
power, and a concentration index. Methods chosen by researchers may
therefore differ considerably and consequently the results of research
studies may lack comparability (Moizer and Turley, 1987). However,
this issue is often neglected in the interpretation of the results of con¬
centration studies.
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3.2 Data and Method
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The data used in this study consisted of fully listed and USM companies
(with the exclusion of investments trusts) for the years from 1991 to 1995.
Information on company auditors was extracted manually from the Hambro
Company Guide3, November issues 1991 to 1995. Financial information on
companies - total assets and audit fees, were downloaded from Datastream.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the five year data set. Casual
observation of the summary statistics suggests that there was an increase in
auditor concentration during the five year period. In 1991, there were 119
firms providing audit services to 1211 companies. The comparative figures in
1995 were 106 firms and 1401 companies. Audit fees paid varied among the
companies, from below £1000 to £9 million. Interestingly, the average audit
fee per company has decreased over the five year period, from £295,000 in
1991 to £275,000 in 1995 while the average size of company has increased
from £825 million in 1991 to £955 million in 1995.
Data collection proceeded as follows. Accounting data from Datastream
was obtained on a calendar year basis (based on accounting year end date).
This created the potential for a cut-off problem when the data was matched
with auditor information in the Hambro Company Guide (November issue)
3According to the company guide, information was compiled from prime sources and
drawn mainly from the company's own reports and accounts, and each entry was submitted
for verification to the company concerned prior to publication.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Sample Size 1,211 1,222 1,237 1,320 1,401
Number of Auditors 119 116 113 110 106
Audit Fees 1£'000)
Mean 295 299 300 279 275
Standard Deviation 653 682 698 647 666
Minimum 1 2 2 2 0
Maximum 7,400 8,000 9,000 8,000 8,000
Total Assets f£ '0001
Mean 825,206 874,907 954,985 930,910 955,039
Standard Deviation 5,910,634 6,485,236 7,395,138 7,272,258 7,946,593
Minimum 230 115 216 348 532
Maximum 128,540,000 143,216,000 163,116,000 159,363,000 166,347,000
based on the latest published accounts4. However, there was only a small
number of auditor changes in each of the years under investigation, and
so overall auditor concentration measures were not significantly affected.
Not all the companies listed in the Hambro Company Guide were available
in Datastream and therefore, the resulting population size for each of the
years has been reduced (Table 3.1)5. There was no merger between the Big
Six audit firms during 1991 to 1995. During the period, there were a few
4Such a problem would occur, for example, when a company had year end date 31st
December and had an auditor change during the year. The Hambro Company Guide
would only give auditor information as at November of that year and thus, would not
have the new auditor information.
5This was because Datastream did not have information on all the dead companies.
This might understate the actual numbers of newly listed and delisted companies during
the five year period.
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smaller audit firms mergers including Baker Tilly and Longcrofts, Moore
Stephens and Overton Salt, and Finnie and Stoy Hayward in 1992; Brewers
and Coopers Lancaster, and Chantrey Velloacott in 1993; and BDO Binder
Hamlyn6 and Stoy Hayward in 1995.
Using the five year data set, concentration ratios were calculated for the
years from 1991 to 1995. Audit fee income and number of audit engagements
were used as proxies for size and market power of audit firms. Degree of
concentration was measured by C4 and C$, market share by the largest
four and six firms respectively. Market share held by each of the top 15
firms was also computed for each year. The change in auditor concentration
during the five year period was then analysed and classified according to its
causes (company switching auditor, newly listed companies and companies
removed from stock exchange). Using audit fee income as the size measure,
Herfindahl indices were also computed for each of the five years in order
to look at the effect of choice of concentration indices on concentration
measures. Restricting the study to the 1995 data set, auditor concentration
within industry group was also calculated.
Finally, the effect of population size on auditor concentration was inves¬
tigated as follows. The 1995 data sample was sorted in descending order of
size of companies. Auditor concentration indices were first computed for a
6Only part of BDO Binder Hamlyn merged with Stoy Hayward to form BDO Stoy
Hayward. The remaining practice, continued as Binder Hamlyn, subsequently merged
with Arthur Andersen.
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population with only the largest company. Next, the population size was in¬
creased by adding the immediate largest company and auditor concentration
indices were re-computed based on the new population size. The process was
repeated until the population included 1401 companies. This was done to
examine the effect of choice of sample on results of concentration studies,
particularly in cases where the sample used is based on a proportion of the
largest companies.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Auditor Concentration 1991 - 95
Table 3.2 shows the market shares, by audit fees and number of audits
respectively, of the top 15 audit firms in the UK in each of the years from
1991 to 1995. Results suggested that there was a core of 4 firms (CL, KPMG,
EY and PW) who each consistently possessed an individual market share
in excess of 10% and who together had more than 50% of the audit market.
Moreover, their individual and total shares had steadily increased over the
period. By 1995, these four firms earned 79% of total audit fees and audited
60% of the companies. KPMG had the largest share of the number of audits
(20%) while CL had the largest share of total audit fees (23%). These four
firms were followed by AA and TR who had a lesser, but substantial market
presence. They received 13% of total audit fees and audited 15% of the
companies. The Big Six were surrounded by a fringe of smaller firms who
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Table 3.2 Auditor Concentration 1991 to 1995 - Top 15 Audit Firms
Market Share (No. of Audits) Market Share (Audit Fees)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Sample Size 1211 1222 1237 1320 1401 1211 1222 1237 1320 1401
% % % % % % % % % %
Coopers & Lybrand 14.86 15.96 15.89 16.25 15.35 21.80 21.93 22.05 23.27 23.29
KPMG 18.33 18.78 20.49 20.80 20.24 21.41 21.14 23.14 21.99 22.22
Ernst Young 11.85 11.13 10.75 11.55 11.63 16.98 17.12 17.47 17.10 18.14
Price Waterhouse 11.48 11.74 11.68 12.08 12.46 16.96 18.80 17.11 17.03 15.70
Touche Ross 8.38 8.31 8.57 8.79 9.24 7.34 7.22 6.74 7.71 7.01
Arthur Andersen 4.95 4.95 4.77 5.00 6.00 4.11 4.26 4.41 4.50 5.53
Binder Hamlyn 5.12 5.16 5.34 4.70 3.82 2.65 2.51 2.52 2.27 1.60
Pannell Kerr Forster 1.65 1.96 1.70 1.89 1.71 1.44 1.16 0.97 0.85 0.82
Grant Thornton 3.26 2.86 2.67 2.42 3.14 0.90 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.77
BDO Stoy Hayward 2.48 2.78 2.75 2.42 3.39 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.72
Kidsons Impey 0.95 0.86 0.69 0.80 0.68 0.88 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.59
Moores Rowland 0.78 0.86 0.77 0.72 0.82 0.50 — — — 0.52
Clark Whitehill — 0.74 0.81 0.68 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.62 0.54 0.44
Robson Rhodes 1.98 1.80 1.62 1.59 1.43 0.46 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.34
Moore Stephens — 0.74 — — — — 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.32
Neville Russell 0.66 — 0.73 0.68 0.50
Jayson Newman 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.26 —
Hacker Young 0.83
c4 56.52 57.61 58.81 60.68 59.68 77.15 78.99 79.77 79.39 79.35
C6 70.02 71.08 72.72 74.47 74.92 88.60 90.47 90.92 91.60 91.89
with the exception of Binder Hamlyn ("BH") individually received less than
1% of the total audit fees. However, together these firms earned 8% of total
audit fees and audited 25% of the companies in 1995.
Concentration measures C4 and C^, based upon both audit fees or num¬
ber of audits, confirmed that there has been a slight increase in auditor
concentration from 1991 to 1995. Over the five year period, the increase
in Cq was about 3% (1991:89%, 1995:92%) when audit fee was used as the
size measure while the increase was about 5% (1991:70%, 1995:75%) when
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the number of audits was used. These results can be compared directly to
earlier studies and prove to be consistent with the findings of Beattie and
Fearnley (1994) and Peel (1997).
3.3.2 Auditor Switches and Their Impact on Concentration
There were 69.5 (6.1%), 32 (2.7%), 63 (5.2%) and 50 (3.9%) cases of volun¬
tary auditor switching for the years from 1991/92 to 1994/95 respectively.
Underlying drivers for auditor changes were identified in Beattie and Fearn¬
ley (1995, 1998a,b). Auditor changes which may influence market concen¬
tration are analysed in Table 3.3. Between 1991 and 1995, the results show
that the switch from a small to a Big Six auditor accounted for 41%7 of audi¬
tor change (41%8 for the period from 1987 to 1991 in Beattie and Fearnley
(1994)). KPMG out-performed the rest of Big Six by successfully taking
over 25.5 company audits from small audit firms during this five year pe¬
riod. The other Big Six firms, TR, CL, PW, EY and AA, obtained 17.5,
16.5, 16.5, 8.5, 4 clients from smaller firms respectively. However, the switch
from a Big Six to a small firm, in total only accounted for an average of only
13%9 of the total number of auditor changes (8%10. in Beattie and Fearnley
(1994)). The Big Six lost 28 audits to small firms. The net gain for the Big




146+205 (based on Table 7 of Beattie and Fearnley (1994))
9 12+3.5+7.5+5
214.5
146+205 (based on Table 7 of Beattie and Fearnley (1994))
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Table 3.3 Change of Auditors 1992-1995
AA CL TR EY KPMG PW Big Six Others New Removed
AA — 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.5 0.0 3.5 0.5 14.0 3.0
CL 0.0 — 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 8.0 6.0
CO
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£ PW 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 — 4.0 5.0 11.0 3.0
Big Six 0.0 4.0 1.0 3.5 5.5 2.0 16.0 21.0 75.5 30.0
Others 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 5.0 8.0 47.5 12.0
Total 2.0 5.0 1.0 4.5 6.5 2.0 21.0 29.0 123.0 42.0
AA CL TR EY KPMG PW Big Six Others New Removed
AA — 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 9.5 2.0
CL 1.0 — 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 3.0 2.5 24.0 5.0
CO
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55 PW 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 — 4.0 6.5 16.0 6.0
Big Six 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 7.5 3.5 22.0 25.0 98.0 25.0
Others 0.0 2.5 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 7.5 8.5 20.0 10.0
Total 2.0 6.5 2.0 4.0 9.5 5.5 29.5 33.5 118.0 35.0
AA CL TR EY KPMG PW Big Six Others New Removed
AA — 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 5.0 2.0





















£ PW 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 — 3.0 2.5 2.5 5.0
Big Six 3.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 10.0 13.5 40.0 23.5
Others 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.5 5.0 13.0 14.5
Total 5.0 2.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 13.5 18.5 53.0 38.0
AA CL TR EY KPMG PW Big Six Others New Removed
AA — 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.5 5.0






TR 0.0 0.0 — 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 8.0 5.0





r—1 KPMG 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 — 1.5 4.5 10.0 13.0 15.0
£ PW 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 — 5.0 2.5 8.0 5.0
Big Six 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 6.0 18.5 29.0 51.5 48.5
Others 1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 12.0 10.0 22.5 14.5
Total 3.0 5.0 6.0 5.5 5.0 6.0 30.5 39.0 74.0 63.0
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i.e, a net gain of 60.5 audits.
Switching auditors within the Big Six accounted for 31%n of the total
auditor change (35%12 in Beattie and Fearnley (1994)). Table 3.3 shows
that during the five year period, AA won 5 audits from and lost 7 to other
Big Six, a net loss of 2 audits. EY, CL and KPMG also had a net loss of 6,
1.5 and 1 respectively. PW and TR had a net gain of 3.5 and 7 respectively.
Therefore, although switching auditors among the Big Six accounted for
31% of the total auditor change, the actual net gain or loss for each of the
firms was small.
The Big Six also gained most of the audits of newly listed companies.
They were auditors of 75.5 out of 123 (61%) newly listed companies in
1994/95 (Table 3.3) while the comparable figures were 70%, 75% and 83%
for the years from 1991/92 to 1993/94. Indeed, over the five year period,
the Big Six gained 265 of the 368 new audits.
While the Big Six gained from new entrants to the Stock Exchange,
they also lost from company departures. Of the 178 companies leaving the
Stock Exchange, the Big Six were auditors of 127 companies. This 71%
(127/178) ratio is similar to the audit market concentration ratio C6 based
on number of audits (average 73% from 1991 to 1995). Therefore, there




146+205 (based on Table 7 of Beattie and Fearnley (1994))
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companies removed from the Stock Exchange.
In summary, during the years from 1991 to 1995, a marginal increase in
concentration was apparent. C§ has increased from 89% to 92% based on
audit fees measure and from 70% to 75% based on number of audits measure.
The rate of increase in concentration had slowed from that observed in the
period from 1987 to 1991 (when C6 increases from 55% to 72%). This change
was largely due to the effect of mergers of large audit firms in the late 1980s.
The smaller more recent increment in auditor concentration was mainly due
to companies switching from a small auditor to the Big Six (net gain of 60.5
audits) and newly listed companies having a preference for a Big Six auditor
(average 72%). The increase in market share (based on number of audits) by
the Big Six, namely, KPMG, PW, TR, CL, AA and EY was 1.91%, 0.99%,
0.86%, 0.49%, 1.05%, and -0.22% respectively. Relative net gains in number
of audits by the Big Six were as follows:
Companies switching from small firms : KPMG > TR > PW > CL > EY > AA
Companies switching between Big Six : TR > PW > KPMG > CL > AA > EY
Newly listed companies choosing a Big Six: KPMG > CL > EY > PW > AA > TR
3.3.3 Auditor Concentration by Industry Sector
Aggregate market concentration provides no direct indication of the nature
of concentration in specific sectors. Table 3.4 summarises the market share
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of the Big Six by industry sector during the year 1995. It shows that the
Big Six had complete dominance over five industry sectors: gas distribution,
oil (integrated), merchant and retail banks, and tobacco. They also had
over 90% of the market share, both in terms of audits fees and number
of audits, in the chemicals, electricity and paper, packaging and printing
sectors. Indeed with the exception of the breweries, other financial and
property sectors, the Big Six had 80% or above in terms of audit fees and
60% or above in terms of number of audits in all industry sectors. This
analysis thus indicates that in many of the industry sectors, concentration
is extremely high. It can, however, be argued that this high concentration
has been the result of companies choosing the 'best' auditor in the field.
Moreover, in many sectors, choice of auditors remained reasonable as Table
3.4 shows that, out of the 37 industry sectors, there were 21 industry sectors
that had at least 10 different audit firms.
Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) examined the effect of audit special¬
ists on the level of audit fees13. They revealed that on average an industry
specialist Big Eight firm (now Big Six) earned a 34% premium over non-
specialist Big Eight auditors. Based on data for 1995, Table 3.5 shows
industry market share by auditors. When the 10% market share threshold
was used to denote audit specialisation, the four largest firms CL, KPMG,
13They determined auditor specialisation according to a threshold of 10% of market
share based on either the number of clients in the industry or the percentage of total fees
in the industry. However, they noted that the 10% market share threshold was arbitrary
and when the threshold was changed to 20%, no statistically significant specialist premium
was found.








































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:BH:Binderamlyn;TB kerTill ;CKle entKeys;G :ra thornton;MR:or sRow a d;Nvilleuss ll;SC:fferyChamp ess;HDOtH war
CHAPTER 3. AUDITOR CONCENTRATION 1991-1995 76
EY and PW were identified as specialists of all industries. However, when
the threshold was raised to 30%, only one audit specialist emerged in most
of the industries. For example, CL and PW were audit specialists of 16 in¬
dustry sectors. The newly merged PricewaterhouseCoopers would be audit
specialists of 29 industry sectors14.
3.4 Effects of Population Size, Size Measure and
Concentration Index
3.4.1 Population Size
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of population size of companies on concentration
ratio. On an audit fees basis, C4 and Ce dropped slowly as the population
size increased. The effect, however, was small - when the population was
the 500 largest companies, C4 was 82.58% and Cq was 94.48% and when the
population was 1400 largest companies, C4 was 79.36% and Ce was 91.90%.
As expected, the reduction was much larger when the number of audits was
used as the size measure. On this basis, when the population was the 500
largest companies, C4 was 73.20% and C& was 88.90%, compared to that of
59.71% and 74.96% when the population was the 1400 largest companies.
These results suggest that when audit fee was used as the size measure,
a population of the largest 500 companies produces a concentration ratio
which would be a reasonable estimate of that for all listed companies.
14The merged firm would become audit specialists in the sectors of building construction,
chemicals, diversified industrials, engineering, food retailers, health care, media, paper,
packaging and printing, pharmaceuticals, retail banks and support services.
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The results are due to large companies tending to appoint a Big Six
and also large auditees paying higher audit fees. Consequently, when the
sample size increases, C4 or C§ should decrease because smaller companies
are more likely to appoint a non Big-Six firm. This effect would be modified
somewhat when fees rather than number of audits were used as a basis for
the concentration ratios as smaller companies typically pay smaller audit
fees. Since larger audits will always comprise a greater proportion of the
total population of fees, a fees based measure will show greater consistency
between sample sizes than a measure based on the number of audits.
To investigate the effect of company size on auditor concentration, the
sample was ranked according to size and was divided into 14 groups. Each of
the first 13 groups had 100 companies and the 14th group had 101 companies.
For each of the 14 groups, market share by the Big Six (CsigSix), based on
either number of audits or audit fees, was calculated. By stratifying the
sample on companies of comparable size, Table 3.6 confirms that CsigSix
based on number of audits was similar to CsigSix based on audit fees. On
average, CsigSix based on audit fees was about 4% higher than CBigSix based
on number of audits. This finding is consistent with the proposition that,
given the size and complexity of a company, a Big Six auditor would charge
the company higher audit fees than those charged by smaller audit firms.
As expected, the auditor concentration of the first group, which consisted of
the largest 100 companies, was very high. The CsigSix was about 98% based
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Table 3.6 1995 Auditor Concentration per 100 Companies
BIG SIX
Number Fees Difference
0 - 100 98.50% 98.77% 0.27%
101 - 200 90.50% 88.14% -2.36%
201 - 300 90.00% 91.61% 1.66%
301 - 400 84.00% 89.00% 5.00%
401 - 500 81.50% 85.12% 3.62%
501 - 600 89.50% 92.34% 2.84%
601 - 700 68.00% 76.59% 8.59%
701 - 800 76.00% 80.01% 4.01%
801 - 900 72.50% 77.63% 5.13%
901 - 1000 71.00% 72.02% 1.02%
1001 - 1100 66.50% 72.95% 6.45%
1101 - 1200 63.00% 65.75% 2.75%
1201 - 1300 55.50% 60.59% 5.09%
1301 - 1401 39.11% 46.49% 7.38%
on either audit fees or number of audits. CBigSix for each of the next five
groups of 100 companies were also high, varying from 81% to 90% based on
number of audits and from 85% to 92% based on audit fees. The next five
groups showed a slightly smaller CsigSix while the last 3 groups, comprising
the smallest 301 companies, had a significant decrease in CsigSix varying
from 39% to 66%.
3.4.2 Size Measure
Figure 3.1 shows the difference in concentration ratios when different size
measures were used. When the population was the 500 largest companies
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and the size measure was audit fees, C4 was 82.58%. This percentage re¬
mained fairly stable as the population of companies increased. For the same
population size but using the number of audits as the size measure, C4 was
73.20%, a difference of about 9%. However, when the population was in¬
creased to include 1400 largest companies, C4 was 79.36% based on audit
fees and 59.67% based on number of audits, a difference of 20%. These re¬
sults suggest that when interpreting concentration ratios it is necessary to
take into account the size measure used.
3.4.3 Concentration Indices
Using audit fees as size measure, the Herfindahl index increased slightly from
15.92% in 1991 to 16.97% in 1995. As a basis for assessment, Herfindahl
value of 16.67% is equivalent to having a market composed of only 6 firms
of equal size. Moizer and Turley (1989) noted that the Herfindahl index for
FT500 was 9.6% in 1982. The marked increase in the value of the index
from 1982 to 1991 was due to mergers between the Big Eight firms. Figure
3.1 shows the effects of the company population size on the computation of
Herfindahl index. When the population size had risen above 300, the index
became fairly steady.
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This study has examined the issue of auditor concentration in the U.K.
during the period from 1991 to 1995. Based on 1401 companies (fully listed
and USM companies excluding investment trusts) in 1995, it demonstrates
that the audit market was dominated by the four largest firms, namely,
CL, KPMG, PW and EY. These four firms held 60% of the total number
of audits and collectively earned 79% of the total audit fees. Two other
auditors AA and TR had smaller but significant market shares while the
remainder of audit firms in the market were relatively small. These results
suggest that the audit market was oligopolistic. The study also reveals
that there was only a relatively small increase in concentration (5% when
measured by number of audits and 3% when measured by audit fees) and
this represents a marked reduction in the rate of increase in concentration
compared with that observed in prior years in the UK. This change arose
because there were no mergers between large audit firms in the period of
study. Thus, companies switching from small audit firms to the Big Six
and newly listed companies choosing a Big Six auditor accounted for the
increased concentrated occurring from 1991 to 1995.
At a sectoral level, the Big Six had complete dominance over 5 industry
sectors and a highly dominant position in 29 others. The results do indicate
that in many of the industry sectors, auditor choice may well be effectively
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restricted. However, it can be argued that although auditor concentration
was high at an industry level, there was still competition among audit firms,
firstly because switching between the Big Six firms represented 28% of the
total auditor change during the five year period and secondly, because in 21
out of the 36 industries used in this study, choice of auditors existed to the
extent that there were 10 or more auditors active in the sector.
The analysis undertaken also examined the effects of population size, size
measure and concentration indices on the results of concentration studies.
There was evidence that the Big Six had relatively more audits of larger
companies. For example, they had 98% of the audits of the top 100 com¬
panies, 87% of next largest 500 companies, 71% of the next largest 500
companies and only 53% of the smallest 301 companies. This confirmed the
general belief that large companies tend to appoint a Big Six auditor. The
study shows that the basis of measuring concentration can affect results.
Where the basis is audit fees, they are not sensitive to population size. In
contrast, when the number of audits is the basis of measurement, popula¬
tion size does significantly affect the concentration measure. Finally, both




In an oligopolistic market, if firms decide to collude (even implicitly through
a tacit price leadership scheme) there is a resulting social welfare loss deriv¬
ing from their non-competitive output and pricing policies1. However, collu¬
sion is not necessarily inevitable under this type of market structure, as even
a few large firms may compete vigorously rather than collude. Oligopoly
pricing is complex, and no single theory is as yet applicable to all oligopolis¬
tic industries. However, as a generalisation, Clark (1985, 66) concluded that
"high market concentration, stable market conditions, homogenous demand
and cost conditions, [and] full information ... tend to facilitate oligopolistic
co-ordination". This chapter is concerned with pricing behaviour in the UK
audit services market where a key feature has been the domination by a few
large audit firms over the last 20 years. As we saw in Chapter 3, the extent
of this domination has increased steadily during this period as a result of
^or a discussion of welfare economics of competition and oligopoly, see Scherer and
Ross (1990, 15-55).
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mergers between large audit firms, large firms taking over small firms and
also auditees switching to large firms. This change in auditor concentration
has led to the situation that the market for "audit services has reached the
limit of a tight oligopoly, which is characterised by few rivals, stable mar¬
ket shares and medium-to-high entry barriers" (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994,
308). The recent merger between CL and PW has created a 'Big Five' and
has further increased auditor concentration (Pong, 1998). As a consequence
of these trends the buyers of audit services face the increasing potential of
cartel formation and price collusion among a smaller number of large audit
firms.
While increases in the total market share of a few large firms creates the
circumstances in which price competition may be weakened, this is even¬
tually dependent on how the large firms decide to behave and a contrary
view of the effect of market concentration on auditor pricing policies may
also be taken. Large firms, due to economies of scale, may actually become
more efficient and pass on some of the benefits of this to the customer in the
form of no or restricted fee increases or even lower-priced audits. Although
greater efficiency has been the stated motivation for some of the mergers
between accounting firms, their impact on the audit market and audit pric¬
ing has not been explicitly identified. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers
recently emphasised, as the primary motive for its merger, improved client
service by stating that:
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"[its] merger offers clients access to substantially greater resources world¬
wide, with faster deployment of specialists. It also provides enormous scope
and scale in critically important emerging markets, as well as faster de¬
ployment of new products and services through more efficient management
of a larger investment pool. Finally, ... increase investment in technology
and knowledge management ensures clients access to leading-edge solutions"
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, News Release, 01/07/1998).
Iyer and Iyer (1996) did not find any significant increase in audit fees in
the UK following the mergers between Arthur Young and Ernst & Whin-
ney, and between Coopers & Lybrand and Deloitte, Haskins & Sell in the
late 1980s. They concluded that these mergers did not lower competition
in the audit services market. Tonge and Wootton (1991) also concluded
that mergers within the big audit firms might produce more competition
in the audit market for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange and national Over the Counter Market. They
argued that, although the number of major competitors amongst auditors
had fallen, those remaining would have the comparable resources needed to
compete effectively. Further support for this perspective on the audit mar¬
ket came from Pearson and Trompeter (1994). They found that the level of
audit fees was lower in more highly concentrated audit markets, and this,
they suggested, was due to more intense price competition among fewer,
more powerful participants. Although audit firm mergers have resulted in
an increase in audit services market concentration, there have been some
indications of strong price competition among audit firms. For example,
there were allegations that low balling has been prevalent (see pages 48 and
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49).
US experience also suggests that price competition remains an important
feature of the audit services market. Maher et al. (1992) noted a moderate
inflation adjusted decrease in audit fees paid by 78 publicly traded US com¬
panies during the years from 1977 to 1981. Similarly, Sanders, Allen and
Korte (1995) noted a real decrease in audit fees for US public sector audits
during the period from 1985 to 1989.
4.1 Study Objectives
Answering the question of how the changing structure of the supply side of
the audit services market affects competition is not straightforward. The
answer depends on how firms react to circumstances and although fewer
large firms make price collusion easier there is no guarantee that they will
decide to act in this way. Analysis of their pricing behaviour is, however,
one source of evidence which provides some insight into their competitive
behaviour. The purpose of this study is to examine one consequence of their
competitive behaviour i.e., audit fees. It investigates the change in audit fees
during the period from 1991 to 1995, a period of increasing concentration in
the UK audit market. The key characteristics of this study which distinguish
it from prior research and delineate its additional contribution to the audit
services market literature are as follows:
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1. It uses data from 708 UK listed companies, covering a wide range of
industry sectors and audit firms. This data sample is much larger and
more contemporary than that of previous studies. For example, Maher
et al. (1992) (which found a moderate decrease in audit fees from 1977
to 1981) used only 78 US publicly traded companies and they did not
represent a random sample. Iyer and Iyer (1996) (which did not find
changes in audit fees in the UK following large audit firm mergers)
used only 270 UK listed companies and all of these selected had a Big
Six auditor.
2. This study is the first to analyse the changes made in audit fees by
individual Big Six firms, medium sized firms and small firms. This
analysis gives visibility to pricing behaviour at a micro level and so
improves our understanding of the audit market operation. Control¬
ling for variations in pricing among firms also improves the methodol¬
ogy used in Iyer and Iyer (1996) which considered pricing of the Big
Six as a group. In addition, allegations of low balling (as outlined
above) suggest that the Big Six initially at least offer the audit clients
of medium sized firms a substantially lower price for their audits. If
these allegations were true, medium sized firms are likely to respond
by cutting the price of their audits to match the Big Six offers to their
existing clients. Examining medium sized firm pricing will therefore
help shed some light on this issue.
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3. Earlier studies looked at the change in audit fees only after a 5 year
period. While this study also encompasses a five year period, it inves¬
tigates the change in audit fees on an annual basis. This additional
refinement offers the opportunity to provide a clearer picture of the
pricing strategy patterns of audit firms.
4. This study allows the analysis of audit fee changes by auditee size and
this provides evidence on the question of whether or not the Big Six
have different pricing strategies for large and small clients.
Thus, this study examines several important dimensions of auditor pricing
behaviour which have never previously been researched and also provides
more extensive, more contemporary and more robust evidence on trends in
UK audit fees than that available from prior research.
The rest of the chapter will be structured as follows: section 4.2 describes
the technique used to identify changes in audit fees. Section 4.3 describes
the data sample used in the study. Section 4.4 provides a summary of results
of analyses of audit fee changes by auditors and by auditees. Section 4.5
discusses some methodological issues and the robustness of results. Section
4.6 concludes the study.
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Analysis of changes in fees was performed on data at both an aggregate
and an individual audit firm level. Movement in audit fees at a macro
level are one indication of the competitiveness of the audit services market
and when studied at the level of the individual firm (or firm group) may
give some insight into the micro pricing strategies adopted to cope with the
competitive situation faced by each firm (or type of firm) operating in the
market.
To account for changes in audit fees additional to those attributable to
general inflation, general retail price indices (monthly) were used to correct
reported audit fees for inflation during the years from 1991 to 1995. Audit
fees paid by a company were adjusted to the January 1991 general price
level according to the company's month of accounting year end. Change in
inflation adjusted fees may be symptomatic of audit firms trying to extract
more value from customers (fee increases) or sacrificing individual fee value
(fee decreases) to increase market share and make longer term gains. How¬
ever, fee movement may also result from increasing or decreasing regulation
(by both the state and self-regulatory bodies) governing the amount of audit
work or from innovations in audit process which enhance auditor efficiency
or from the growth in auditee size, complexity and risk, and from changes in
its ability to pay. It is possible to systematically control for change in com-
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pany size, complexity and risk of auditees by utilising an audit fee model.
Chan et al. (1993) discussed in detail various possible determinants of audit
fees. Table 4.1 summaries their discussions on the audit fee determinants
and their suggestions on the proxies2 for the determinants. As a result of
data availability, this study has only used some of the proxies listed in Table
4.1: turnover3 for auditee size; inventory to total assets ratio, debtors to to¬
tal assets ratio and number of subsidiaries for complexity; return on equity
and profit before tax4 for ability to pay; year end dummy variable for timing
of audit; Big 6 dummy variable for auditor size. In addition, since Ezzamel
et al. (1996) found a statistically significant positive association between
fees for audit and non-audit services, a non-audit services fees variable was
included in the analysis.
The relationship between audit fees and the their determinants is as¬
sumed to be in the form of a 'logarithm' model, the most commonly used
audit fee model (Simunic, 1980; Chan et al., 1993; Iyer and Iyer, 1996, etc.)
in this type of research studies:
logFij = ao + a\logSi>t + a2DAitt + a3IAijt + a^Subij
2Other proxies have been used in audit fees research studies such as Simunic (1980),
Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes (1986), Palmrose (1986a,b), Francis and Simon (1987)
and Craswell et al. (1995). For example, number of foreign subsidiaries to total number
of subsidiaries ratio for complexity and a dummy variable (equals to 1 if a company made
a loss in the past 3 years) for ability to pay.
3Preliminary analysis showed that the correlation coefficient between turnover and
audit fees was higher than that between total assets and audit fees. Therefore, turnover
was used as proxy for auditee size.
4This proxy variable for ability to pay was found statistically significant in Pong and
Whittington (1994).
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Table 4.1 Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993) on Audit Fee Determinants
Audit Fees Determinants Proxies for Statistical Analysis
Auditee Size:
Larger company takes longer to audit Total assets, turnover
Auditee Complexity:
A reflection of the nature of the business of the
auditee, its location, the quality of internal con¬
trol, the proportion of unusual transactions etc.
- Some assets are prone to errors
- Diversified business, lines of business
- Group companies




Extend and scope of audit testing are determined
by the perceived risk of audit failure (e.g. audit
risk models). It reflects the nature of the business
of the enterprise and also the control environment
instituted by the enterprise
Gearing, liquidity, beta, unsystematic risk
Ability to pay:
Financial pressure keeps overhead costs low Return on shareholders' equity
Ownership control:
Companies with a diverse ownership structure re¬
quire a more extensive and higher quality audit
over and above that necessary to fulfil the mini¬
mum statutory requirements
Directors' beneficial and non-beneficial sharehold¬
ings and all disclosed shareholdings in excess of 5%
Timing:
- Auditors charge more during peak season
- Time taken for audit to complete
Dummy variable, Dec & Mar = 1, otherwise = 0
Audit delay
Audit Location:
Audit staff costs are significantly higher in the
south east than in other UK regions
Dummy variable, London = 1, otherwise = 0
Auditor Size:
Big Six firms charge premium fees Dummy variable, Big Six firm = 1, otherwise = 0
Note:
Chan et al. (1993) did not find all the coefficients of the proxy variables were statistically different
from 0. Their final proposed model included only turnover, return on shareholders' equity, number
of subsidiaries, Herfindahl index, audit delay, ownership control, location and auditor size.
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Pa^Geari^ + agRoE^t + ajPbTij + a%YEitt
+C19NAFij + a\oBitt + (4-1)
where for auditee i at time t,
logFij = natural logarithm of inflation adjusted audit fees
logSij — natural logarithm of inflation adjusted turnover
DAij — debtor to total assets ratio
IAij = inventory to total assets ratio
Subitt = number of subsidiaries
Gearij = gearing ratio
RoEij = return on equity ratio
PbTij = inflation adjusted profit before taxation
YEij = year end dummy (= 1 if year ends in December or March, = 0 otherwise)
NAFij = inflation adjusted non-audit services fees
Bij = Big Six dummy (= 1 if auditor was a Big Six, = 0 otherwise)
= error term
ao = constant term
ai... aio = coefficients
Using data at time t, coefficients ao ■ ■ ■ aio are estimated. Based on the
estimated parameters (ao •. • dio), the model is used to predict fees for the
same auditees sample at time t+1 using data at time t+1. Intuitively, if
company i's auditor has not changed its pricing bases, Ft+i is the amount of
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audit fees that company i has to pay at time t+1 given its size, complexity
and risk:
logFi)t+i = ao + a\logSitt+\ + faDAij+i + azIAi^+i
+aiSubi,t+\ + a5Gearij+i + aeRoEitt+1
+a,TPbTij+i + asYEij+i + a$NAFi)t+1
+aioBijt+i (4.2)
A difference aj5 between actual log(Fi t+i) and predicted log(Fljt.+i) at
time t+1 represents a change in inflation adjusted fees for auditee i. The
null and alternative hypotheses are thus:
H0 : a-i — 0
H\ : a.i ^ 0
If a systematic cxt exists among all auditees, the average percentage
change in inflation adjusted fees Ft+\~Ft+1 can calculated as follows:
Ft+i
logFt+1 - logFt+i = a
5At time t+1, Ft,t+i is also given by the equation:
logFiit+1 = bo + b\logSi,t+\ + &2.D+;,t+i + bzIAi,t+i
-\-b4Subi:t+i + b*,Geari,t+\ + beRoEitt+i
+67+621,t+i + bsYEitt+i + b9NAFitt+1
+610+1,4+1 + e+t+i
Therefore, change in the log(fees) a, is:
Qi = (60 — ao) + (61 — ai)logSi,t+i + (62 — a,2)DAilt+i
+ ■■■
+ (610 — aio)+i,t+l + Si,t+1





where AFi+i = Ft+1 - Ft+1
«= (E?=i <*i)/n
4.3 Sample
The data used was initially based on all fully listed and USM companies
(except investments trusts) for the years from 1991 to 1995. The final sam¬
ple was arrived at on the basis of the following criteria. First, a company
would be included only if all the necessary information about the company
during the years from 1991 to 1995 was available. Information on com¬
pany auditors was extracted manually from the Hambro Company Guide6,
November issues 1991 to 1995. Information on the number of subsidiaries
was also extracted manually from the Stock Exchange Yearbook. The num¬
ber of companies collected was 1211, 1222, 1237, 1320 and 1401 for the years
from 1991 to 1995 respectively. Financial information of the companies - au¬
dit fees, total assets, total sales, stock, debtors, profit before tax, return on
equity and gearing ratio, was downloaded from Datastream; non-audit ser¬
vices fees7 were manually collected from FT Extel. These accounting items
6According to the company guide, information was compiled from prime sources and
drawn mainly from the company's own reports and accounts, and each entry was submitted
for verification to the company concerned before publication.
7As noted in Ezzamel et al. (1996), there is a lack of clarity with regard to disclosure
of non-UK audit services fees. The exemption of disclosure of non-audit services provided
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and ratios were available on only 907 companies. Second, companies which
had auditor change during the 5 year period were removed. The sample size
was then reduced to 721 companies which operated with the same auditor
during the whole 5 year period. This latter adjustment was to avoid the
impact of low-balling8 on our analysis. However, it should be noted that by
including only companies that operated with the same auditor over the five
years, a survivorship bias might be introduced into the sample. Third, in
order to facilitate analysis by audit firm, companies in the sample that had
joint auditors were removed. Fourth, since there were only 5 financial and
property companies in the resulting sample, they were not considered to be
representative of the sector and were therefore removed. The details of the
resulting sample of 708 companies is summarised in table 4.2.
The Big Six were auditors of 78% of the 708 companies. Their share was
divided as follows: KPMG 147 (21%); CL 112 (16%); PW 100 (14%); EY
97 (14%); TR 62 (9%); and AA 32 (4%). Medium sized audit firms9 which
comprised BDO Binder Hamlyn, Grant Thornton, Stoy Hayward, Robson
Rhodes and Pannell Kerr Forster had 89 (12%) of the audits. 46 auditors
shared the remaining 10% (69 audits) of the audits and they were categorised
as small firms.
for overseas subsidiaries may lead to a misleading result on the effect of non-audit services
fees on group audit fees.
8Impact of low balling might still be present, albeit smaller, two years after a change
of auditors (Gregory and Collier, 1996).
9The classification was arbitrary. A firm, other than the Big Six, was medium sized if
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.3 provides some summary statistics on the data sample. During the
period from 1991 to 1995, the mean inflation adjusted audit fee dropped by
4% from £341,238 to £327,903. The average size of companies, as measured
by inflation adjusted turnover, went up by 12% from £585 million to £653
million. Thus, there was some evidence that, overall, audit fees have dropped
during the five year period.
Given that, first, over a five year period, there can be 4 possible fee
changes for an auditee and, second, in each year, there can be 3 directional
changes in audit fees (increase, decrease or none) for an auditee, there could
be 15 possible combinations of audit fee change pattern for an auditee (see
first row of Table 4.4 on page 99). Table 4.4 also lists the total number
of auditees in each of the possible nominal10 fee change combinations. 74
(10%) companies had the maximum of 4 consecutive nominal annual in¬
creases, 14 (2%) companies had the maximum of 4 consecutive nominal
annual decreases and 13 (2%) companies did not have any fee change over
the period. However, most companies had 2 increases and 2 decreases (135;
19%), or 3 increases and 1 decrease (140; 20%). Of the total 2,832 audits
for 708 companies from 1992 to 1995, there were annual nominal fee in¬
creases in 1,454 (51%) audits, decreases in 894 (32%) audits and no change
10Not adjusted for inflation.
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics
Year Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Fees 341.238 719.500 1.927 7,100.070
Total assets 591,838.000 2,211,690.000 471.264 30,503,400.000
Turnover 585,267.000 2,145,830.000 176.542 39,594,400.000
T—1
Profit before tax 45,374.300 180,518.000 -102,820.000 3,046,920.000
OD
2 No. of subsidiaries 13.774 17.721 0.000 181.000
Return on equity 11.892 42.455 -470.820 599.870
Gearing 36.748 96.066 -97.970 1,963.520
Inventory / total assets 0.188 0.152 0.000 0.925
Debtors / total assets 0.250 0.131 0.007 0.761
Fees 341.511 724.897 1.861 7,482.760
Total assets 622,756.000 2,394,310.000 519.311 32,540,600.000
Turnover 591,572.000 2,196,400.000 82.310 40,513,500.000
CM
Profit before tax 36,660.700 185,896.000 -1,123,350.000 2,926,880.000
as
2 No. of subsidiaries 13.521 16.649 0.000 162.000
Return on equity -0.703 314.243 -8,266.660 500.200
Gearing 36.646 76.805 -229.900 1,547.780
Inventory / total assets 0.185 0.155 0.000 0.910
Debtors / total assets 0.245 0.130 0.007 0.913
Fees 338.485 729.461 1.836 8,257.930
Total assets 634,830.000 2,447,560.000 331.809 36,034,800.000
Turnover 621,649.000 2,338,350.000 240.397 43,725,700.000
CO
Non- audit fees 214.258 601.131 0.000 10,093.000
CD
as Profit before tax 42,145.600 160,837.000 -422,989.000 1,843,180.000
No. of subsidiaries 13.672 17.207 0.000 162.000
Return on equity 14.079 83.344 -428.800 1,876.420
Gearing 34.958 80.484 -252.590 1,498.270
Inventory / total assets 0.179 0.152 0.000 0.901
Debtors / total assets 0.251 0.136 0.009 0.997
Fees 329.712 684.393 1.793 7,134.250
Total assets 642,851.000 2,392,730.000 544.293 35,657,900.000
Turnover 628,185.000 2,270,340.000 25.583 41,258,200.000
"O*
Non- audit fees 223.311 598.224 0.000 7,134.250
OS
as Profit before tax 50,581.000 198,275.000 -204,931.000 2,518,110.000
No. of subsidiaries 13.970 17.824 0.000 168.000
Return on equity 18.731 225.277 -1,013.780 5,830.240
Gearing 32.731 68.406 -548.180 1,240.810
Inventory / total assets 0.182 0.157 0.000 0.913
Debtors / total assets 0.254 0.138 0.008 0.900
Fees 327.903 692.071 1.738 6,911.750
Total assets 673,915.000 2,504,250.000 616.691 39,071,200.000
Turnover 652,799.000 2,354,630.000 557.628 43,371,200.000
ISO
Non- audit fees 205.283 542.100 0.000 6,911.750
as
OS Profit before tax 55,066.200 200,306.000 -222,926.000 2,349,780.000
No. of subsidiaries 13.494 17.022 0.000 168.000
Return on equity 13.777 108.758 -2,469.330 841.830
Gearing 31.793 61.738 -862.770 584.640
Inventory / total assets 0.185 0.160 0.000 0.926
Debtors / total assets 0.256 0.139 0.012 0.857
Notes:
Fees, total assets, non-audit fees, profit before tax are in £'000s and in January 1991 prices
Complete information on non-audit fees was only available in FT Extel from 1993
There were 708 observations for each of the 5 years
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in 484 (17%) audits. The ratio of fee increases, decreases and no change
was similar when the sample was analysed according to audit firm groups.
Respective proportions for the Big Six were: 52%:31%:17%; medium sized
firms 48%:36%:16%; and small firms 53%:26%:21%.
Some marked differences were apparent when the analysis was performed
on inflation adjusted audit fees. None of the audits had fees unchanged from
the previous year. As a result, there were only 5 combinations of audit fee
change patterns over the five year period. Table 4.5 shows that 32% of the
companies had 2 annual inflated adjusted fee increases and 2 annual inflation
adjusted fee decreases. This ratio was also consistent when the companies
were grouped according to Big Six (31%), medium sized (37%) and small
audit firms (32%). During the five year period, 52 (7%) companies had
the maximum of 4 consecutive annual inflation adjusted fee increases and
84 (12%) companies had the maximum of 4 consecutive annual decreases.
Of the 52 companies that had 4 fee increases, 24 companies had each of
the increases 5% or above in real terms. The auditors of these 24 companies
were EY (Weir, Euromoney Publications, Boxmore International, Cranswick
Mill), CL (Mersey Docks), PW (Rugby Group, Halma, Porvair, Pentecost
Hicking), KPMG (Rolls Royce, EIS Group, Appollo Metals, Protean, Se-
lectv), TR (Vodafone, Serco Group), AA (Verson International Group, Ab¬
bott Mead Vickers, Horace Small Apparel, Tunstall Group), Grant Thorn¬
ton (Airtours), Gerald Edelman (Essex Furniture), Crane 8z Partners (Scott
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Table 4.5 Number of of Auditees in Each Inflation Adjusted Fee Change Combination
Number of 1 +ve 2 +ve 3 +ve Total Number Total dumber
+ ve and -ve 4 -ve & & & 4 +ve of of Changes
Changes 3 -ve 2 -ve 1 -ve Companies -ve +ve
KPMG 18 39 51 29 10 147 320 268
CL 8 37 34 28 5 112 239 209
PW 14 20 41 18 7 100 216 184
EY 11 30 24 26 6 97 208 180
TR 9 19 14 17 3 62 138 110
AA 2 11 7 7 5 32 62 66
Big Six 62 156 171 125 36 550 1183 1017
BH 4 7 12 3 1 27 64 44
GT 4 2 6 7 3 22 41 47
SH 0 4 7 2 3 16 28 36
RR 5 3 4 1 1 14 38 18
PKF 1 4 4 1 0 10 25 15
Medium Firms 14 20 33 14 8 89 196 160
Small Firms 8 17 22 14 8 69 141 135
Total 84 193 226 153 52 708 1520 1312
Notes:
nc : no change in fees; -ve : decrease in fees; +ve : increase in fees
CL: Coopers &c Lybrand, PW: Price Waterhouse, EY: Ernst & Young, TR: Touche Ross,AA:
Arthur Andersen,BH: BDO Binder Hamlyn, GT: Grant Thornton, SH: Stoy Hayward, RR:
Robson Rhodes, PKF: Pannell Kerr Forster
Pickford) and BDO Binder Hamlyn (Huntleigh Technology). Among the 84
companies that had 4 annual fee decreases, 10 companies had each of the
decreases 5% or above in real terms. The auditors of these 10 companies
were EY (Saltire), PW (Fenner, Forte, Goodhead Group, Torday & Carlisle)
KPMG (GEI International, PEX), TR (BAA, Goode Durrant) and BDO
Binder Hamlyn (First Technology).
Of the total 2,832 audits, there was inflation adjusted fee increase in
1,312 (46%) audits and decreases in 1,520 (54%) audits. Thus, overall,
there was evidence of a decrease in inflation adjusted fees over the five year
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period. The ratio of cases of fee increase to fee decrease was similar when
the sample was analysed by auditor categories (Big Six: 46%:54%; medium
sized firms: 45%:55%; small firms: 49%:51%). Within the Big Six, each of
KPMG, CL, PW, EY and TR lowered audit fees in approximately 54% of
their audits. AA was the only member of the Big Six which raised fees in the
majority (52%) of its audits. Among the medium sized audit firms, BDO
Binder Hamlyn, Robson Rhodes and Pannell Kerr Forster lowered fees in
the majority of their audits (59%, 68% and 63% respectively). In contrast,
Grant Thornton and Stoy Hayward increased fees in the majority of their
audits (53% and 56% respectively).
4.4.2 Determinants of Audit Fees
Table 4.6 presents the results of preliminary logarithm audit fee model
estimation. When annual analysis was performed for each of the five years,
the model explained between 84% to 86% of the variations in audit fees. The
coefficient of the variables logarithm of sales was positive as expected and
was statistically different from 0 at the 5% level ('statistically significant').
This result was consistent in each of the five year period. Therefore, audit
fees had increased as size of companies increased.
The coefficient of the complexity variable, that is, number of subsidiaries
was also positive and statistically significant in each of the five years in the
period. Therefore, audit fees had increased as the complexity of companies
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Table 4.6 Preliminary Model Estimation
Independent Variables Coefficient t-statistic (P-value) Adjusted R2
Constant -1.569 -7.300 (0.000)*
Log(Turnover) 0.515 23.997 (0.000)*
Inventory / total assets -0.254 -2.053 (0.040)*
Debtors / total assets 0.238 1.389 (0.165)
Ci No. of subsidiaries 0.021 6.591 (0.000)* 0.839
CT1
Gearing 0.001 2.209 (0.027)
Return on equity -0.001 -1.304 (0.192)
Profit before tax 0.000 2.143 (0.032)*
Busy season 0.049 1.187 (0.235)
Big-6 0.113 2.344 (0.019)*
Constant -1.656 -7.975 (0.000)*
Log(Turnover) 0.525 26.274 (0.000)*
Inventory / total assets -0.310 -2.417 (0.016)*
Debtors / total assets 0.248 1.394 (0.163)
O)
OS No. of subsidiaries 0.021 7.686 (0.000)* 0.836
O
Gearing 0.001 2.365 (0.018)*
Return on equity -0.000 -5.396 (0.000)*
Profit before tax 0.000 1.343 (0.179)
Busy season 0.001 0.023 (0.982)
Big-6 0.126 2.559 (0.011)*
Constant -1.746 -9.015 (0.000)*
Log(Turnover) 0.523 26.815 (0.000)*
Inventory / total assets -0.361 -2.582 (0.010)*
Debtors / total assets 0.499 3.022 (0.003)*
CO No. of subsidiaries 0.020 8.172 (0.000)*
o>
Ol Gearing 0.001 1.944 (0.052) 0.849
Return on equity 0.001 2.983 (0.003)*
Profit before tax 0.000 0.776 (0.438)
Busy season 0.002 0.056 (0.955)
Big-6 0.140 3.162 (0.002)*
Non-audit fees 0.000 1.671 (0.095)
Constant -1.799 -7.041 (0.000)*
Log(Turnover) 0.521 22.377 (0.000)*
Inventory / total assets -0.418 -3.471 (0.001)*
Debtors / total assets 0.662 3.894 (0.000)*
TT No. of subsidiaries 0.018 8.031 (0.000)*
Oi
Oi Gearing 0.001 1.389 (0.165) 0.849
Return on equity -0.000 -0.760 (0.447)
Profit before tax 0.000 0.363 (0.717)
Busy season 0.028 0.672 (0.502)
Big-6 0.174 3.830 (0.000)*
Non-audit fees 0.000 2.974 (0.003)*
Constant -1.839 -9.292 (0.000)*
Log(Turnover) 0.520 26.838 (0.000)*
Inventory / total assets -0.365 -3.205 (0.001)*
Debtors / total assets 0.505 3.403 (0.001)*
lO No. of subsidiaries 0.020 7.868 (0.000)*
CT1
a> Gearing 0.002 3.282 (0.001)* 0.859
Return on equity -0.000 -0.692 (0.489)
Profit before tax 0.000 1.473 (0.141)
Busy season 0.037 0.918 (0.359)
Big-6 0.159 3.638 (0.000)*
Non-audit fees 0.000 1.701 (0.089)
Notes:
Results were based on 708 observations
t-statistics were calculated based on White (1980)
* indicates statistically significantly different from 0 at 5% level
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increased. Results of the other two complexity variables were less conclusive.
The coefficient of the variable debtors to total assets was positive but it was
only statistically significant in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Although the coefficient
of the variable inventory to total assets ratio was statistically significant in all
years, it was negative. This is contrary to the belief that higher quantities
of inventory increase audit complexity and hence increase audit fees. It
suggests either that this variable might not have been an appropriate proxy
for complexity or that the absolute value of stock might not influence audit
work significantly (perhaps as a result of the use of sampling technique).
There was also some evidence to suggest that audit fees were determined
by auditee risk, as measured by the gearing ratio in the estimation model.
The coefficient of the variable gearing ratio was positive but was only statis¬
tically significant in 1991, 1992 and 1995. There was no strong evidence to
suggest that audit firms charged fees according to profitability of auditees.
Although the coefficient of the variable profit before tax was positive in each
of the five year analysis, it was statistically significant only in 1991. The
coefficient of the variable return on equity ratio was negative in 1991, 1992,
1994 and 1995, suggesting that this may be a better proxy for risk but was
only statistically significant in 1992 and 1993. The coefficient of the busy
season variable was not statistically significant in any of the annual analysis.
The coefficient of the dummy Big Six variable was positive and statis¬
tically significant in each annual analysis. Hence there was evidence of the
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existence of a Big Six premium. As complete information on non-audit ser¬
vices fees was only available from 1993, this variable was incorporated into
the fee model and was analysed in 1993, 1994 and 1995. There was only
weak evidence that higher non-audit services fees will lead to higher audit
fees. The coefficient on the variable non-audit services fees was positive in
1993, 1994 and 1995 but was statistically significant only in 1994.
Based on the results of preliminary model analysis, the model was re¬
vised and was simplified for further analysis. The variables inventory to
total assets ratio, debtors to total assets ratio, profit before tax and busy
season were removed from the model. The results of regression analysis are
presented in Table 4.7. The explanatory power of the model was almost
the same as that of the previous model. The adjusted R-square was still
between 84% to 86%. Results on the individual variables were also similar
to that of the previous model.
4.4.3 Audit Fee Changes 1991 - 95 by Auditors
Table 4.8 (page 107) summarises the results of analysis of audit fee change
based on the logarithm model. When the whole data sample of 708 compa¬
nies was analysed, results revealed that there was a 9.0% decrease in inflation
adjusted fees during the five year period. It was statistically different from
0 at the 5% level. Annual analysis indicated that there was fee reduction
in 1992/93 (4.6%), 1993/94 (2.9%) and 1994/95 (3.7%). The decrease in
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Table 4.7 Simplified Model















































































































Results were based on 708 observations
t-statistics were calculated based on White (1980)
indicates statistically significantly different from 0 at 5% level
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Table 4.8 Audit Fee Changes based on Logarithm Model
Sample Fee Change Sample Fee Change
(No. of Observations) (%) (No. of Observations) (%)
1991/95 -9.019 (-4.678)** 1991/95 -7.783 (-1.617)
Whole 1991/92 0.437 (0.175) CL 1991/92 -2.703 (-0.536)
Sample 1992/93 -4.578 (-2.292)** (112) 1992/93 -4.596 (-0.829)
(708) 1993/94 -2.947 (-1.435) 1993/94 1.023 (0.177)
1994/95 -3.660 (-1.907)* 1994/95 0.362 (0.073)
1991/95 -8.197 (-3.258)** 1991/95 -7.493 (-1.477)
Big 1991/92 -1.974 (-0.427) PW 1991/92 0.975 (0.180)
Six 1992/93 -4.303 (-1.813)* (100) 1992/93 7.481 (0.599)
(553) 1993/94 -2.330 (-0.975) 1993/94 -5.130 (-0.599)
1994/95 -3.970 (-1.782)* 1994/95 -5.799 (-1.185)
1991/95 -9.904 (-1.639) 1991/95 -9.252 (-1.466)
Medium 1991/92 -0.758 (-0.136) EY 1991/92 -6.334 (-0.513)
Firms 1992/93 -4.109 (-0.885) (97) 1992/93 -6.233 (-1.053)
(89) 1993/94 -0.103 (-1.725)* 1993/94 0.501 (0.089)
1994/95 -2.355 (-0.498) 1994/95 1.878 (0.217)
1991/95 5.024 (0.594) 1991/95 -9.136 (-1.309)
Small 1991/92 7.306 (1.174) TR 1991/92 2.312 (0.291)
Firms 1992/93 -4.045 (-0.783) (62) 1992/93 -5.048 (-0.867)
(69) 1993/94 -1.504 (-0.263) 1993/94 -1.251 (-0.180)
1994/95 -0.101 (-1.829)* 1994/95 -8.733 (-1.337)
1991/95 -7.891 (-2.033)** 1991/95 0.638 (0.263)
KPMG 1991/92 2.358 (0.556) AA 1991/92 -0.373 (-0.044)
(147) 1992/93 -2.664 (-0.641) (32) 1992/93 -2.198 (-0.274)
1993/94 -5.204 (-1.247) 1993/94 1.781 (0.203)
1994/95 2.879 (0.717) 1994/95 -14.831 (-1.584)
Notes:
Dependent variable: log(Fees)
Independent variables: log(Sales), number of subsidiaries, gearing ratio, return on equity, Big-6
dummy variable and non-audit fees (for 1993/94 and 1994/95)
t-statistics are in parenthesis
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
CL: Coopers &c Lybrand, PW: Price Waterhouse, EY: Ernst & Young, TR: Touche Ross, AA:
Arthur Andersen
Medium sized firms include BDO Binder Hamlyn, Grant Thornton, Stoyward Hayward, Robson
Rhodes and Pannell Kerr Forster
46 small audit firms constituted the small firm group
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1992/93 was 'statistically significant' different from 0 at 5% level and the
decrease in 1994/95 was significant at 10% level. The was a small increase
(0.4%) in 1991/92 but it was not statistically significant.
Results were similar when the analysis was confined to Big Six firms.
There was an overall 8.2% decrease in audit fees during the five year pe¬
riod, while the annual decreases were 2.0%, 4.3%, 2.3%, and 4.0%. Only
the 1992/93 and 1994/95 results were statistically significant at 10% level.
Analysis of individual Big Six firms indicated that only KPMG had statisti¬
cally significant overall inflation adjusted fee decreases of 7.9%. There was
weak evidence that CL, PW, EY and TR had overall inflation adjusted fee
decreases of 7.8%, 7.5%, 9.3% and 9.1% respectively. None of the four firms
had statistically significant annual changes in audit and the annual results
did not reveal any fee change pattern over time. AA did not have any sta¬
tistically significant change in fees over the five year period. If anything,
there was a inflation adjusted fee reduction in 1994/95.
Medium sized audit firms had weak evidence of inflation adjusted fee
reduction of 9.9% over the five year period. When annual change in fees of
this group of auditors was analysed, all were negative. However, only the
result in 1993/94 was statistically significant at 10% level. Compared to
the results of the Big Six, there was perhaps some evidence to support the
notion of a medium firm reaction to the threat of low balling practice by
the Big Six. Finally, small audit firms revealed an overall 5.0% increase in
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fees but was not statistically significant at 10% level. The annual change in
1991/92 was positive and annual changes in 1992/93, 1993/94, 1994/95 were
negative. However, the only statistically significant result in 1994 indicated
a minimal 0.1% reduction in fees.
Overall, the UK audit market experienced a 9.0% reduction in inflation
adjusted fees over the five year period. The change for the Big Six was -8.2%;
medium sized firms -9.9% and small firms +5.0%. However, results of the
medium sized and small firms were not statistically significant. Statistically
significant fee reduction occurred in year 1992/93 and 1994/95 (4.6% and
3.7%). Since the Big Six held slightly more than three quarters of the
audits in the data sample, their behaviour accounted for most of this pricing.
KPMG showed an average of 7.9% reduction in inflation adjusted audit fees
over the five year period but no statistically significant change was found in
the pricing policy of AA, CL, EY, PW and TR. Weak evidence of overall
fee reduction by CL, EY, PW and TR was found.
Results of Tables 4.6 (page 103) and 4.7 (page 106) indicated that there
was a Big Six premium in each of the five year period. Replacing the single
Big Six dummy variable in the logarithm model by six individual Big Six
dummy variables, results indicated that only CL, EY and KPMG charged
premium fees (Table 4.9). The coefficients of the individual Big Six dummy
variables for CL, EY and KPMG were positive and statistically significant at
5% level for each of the five years. The results showed that, on average, audit
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Table 4.9 Individual Big Six Premium
Coefficient
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
AA 0.111 0.117 0.146 0.220** 0.132
CL 0.205** 0.182** 0.170* 0.229** 0.256**
EY 0.161** 0.189** 0.188* 0.253** 0.231**
KPMG 0.121** 0.140** 0.170* 0.183** 0.160**
PW 0.030 0.048 0.071 0.116* 0.073
TR -0.013 0.043 0.066 0.097 0.019
Individual Big Six Premium (relative to non-Big Six firms)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
AA 11.714% 12.361% 15.675% 24.589% 14.081%
CL 22.779% 19.924% 18.560% 25.716% 29.118%
EY 17.439% 20.846% 20.650% 28.778% 25.972%
KPMG 12.833% 14.990% 18.496% 20.109% 17.404%
PW 3.087% 4.935% 7.349% 12.355% 7.528%
TR -1.327% 4.425% 6.798% 10.195% 1.939%
Notes:
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
CL: Coopers & Lybrand, PW: Price Waterhouse, EY: Ernst & Young, TR: Touche Ross, AA:
Arthur Andersen
Individual Big Six premium (relative to non-Big Six firms)
= expCoefficient of Individual Big Six Dummy Variable _ j
prices of CL were between 19% to 29% higher than audit prices of non-Big
Six firms. Audit prices of EY and KPMG were, respectively, between 17%
to 26% and 13% to 20% higher. Although there were annual changes in the
premium fees for each of the three firms, the changes were not statistically
significant. There was weak evidence that AA, PW and TR also charged
premium fees. The coefficients of the individual Big Six dummy variables
were all positive except for TR in 1991. However, only in 1994 that the
coefficients for AA and PW were statistically significant.
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Table 4.10 Pricing of Big Six Audits by Auditees Size (Total Assets)
Auditee Size X (JE'000) No. of Auditees % Change t-statistics
1st Quartile X > 572, 700 137 -9.164 OO *
2nd Quartile 572,700 > X > 117,123 138 0.175 -0.361
3rd Quartile 117,123 > X > 33,432 138 -7.274 -1.407
4th Quartile 33, 432 > X 137 -5.207 -1.504
* statistically significant at 10% level
4.4.4 Audit Fee Changes 1991 - 95 by Auditees Size
Table 4.10 summarises audit fee change for four groups of Big Six auditees.
On the basis of their size, as measured by total assets, the 550 Big Six
auditees in the sample were divided into 4 quartile groups. Although all
four groups experienced a reduction in audit fees, only the audit fee change
in the first quartile group was statistically significant at 10% level. The first
quartile group, represented by companies with total assets equal to or above
£572 million, had an overall fee reduction of 9.2%. Reductions of 7.3%
and 5.2% were observed for the third and fourth quartile group respectively.
The second quartile group had a very small increase of 0.2%. One possible
explanation for the observed largest price cuts for the largest auditees is
because they are the highest prestige clients.
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4.5 Methodology Issues
4.5.1 Multicollinearity and Heteroscedasticity
Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) test was performed to detect problem of
multicollinearity between the independent variables. Results11 of annual
analyses did not suggest problem of multicollinearity existed.
In the analysis, standard ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure led to
an unacceptable degree of heteroscedasticity (as indicated by the Breusch
and Pagan (1979) test). Therefore, the White (1980) method was used. The
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of
the OLS estimator, due to White (1980), is recommended whenever OLS es¬
timates are being used for inference in a situation in which heteroscedasticity
is suspected but the researcher is not able to find an adequate transformation
to purge the data of this heteroscedasticity (Kennedy, 1998, 133).
4.5.2 Audit Fees Quadratic Model
Other functional forms of audit fees have been used in research studies.
One example is the quadratic model used in Pong and Whittington (1994).
They argued that it is unnecessary to make the size variable (e.g turnover)
logarithmic in order to capture economies of scale in auditing from the per¬
spective of the auditee, that is, large audits may cost less, per unit of assets
uMaddala (1992) considers that measures of multicollinearity are all of limited use from
practical point of view and that they are all merely complaints that things axe not ideal.
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or transactions audited, than do small audits. They chose a quadratic form
because it adds a degree of flexibility to the estimation process and the Pong
and Whittington (1994) quadratic form is therefore used to detect audit fee
changes during the period 1991 to 1995:
Fi,t = b0 + h\Sitt + b2Sl + b3Wht + b4W?t
+b5Subitt + beSubijWij + b7Bi>t
+b&BijtSubittWitt + bgNAFij + eitt (4-3)
where for auditee i at time t,
Fitt = inflation adjusted audit fees
Sij = inflation adjusted turnover
Wij = inflation adjusted (debtors + inventory)
Subij = number of subsidiaries
Bij = Big Six dummy (= 1 if auditor was a Big Six, = 0 otherwise)
NAFij = inflation adjusted non-audit services fees
e^t = error term
bo = constant term
b\ ... bo = coefficients
Model parameters (bo ... 69), which are estimated using data at time t, are
substituted into the model to predict Fitt+\ at time t+1. If a systematic
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AFt+i, defined as AFt+i = Ft+i — Ft+1, exists, there is a change in inflation
adjusted fees.
Table 4.11 summarises the results of the quadratic model. Overall, the
results were consistent with that of the logarithm model: (1) there was a
statistically significant overall decrease in inflation adjusted fees during the
five year period. The decrease was relatively smaller, at 7.0% compared to
9.0%, when the logarithm model was used. No annual statistically significant
change was observed. (2) the reduction of fees was also mainly caused by
the impact of the Big Six (6.5% of this decrease). (3) although KPMG still
showed an overall fee reduction, it was not statistically significant. PW and
AA now showed statistically significant reduction in fees. Weak evidence
of fee reduction was still observed for CL and TR. (4) although medium
sized firms revealed a statistically significant fee reduction over the five year
period, it was only 0.2%. (5) no change in fees for the small firms over
the five year period could be detected. However, a statistically significant
reduction of 8.5% was observed in 1994/95.
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Table 4.11 Audit Fee Changes based on Quadratic Model
Sample Fee Change Sample Fee Change
(No. of Observations) (%) (No. of Observations) (%)
1991/95 -7.015 (2.206)** 1991/95 -8.719 (-1.205)
Whole 1991/92 0.261 (0.077) CL 1991/92 -2.277 (-0.318)
Sample 1992/93 -0.807 (-0.226) (112) 1992/93 -1.067 (-0.152)
(708) 1993/94 -5.079 (-1.530) 1993/94 -5.097 (-0.782)
1994/95 -2.553 (-0.748) 1994/95 -1.708 (-0.287)
1991/95 -6.546 (-1.945)** 1991/95 -16.811 (-3.164)**
Big Six 1991/92 0.455 (0.127) PW 1991/92 -1.278 (-0.197)
(553) 1992/93 -0.795 (-0.211) (100) 1992/93 -3.676 (-0.572)
1993/94 -4.845 (-1.383) 1993/94 -9.475 (-1.792)*
1994/95 -2.542 (-0.706) 1994/95 -7.417 (-1.352)
1991/95 -0.187 (-2.329)** 1991/95 5.117 (0.665)
Medium 1991/92 -10.002 (-1.167) EY 1991/92 5.425 (1.014)
Firms 1992/93 -1.427 (-0.214) (97) 1992/93 -2.418 (-0.355)
(89) 1993/94 -17.721 (-1.113) 1993/94 -3.389 (-0.582)
1994/95 -2.281 (0.300) 1994/95 4.449 (0.531)
1991/95 -3.256 (-0.425) 1991/95 -7.232 (-1.341)
Small 1991/92 7.166 (1.071) TR 1991/92 8.485 (1.154)
Firms 1992/93 -0.586 (-0.133) (62) 1992/93 -7.326 (-1.505)
(69) 1993/94 -2.801 (-0.721) 1993/94 1.750 (0.272)
1994/95 -8.555 (-2.047)** 1994/95 -8.633 (-1.209)
1991/95 -6.893 (-1.180) 1991/95 -12.793 (-2.072)**
KPMG 1991/92 0.638 (0.104) AA 1991/92 2.894 (0.334)
(147) 1992/93 -0.246 (-0.036) (32) 1992/93 -4.093 (-0.393)
1993/94 -7.337 (-1.135) 1993/94 -10.077 (0.971)
1994/95 -3.495 (-0.569) 1994/95 -0.768 (-0.158)
Notes:
t-statistics are in parenthesis
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
CL: Coopers &: Lybrand, PW: Price Waterhouse, EY: Ernst &: Young, TR: Touche Ross, AA:
Arthur Andersen
Medium sized firms include BDO Binder Hamlyn, Grant Thornton, Stoyward Hayward, Robson
Rhodes and Pannell Kerr Forster
46 small audit firms constituted the small firm group
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4.5.3 Tests for Parameters Changes over Time
One commonly used test for parameters changes is based on Chow (I960)12
and Table 4.12 presents the results of its application to this case. When the
Chow test is performed on the whole data sample, the result indicated that
there were structural changes in the fee model parameters between 1991 and
1995. When the data sample was subdivided into Big Six, medium firms
and small firms, the results of the analysis on Big Six and medium firms
also showed structural changes in the fee model parameters between 1991
and 1995. Annual analysis of the Big Six showed that the changes occurred
in 1991/92. None of the annual analysis of the medium firms indicated
any structural difference. Among the Big Six, only Ernst and Young had
structural changes in audit pricing between 1991 and 1995.
It has to be noted that the Chow test has deficiencies. First, the test re¬
jects the null hypothesis more often than it should (Kennedy, 1998). Second,
12At time t, logFiit is given by:
logFi,t = ao + ailogSi,t + a3DAi,t + a3IAilt
+aiSubitt + asGearitt + a&RoEi,t
+<nPbTitt + asYEi<t + agNAFi,t
+aioBitt + a,t (4-4)
At time t+1, logFitt+1 is given by:
logFi,t+i = bo + bilogSi,t+i + bgDAij+i + b3IAi,t+i
+biSubi,t+\ + &5Gear,,t+i + bgRoEi^t+i
+b7PbTi,t+i + b3YEitt+i + bgNAFi,t+i
+fcioBi,t+i + e+t+i (4-5)
Therefore, null and alternative hypotheses for testing parameters change are:
Hq : a/c = bk for all k
Hi : ak 7b bk for at least one k
CHAPTER 4. AUDIT PRICING BEHAVIOUR 117











































































































































* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
(+) indicates increase in coefficient magnitude which was statistically significant at 5% level
(-) indicates decrease in coefficient magnitude which was statistically significant at 5% level
G stands for variable gearing
R stands for variable return on equity
NS stands for variable number of subsidiaries
CL: Coopers &; Lybrand, PW: Price Waterhouse, EY: Ernst & Young, TR: Touche Ross, AA:
Arthur Andersen
Medium sized firms include BDO Binder Hamlyn, Grant Thornton, Stoy Hayward, Robson Rhodes
and Pannell Kerr Forster
46 small audit firms constituted the small firm group
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it detects simply some unspecified change in parameter values. This might
be a change in the intercept, in one of the slope parameters or both. Third,
one of the assumptions made by the Chow test is that the disturbances of
the individual regression are independently distributed. This assumption
may not be valid in the audit market. Cases where a Chow test revealed a
statistical significant structural change (at 10%) were investigated further.
The dummy variables technique was used to test for shifts in each particular
parameter between time t and t+1. An ordinary least squares regression was
performed on pooled data samples at time t and t+1. Any structural change
will be indicated by the coefficients (bo ... b\o) on the dummy variables.
logFij = ao + ailogSi + a,2Subi + a^Geari
Pa^RoEi + a^NAFi + a^Bi
+boDt+i + b\logSiDt+i + bzSubiDt+i + b^GeariDt+i
Pb^RoEiDt+i + &5./VAFiDt+i + boBiD^i + ej (4-6)
logFi = natural logarithm of inflation adjusted audit fees
logSi — natural logarithm of inflation adjusted turnover
Subi number of subsidiaries
Geari = gearing ratio
RoEi = return on equity ratio
NAFi = inflation adjusted non-audit services fees
Bi Big Six dummy (= 1 if auditor was a Big Six, = 0 otherwise)
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Dt+i = dummy variable (= 1 when time t+1, = 0 otherwise)
ei — error term
do = constant term
a\ ... d6 = coefficients
bo ... be = coefficients
Table 4.12 presents the results of the dummy variables test. When the
whole sample was analysed for 1991/95, the coefficient magnitudes of the
variables return on equity and gearing had increased. A similar increase
in the coefficient magnitude of the variable gearing ratio was also observed
for EY. However, in the case of medium sized audit firms, the coefficient
magnitudes of the variables gearing ratio and number of subsidiaries had
decreased.
4.5.4 Fixed and Random Effects Models
So far, the chapter has only considered static audit fee models with cross-
sectional auditees data having been used to estimate the models. However,
it is also possible to incorporate time effects to produce a dynamic model.
The general form of a dynamic model is:
■Fjpt — Oiipt + PiptXipt + &ipt (4-7)
where Fipt = inflation adjusted audit fees paid by auditee p to auditor i at time t
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otipt = constant term for auditor i, auditee p at time t
Nipt = determinants of audit fees
= vector of coefficients
£ipt = error term
Assuming that an audit firm does not have differential pricing policies among
its auditees at any point in time, we may simplify the above to:
This model can be estimated using a set of panel data, that is, a set of
pooled cross-sectional time-series data. However, the standard ordinary least
squares technique may not be applicable because its assumption that the
error covariance terms are zero is unlikely to be valid. In particular, we
would expect that fees charged by auditor i to auditee p at time t may
affect auditor i's decision on the amount of fees to be charged to auditee p
at time t+1. In other words, covariance of eipt and diPt+\ is not equal to
0. A time series analysis technique may be applied to solve the problem.
However, the dataset used in this chapter covers only a 5 year period and this
is not sufficient for time series model estimation. Therefore, two commonly
used panel data models have been used: a two way fixed effects model and
a random effects model (Greene, 1997, 1998). The fixed effects model is a
Pipt — Otit T fiiptXipt + dipt (4.8)
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classical regression model involving dummy variables:
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logFht = a0 + ai+'yt + ailogSijt + a2Subitt
+a3Gearitt + a^RoE^t + a5NAFht + eijt (4.9)
where for auditee i at time t
logFij = natural logarithm of inflation adjusted audit fees
logSij = natural logarithm of inflation adjusted turnover
Subht = number of subsidiaries
Gearij = gearing ratio
RoEitt = return on equity ratio
NAFitt = inflation adjusted non-audit services fees
eij = error term
cq = constant auditor i effect
71 = constant time t effect
do = constant term
a\ ... 05 = coefficients
The random effects model is a generalised least squares model of the follow¬
ing form:
logFitt = o0 + ailogSij + a2Subi}t + a3Gearitt
+a^RoEitt + a3NAFij + e%tt + Ui + w% (4-10)
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where E[ui] = 0, Var[iq] = of, cov[ui,eitt] = 0
E[wt] = 0, Var[wt] = of, cov[wt, eijt] = 0
Results of the two way fixed and random effects models are summarised
in Table 4.13. The two way (group and time) fixed effects model had an
adjusted R-square of 84.13%. The model test showed that the group and
time effects were important explanatory factors of audit fees and its results
were in favour of the fixed effects model to random effects model (Hausman
test). Confirming our results in earlier sections, the results of the two way
fixed effect model indicated that Big Six charged higher fees than medium
sized and small firms. In addition, the results revealed that fees in 1992
were higher than the average fees of the five year period and that fees in
1995 were lower than the average fees.
4.5.5 Other Issues
As earlier researchers (Maher et al., 1992; Iyer and Iyer, 1996; Sanders et ah,
1995) have observed, since the true functional form of the audit fee model
is not known, any result obtained from using these audit fee models is con¬
founded by the potential omitted variables bias. For example, the models
in this study did not include client participation in audits, the effectiveness
of internal control system, the economic condition of particular audit firm
offices and the quality of audits. Other limitations of this study are its
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Table 4.13 Fixed and Random Effects Models
Estimated Fixed Effects Coefficient t-statistic
Group
Big Six 0.033 6.31*
Medium Sized Firms -0.072 -2.89*







Model Test Test Test statistic
Model(l) vs Model(2) F Test 9.428*
Model(l) vs Model(3) F Test 4.894*
Model(l) vs Model(4) Hausman 1.780
Notes:
Model(l): Fixed group and time effects model
Model(2): Model without group or time effects
Model(3): Fixed group effects model
Model(4): Random effects model
* Statistically significant at 5% level
inability to isolate the increase in fees due to changes in the regulatory en¬
vironment and the fact that while it identifies changes in inflation adjusted
audit fees, it does not provide direct explanations for these changes.
4.6 Summary, Observations and Conclusion
This chapter has reported a variety of new empirical evidence about audit
firm behaviour in the UK audit services market for quoted companies. The
evidence is based on audit price data for the period 1991-95. In summary it
has shown that,
1. a wide variety of audit fee change patterns for individual auditees was
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apparent although some experienced either consistent increases and
decreases.
2. a majority of audits had a real term fee reduction and total audit fees
fell markedly, in real terms, over the period.
3. fees in 1992 were higher and fees in 1995 were lower than the average
fees during the five year period.
4. the pattern of real audit fee reduction was distributed differently over
the period for different audit firms.
5. there were some strong evidence that a few Big Six firms (KPMG,
PW and AA) had significant fee reduction over the period and weak
evidence for the others (CL, EY, TR).
6. there was weak evidence that medium sized auditors reduced their
audit fees but small audit firms maintained their fee levels.
7. there was strong evidence that CL, EY and KPMG charged premium
fees but weak evidence for AA, PW and TR. There was no change in
premium fees for each of the Big Six firms over the five year period.
8. audit fee reduction in the largest group of Big Six auditees was markedly
more than that evident among smaller clients.
9. alternative audit fee change models are generally mutually supportive
in the results produced when applied to this data.
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These findings provide more information than has hitherto been available on
audit pricing behaviour in the UK. They result from a primarily descriptive
analysis which has been designed to enhance visibility on what has happened
in the audit services market as opposed to the ascertainment of why firms
price as they have. Consequently the study represents only a first, but
important, step towards explaining and gaining a further understanding of
how firms have priced their audit services. However, it does also provide
a basis for some significant observations about the operation of the market
and some suggestions for future research.
The marked reduction in real audit fee income over the period is con¬
sistent with the existence of a price competitive market. Alternative ex¬
planations include an improvement in audit firm efficiency which was, at
least in part, passed on to clients. The fact that benefits may have been
passed on to clients does, in fact, provide more support for the price com¬
petitiveness of the market. It is also possible that the fee reduction reflects
a deterioration in the quality of audit service provided. Researching these
options would assist in the determination of the reasons underlying audit
price movement but would require the use of evidence which may be difficult
to obtain. For example an analysis of the costs and revenues (profitability)
of audit work would shed some light on audit efficiency while future litiga¬
tion or retrospective interviewing of those party to the audit process would
be needed to assess audit quality changes. The availability of this type of
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data to independent researchers is doubtful. However, disclosure of financial
performance of audit firms may eventually provide some further data which
can be used by researchers seeking to explain audit price variations.
The audit price data presented reveals a variety and a complexity in
the pricing behaviour of audit firms. Although on average audit prices fell
there were price pattern differences apparent in individual years, across au¬
dit firms and in respect of client companies. Even the Big Six exhibited no
uniformity in their audit pricing. However, some analysis of the timing of
audit price changes by the Big Six over a longer period than that used in
this study might be merited to determine whether a long-term price lead¬
ership pattern can be determined. Also the variability in client treatment
provides evidence which, on investigation, would provide valuable insights
into audit firm pricing decisions. Those clients receiving consecutive price
reduction give an analytical benchmark for the comparison of the opposite
treatment of other clients by the audit firm. Investigation of the respective
characteristics and circumstances of these clients could provide indications
of factors to which the level of audit fee is sensitive. For example, con¬
trasts in the circumstances of the individual auditor client relationship may
become apparent as important determinants of audit fee. Moreover, the
higher price reductions enjoyed by larger Big Six clients may be indicative
of greater price competition in this segment of the market. It may also be
that the prestige and consultancy opportunities offered by large clients are
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influential in this distinction.
In conclusion, the findings of this study do, to some extent, ameliorate
the worries of those audit service purchasers who are concerned that the
increasing market dominance of a few big firms has led to a reduction in price
competition. However, while the 1991-95 picture does suggest that price
competition remained healthy, there is a need to undertake a longer period
study which allow audit market behaviour to be researched in the context of
different economic conditions and over a time scale when significant increases




Earlier, we saw that while there was a slight increase in audit services mar¬
ket concentration during the years from 1991 to 1995, audit prices charged
by the large and medium sized audit firms have fallen. However, we also
noticed that, in Chapter 4 (Table 4.9 on page 110), Big Six firms were
charging premium fees and that these fees (as measured relative to non-Big
Six audit prices) were increasing over this period. Moizer (1997, 67-68)
suggested that reasons for auditee companies paying a Big Six premium
include: a higher quality Big Six audit; a Big Six name attached to the
financial statements; a higher chance of getting claims from the Big Six if
the audit went wrong; and an oligopoly price charged by the Big Six. In
addition, Craswell et al. (1995) argued that the development of both brand
name reputation and industry specialisation by the large international audit
firms was costly and therefore these firms charged higher audit fees. Their
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argument was based on economic theories of product differentiation which
suggest that higher product prices in competitive markets are consistent
with positive returns to investments in brand reputation and higher quality
products (Shapiro, 1989). In the audit services market, demand for brand
reputation and higher quality audits could, from an economic perspective,
be explained in terms of agency and contracting costs. The relationship
between the shareholders and management of a company is a typical prin¬
cipal agent setting. Management, who run the company, are contractual
agents of the shareholders. As principals, shareholders are motivated to
monitor the performance of the managers who have an asymmetric balance
(in their favour) of local information about the firm's operations and oppor¬
tunities (through the divorce of ownership and control). When the goals of
managers and shareholders are not congruent, the managers might sacrifice
shareholders' interests. The use of an auditor may enhance the effectiveness
of monitoring activity by reducing the agent's pursuit of self-interest and if
this benefit exceeds the cost of the audit then auditing can be of financial
benefit to the principal. The better the quality of an audit, the higher will
be the cost savings through reduced agency costs.
However, Craswell et al. (1995, 301) noted that because auditors devel¬
oped industry specialisation by increasing their clienteles, specialists could
also achieve production economies and therefore, became more efficient,
lower-cost producers of audits. Without presenting their reasoning, they
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believed that the required return on investment in industry expertise would
dominate potential economies of production and lead to higher audit fees.
This reasoning may be questioned as the avoidance of any price premium
by the specialist reduces the threat of regulatory intervention and avoids
attracting new entrants while allowing the specialist to benefit from their
lower cost base. Craswell et al. (1995) found that on average, industry spe¬
cialist Big 8 auditors earned a 34% premium over nonspecialist Big Eight
auditors, and the Big Eight brand name premium over non-Big Eight au¬
ditors averages around 30%. Although Craswell et al. (1995) identified a
specialist premium when specialists were determined according to a 10%
market share threshold, the premium was not found when the threshold
was increased to 20%. They concluded that given the arbitrariness of any
market share rule, they could not rule out the possibility of spurious results
in their study (p.318). It should also be noted that Palmrose (1986a) also
tested fee premium for specialist auditors. Her study showed that specialist
auditors did not charge higher fees than non-specialist auditors. Thus, there
is little conclusive evidence on the impact of audit specialisation on audit
prices. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop an alternative theory that
explains differences in audit prices charged by audit firms in terms of audit
quality, specialisation, auditor size and changes in the audit services market
concentration. This alternative theory argues that auditors achieving pro¬
duction economics may not pass on the benefit to the auditees in terms of
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lower price audits. The basis of the theory is that both the size of an au¬
dit firm and its specialist knowledge of typologies of auditee are important
dimensions of competitiveness in the audit services market. Both of these
characteristics give supply side benefits to the audit firm through, respec¬
tively, economies of scale and uniqueness in service provision. An audit firm
with competitive advantage based on these characteristics can increase its
market dominance and/or can earn higher than normal industry economic
profits.
Besanko et al. (2000, 389) argued that competitive advantage is achiev¬
able only if a firm can create more economic value than its rivals can. They
defined value-creation as the difference between the value that resided in the
product (quality) and the value of the inputs that were sacrificed to make
that product (cost). An audit firm can therefore economically outperform
other firms in the audit services market by having lower costs of production
for a given quality of services output or by having a higher and differentiated
quality of product for a given cost (and exploit this through a higher price)
or both. Two routes can be taken to achieve these gains. First, by increasing
in size, a firm can achieve cost advantage through economies of scale and
scope. Second, by developing audit expertise knowledge, a firm can provide
superior audit quality services. Quality advantage is more readily attained
in the context of complex audits because specific and specialised knowledge
is more relevant to this type of audits. Moreover, a quality advantage may
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accumulate through experience gained in these audits. Routine audits of¬
fer less opportunity for this advantage. As we shall see later, firms with
both cost and quality advantages can develop strategies to achieve a gain in
market share and/or a higher profit margin.
The rest of the chapter will be structured as follows: section 5.1 pro¬
vides an economic analysis of the impact of the size of an audit firm and its
specialist knowledge on its pricing behaviour and on audit services market
concentration. Hypotheses are then derived for empirical testing. Sections
5.2 and 5.3 provide methods to identify complex industries and audit spe¬
cialists. Section 5.4 describes the data sample and audit fee models used in
the study. Section 5.5 provides a summary of results of analyses. Section
5.6 discusses some methodological issues and the robustness of the results.
Section 5.7 concludes the study.
5.1 Theory Development
The analysis of Besanko et al. (2000, 416) can be applied to audit firms in
respect of their pricing policies in the audit services market. To facilitate
the analysis, a number of assumptions have been made in respect of the for¬
mulation of audit firm pricing strategies in a market context. The following
sub-section lists the assumptions made and provides some discussion of their
nature and applicability to the existing auditee market.
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5.1.1 Assumptions
Market Competitiveness
It is assumed that audit firms are competing with one another on price
and/or quality of products and that they do not collude. In addition, au¬
dit firms are only expected to survive if they can make long run normal
returns.
Number of Competitors
To simplify analysis, it is assumed that there are only four types of audit
firms in an audit services market: L* (large and specialist firm), S* (small
and specialist firm), L (large firm) and S (small firm).
Number of Audit Sub-Markets
To simplify analysis, it is assumed that there are only two types of auditees
- complex and non-complex. In the non-complex auditees market, there are
no audit specialists. In other words, there are only L (large audit firms) and
S (small audit firms). This is because there is no requirement for special
auditing knowledge in order to conduct the audits of the auditee companies.
Also, as no special skills are required to perform the audits, the differences
in respect of the quality of audit firm products are small.
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Price Elasticity of Demand
High (low) price elasticity of demand is associated with weak (strong) hor¬
izontal product differentiation1 . Horizontal differentiation is likely to be
strong when there are many product attributes that consumers weigh in as¬
sessing overall benefit, and consumers disagree about the desirability of those
attributes. It is assumed in this study that price elasticity of demand for au¬
dit services is low. This is because although price is an important factor for
the choice of auditors, the findings of Beattie and Fearnley (1995, 1998a,b)
suggest that there is strong horizontal differentiation in audit services. Beat-
tie and Fearnley (1995) identified 29 important auditor characteristics which
could be grouped under the following headings:
1. integrity and technical competence
2. acceptability to third parties such as bankers and regulators
3. value for money
4. ability to provide non-audit services
5. specialist industry knowledge and
6. geographic proximity.
1A product is horizontally differentiated when some consumers prefer it to competing
products (holding price constant).
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Further research by Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) into the choice of audit
firms found that auditees have different preferences over different auditor
characteristics.
Size and Cost Advantage
Provided they have not exceeded optimal size, large firms are able to achieve
lower average cost than small firms because of their ability to achieve economies
of scale and scope. This advantage is obtained by spreading their fixed costs
over a large client base and by increasing production efficiency through spe¬
cialist learning and cumulative experience. Therefore, for a given auditee
where complexity is not a consideration, firms L* and L are able to produce
the audit for the auditee at a cost (Cl* and Cl respectively) that is lower
than the cost of the same audit produced by firms S* and S (Cs* and Cs
respectively). That is, Cl* = Cl < Cs* = Cs-
Audit Specialisation and Audit Quality
Audit risk for an auditor is usually defined in terms of the probability that
the auditor provides an incorrect opinion on some significant aspect of the
audit combined with the likelihood that this mistake is found out. Recent
business failures suggest that audit risk may be extensive with all audi¬
tors responsible, to some degree, for their assessment of the going concern
character of a client business.
CHAPTER 5. SIZE, SPECIALISATION AND MARKET SHARE 136
Audit risk is auditor specific. Different auditors might have different
perceptions of audit risk in respect of the same audit assignment. The level
of audit risk perceived by an auditor is dependent on the degree of relevant
auditing knowledge that the auditor possesses and the auditee complexity.
Auditors with superior auditing knowledge have a better understanding of
their clients operations and a better ability to recognise and assess riskiness
than auditors with less auditing knowledge. In essence, through superior
audit knowledge, they can provide a higher quality of audit and thereby
reduce audit risk.
Thus knowledge or expertise underlies the concept of audit quality. Bedard
and Chi (1993) reviewed various expertise studies and identified a number of
expert features. First, experts know more about their domain than do non¬
experts. Second, experts demonstrate a better organisation of knowledge.
They have stronger links between concepts and more procedural knowledge
associated with those concepts. Third, experts perform better than non¬
experts because experts have developed better problem solving skills and
they demonstrate greater ability to represent problems successfully. More¬
over, they develop a problem solving schemata and can also more readily and
accurately distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. Thus,
auditing knowledge does not necessarily enable the auditors to reduce the
amount of audit work. It may lead to the recognition that more work is
needed. Auditing knowledge enhances the relevance of work done by allow-
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ing a more effective targeting of audit work to high audit risk areas. It allows
audit work to be more accurately focussed and so reduces redundancy and
waste.
Therefore, for a given auditee complexity, the quality of the audit (Ql*
and Qs*) produced by specialist firms (L* and S* respectively) is higher than
the quality of the audit ( Ql and Qs) produced by non-specialist firms (L
and S respectively). That is, Ql* = Qs* > Ql = Qs- We assume here that
specialists maintain a quality advantage and do not trade off between quality
and cost (that is, L* and S* will not produce a lower quality product at a
lower cost). Thus, L* (S*) will not have cost advantage over L(S). This is
possible in the audit market because first, firms may want to go for a good
quality brand name image and second, lowering its quality of audit for the
sake of competition when it can achieve higher quality may appear rather
unprofessional.
Cost and Quality Advantages
Some firms are able to achieve both cost and quality advantage. Porter
(1998a) argued that higher quality products often cost more to produce.
However, Besanko et al. (2000) disagreed and considered that "the con¬
ditions under which the pursuit of a benefit [quality] advantage may be
consistent with achieving a superior cost position arise frequently enough,
so that we cannot conclude that benefit and cost advantage are generally
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incompatible". They noted that "firms that appeared to have achieved ben¬
efit [quality] advantages in their industries also tended to operate newer
plants, had significantly better-than-average capacity utilization, and had
direct costs per unit that were significantly lower than the industry average.
Firms that appeared to have achieved cost advantages also scored highly on
measures of relative differentiation, such as product quality, and advertising
and promotion expenses" (Besanko et al., 2000, 423). This is certainly true
in the audit services market; the large firms (especially the Big Five) are
audit experts in most industries. This is translated into a quality advantage
deriving from an accumulation of auditing knowledge through the provision
of audit and consultancy services to a large number and variety of compa¬
nies. This superior knowledge enables these auditors to focus on the high
risk audit areas. The ability to identify high risk areas means that there
is less chance that the auditor will form an incorrect opinion. The audit
quality is thus better.
5.1.2 Audit Pricing Strategies in the Non-Complex Auditees
Market
In the non-complex auditees market, we have assumed that there are no
audit specialists. Therefore, as size does not, in itself, influence audit quality,
firms do not compete on the basis of the quality of audits (Ql — Qs)■
Instead, they will compete on price. Firms with a lower cost of production
can afford to offer audits at lower prices (and still make comparable returns
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to other auditors) to entice the customers of their competitors. This is
possible because large firms (L) enjoy cost advantages.
It is reasonable to assume that the price (Ps) charged for an audit prod¬
uct by small firm, S, equals to the cost of producing the service Cs (which
incorporates a normal return). Indeed, S will continue to operate only if
it can earn at least normal profit in the long run. How much L charges
depends on the price elasticity of demand for audit services. Since we have
assumed that the price elasticity of demand for audit services is low, pur¬
chasers of audit services are not sensitive to price changes. A price cut by
L will not take away many customers from S. Under this circumstance, the
best strategy for L is to maintain its price parity with S. This results in the
following relationships: Cl < Pl — Ps = Cs- By maintaining price parity,
L is able to earn above a normal return, that is, a higher profit return than
S ("margin strategy"). This is because (Pl — Cl) > (Ps ~ Cs)-
5.1.3 Audit Pricing Strategies in Complex Auditees Market
Since there are four possible types of players in the market (L*, S*, L and
S), there are 6 possible competitive combinations: (1) L* vs S*, (2) L* vs
L, (3) L* vs S, (4) S* vs L, (5) S* vs S and (6) L vs S. Each are considered
in turn below.
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Strategy of L* against S*
Since both L* and S* are specialist firms, they produce similar audit qual¬
ity products. They therefore may compete on price. Since L* enjoys cost
advantage relative to S*, the strategies used by L* will be the same as
that discussed in Section 5.1.2 (Audit Pricing Strategies in Non-Complex
Auditees Market):
Cs* = Ps• = Pl* > Cl» price parity, margin strategy (5.1)
Strategy of L* against L
Since L* does not have cost advantage over L, it will not underprice L.
Since it is assumed that the price elasticity of demand is low, L* can choose
a mixed strategy. Due to its specialist reputation it can charge the price set
by L plus a premium which is of a size below the maximum premium that
the auditees are willing to pay for the superior quality. Thus, L* will (i)
exploit advantage through higher profit margins ("margin strategy") and (ii)
gain market share as long as the premium price is lower than the maximum
premium ("share strategy").
Pl* > Cl* = Cl = Pl price hike, mixed strategy (5.2)
Strategies of L* against S
L* has both cost and benefit advantage over S. If the price elasticity of
demand is low, L* can choose a mixed strategy. This is to charge the price
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set by S plus a premium price which is of a size below the maximum premium
that auditees are willing to pay for the superior quality. Thus, L* will (i)
exploit advantage through higher profit margins ("margin strategy") and (ii)
gain market share as long as the premium price is lower than the maximum
premium ("share strategy").
Pl* > Cs = Ps > Cl* price hike, mixed strategy (5.3)
Strategies of L against S
Since both L and S produce same audit quality products, they will only
compete on price. Since L enjoys cost advantage relative to S and price
elasticity is low, the strategy used by L will be the same as that discussed in
Section 5.1.2 (Audit Pricing Strategies in Non-Complex Auditees Market):
Cs = Ps = Pl > Cl price parity, margin strategy (5-4)
Strategies of L against S*
L has cost advantage over S* but S* has quality advantage over L. Under
this circumstance, it is likely that L will lower its price to compensate for
its quality disadvantage.
Cs* = Ps* > Pl > Cl price cut (5.5)
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Table 5.1 Audit Firm Strategies
Type of Industries Case Craswell et al. (1995) Alternative Theory
Non-Complex
Industries
L vs S Pl > Ps Pl — Ps
(price parity, margin strategy)
Complex Industries
L* vs S* Pl. > Ps- Pl* = Ps*
(price parity, margin strategy)
L* vs L Pl * > Pl Pl* > Pl
(price hike, mixed strategy)
L* vs 5 Pl* > Ps Pl* > Ps
(price hike, mixed strategy)
L vs S* no predictable result Pl < Ps *
L vs S Pl > Ps Pl=Ps
(price parity, margin strategy)
S* vs S Ps * > Ps Ps * > Ps
(price hike, mixed strategy)
L*: large and specialist firm, S*: small and specialist firm, L: large firm, S: small firm
Strategies of S* against S
Since S* does not have cost advantage over S, it cannot underprice S. Since
it is assumed that the price elasticity of demand is low, S* can choose a
mixed strategy. As a specialist firm, it can charge the price set by S plus
a premium set at a level below the maximum premium that auditees are
willing to pay for the superior quality. Thus, S* will (i) exploit advantage
through higher profit margins ("margin strategy") and (ii) gain market share
as long as the premium price is lower than the maximum premium ("share
strategy").
Ps* > Cs* = Ps = Cs price hike, mixed strategy (5-6)
Table 5.1 summarises the hypotheses (HI to H7) developed in this section
and provides a comparison with the recent work of Craswell et al. (1995):
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HI In non-complex industries with no specialist auditors, large firms will
charge the same audit fees as small audit firms.
H2 In complex industries, large specialist auditors will charge the same
audit fees as small specialist auditors.
H3 In complex industries, large specialist auditors will charge higher audit
fees than large auditors.
H4 In complex industries, large specialist auditors will have higher audit
fees than small auditors
H5 In complex industries, large auditors will charge lower audit fees than
small specialist auditors.
H6 In complex industries, large auditors will charge same audit fees as small
auditors.
H7 In complex industries, small specialist auditors will charge higher audit
fees than small auditors.
5.2 Complex Industry Identification
As a precursor to testing the above hypotheses, this section attempts to find
a basis on which auditee complexity can be specified and thereby identified.
The methods used for this task are based firstly on the relevant research
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literature and secondly on information obtained by the author in research
interviews with six senior auditors2.
Auditee complexity is intrinsic and internal to the business concerned
and is an important factor determining the amount and the specialised na¬
ture of the audit work which is required to be undertaken. Factors affecting
complexity include the nature of the business of the auditee, its location, the
quality of its internal control and the proportion of unusual transactions in
which it participates (Chan et al., 1993). The interviewees focussed on the
nature of the business and its organisational structure as the major factors
determining audit complexity. Their responses also suggested that although
there were variations in terms of audit complexity within an industry, com¬
plexity was largely determined by the type of industry.
5.2.1 Nature of Business
Length of business operating cycle
In general, it was felt that the audit task was easier in business with a shorter
operating cycle (interviewees B, E and F). A business that has a long operat¬
ing cycle is likely to build up a higher volume of stocks for which the risk of
obsolescence is greater. More audit assurance will therefore be needed on the
2To maintain confidentiality, the auditors are labelled with letters A to F. One inter¬
viewee is a full time member and the other five interviewees are/were part-time members
of the Audit Practices Board. Five of them axe now senior audit partners in Big 5 firms.
The interviewees were chosen on the basis of their experience and position which indicated
that they would have a deep understanding of the audit services market. The interviews
were conducted in a semi-structured manner. Only two interviewees approved that the
interviews be taped.
CHAPTER 5. SIZE, SPECIALISATION AND MARKET SHARE 145
value of this type of stock. Businesses with long operating cycles may also
involve additional more complex accounting estimates in valuing its stock
and work-in-progress. See, for example, SSAP 9 "Accounting for Stocks and
Work in Progress" for construction companies involved in long term contract
work and SSAP 13 "Accounting for research and development" for pharma¬
ceutical companies which invest heavily in researching and developing new
products. These companies may prefer to have audit specialists to carry out
their annual audits (interviewee A). This is because complying with these
accounting standards is particularly difficult as they involve the valuation
of assets and liabilities on the basis of very complex and often subjective
accounting judgement by auditee personnel (interviewees B & D). This cate¬
gory of industrial complexity category therefore includes major sectors such
as oil, building and construction, health care and pharmaceuticals.
Volatility
For an auditor, additional and more complex work is needed to provide au¬
dit assurance where clients operate in a sector characterised by relatively
high volatility in technology or market dynamics. Examples of this type of
business include internet, telecommunications, media, computing and elec¬
tronics (interviewees B and D). Volatile industries therefore include those
that involve in fast moving technology and a high speed of innovation (inter¬
viewee E). Interviewees D and F emphasised that changes between clients
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and the marketplace were particularly crucial. For instance, IBM was very
successful at the mainframe market in the early 1980s but the business went
into rapid recession with a significant economic impact for the company.
One possible reason was that IBM did not foresee the importance of the
personal computer as a change agent in the market. Rapid changes are also
observed in product technology of complex financing techniques. There are
new developments of financial arrangements and information technology has
provided the opportunity to have such developments implemented quickly.
Sometimes, management cannot cope with the pace of this change and can¬
not even understand what is going on (interviewee C). Businesses therefore
become vulnerable to errors and irregularities. Interviewee D also noted
that changes within a client could also lead to an increase in audit com¬
plexity. For example, a company undergoing reconstruction may increase
the complexity of an audit assignment. A reconstruction may lead to new
organisational structure and systems which auditors have to make sure are
designed and operated properly. This industry complexity category includes
telecommunications and financial institutions such as banks and insurance.
Legal requirements
Legislative requirements in addition to those universally required by the
Companies Acts increase audit complexity. Financial institutions, for ex¬
ample, have to comply with the requirements of the Financial Services Act
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1986 (interviewees A and E). A thorough understanding of the requirements
of this Act is necessary but involves considerable experience and technical
knowledge. Many audit staff may therefore require additional training be¬
fore they can carry out audits of financial institutions. To cope with these
specialised audits, some audit firms have created and developed teams ded¬
icated to the audit of financial institutions. Auditee complexity may also
increase if the auditee engages in a business which is regulated in the form
of quotas by the government. The oil business is an example. Oil company
auditors have to verify that their clients do not exceed their sales quota.
This dimension of complexity is to be found in electricity, gas, telecommu¬
nications, and banks and other financial institutions.
5.2.2 Organisational Location, Structure and Integrity
Company geographical location and organisational structure are also im¬
portant factors in determining both the amount and complexity of audit
work. Audit clients who operate in global capital markets provide a greater
challenge to the auditor because first, the auditor has to verify extensive in¬
ternational trading between the clients' overseas branches and second, this
type of auditee may have operations in "risky" countries (interviewees D &
E). "Risky" countries include many Asian and Eastern European countries
(interviewees A and B). Moreover, companies operating in these countries
may have questionable or illegal activities.
CHAPTER 5. SIZE, SPECIALISATION AND MARKET SHARE 148
Integrity of management is an important factor in deciding the level of
audit assurance required. Good management control is particularly impor¬
tant in complex industries as it helps to reduce the amount of audit work
and/or helps the auditors to focus their work on risky areas. Different levels
of management skill will result in different levels of audit risk. For example,
the audit of complex industries can be helped by high quality, ethical and
competent management behaviour (interviewees C and F). However, some
industries (for example, construction and property) tend to attract "rotten"
management (interviewees A and F) and in these sectors particular care and
consideration is required by the auditor. Management experience is also im¬
portant. The risk of an entity is increased if its management have entered
into industrial sectors in which they have no prior experience (interviewees
B and F). Again extra audit vigilance is needed in these circumstances.
5.2.3 Identification of Complex Industries
In earlier research work Craswell et al. (1995) arbitrarily classified that an
industry as being complex (industries with specialist auditors) if it had 30
or more observations, and if one or more individual audit firm had a market
share greater than or equal to 10%. However, this appears to be a method
of identifying audit specialists rather than complex industries. The analysis
contained in this Chapter is based on the view that the operations and nature
of business are more important in deciding whether an industry is complex.
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Therefore, in order to identify complex industries, the following procedures
have been adopted. First, 81 industries, as identified by the Stock Exchange
in 1991, were arranged into 20 industry groups. The grouping of industries
was judgemental and was based on, as far as possible, the nature and opera¬
tions of the type of business. Then, the four complex industry criteria were
applied as discussed (length of business operating cycle, volatility in technol¬
ogy and industry dynamics, legal requirements, and organisational structure
and integrity of management) to identify complex industries. The 6 com¬
plex industries were contracting and construction, pharmaceuticals, utilities,
financial institutions, property and extractive industries (Table 5.2).
5.3 Audit Specialists
Bedard and Chi (1993) classify auditing knowledge into five categories: gen¬
eral auditing; functional area; accounting issues; specific industry and gen¬
eral business. By accumulating auditing knowledge, auditors become experts
who have the ability, acquired by practice, to perform to a high standard in
a particular task domain. The key for acquiring expertise is practice. The
more audit clients an auditor has in an industrial sector, the more knowledge
it will have about that industry and the greater the level of quality it can
efficiently provide in its specialist audit services.
However, practice alone, is not sufficient to achieve expert status. The
number, range and difficulty of problems faced, and the way personnel are
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Table 5.2 Identification of Complex Industries
Organisational
Long Operating Volatile Regulated Structure
Industry Cycle Technology Industries & Management
Building materials & merchants
Contracting &: construction V %/
Electrical, electronic & engineering
Motor, engineering
Broadcasting, media
Household & office equipment










Financial institutions V V
Property V
Extractive industries V V
Others
able to learn from each problem are also important. Experience of these
types of problems can come from audit involvement over time and with
a number of specialist clients. Audit firms can also accumulate auditing
knowledge through the provision of consultancy and tax services. Moreover,
knowledge relevant to audit work for a company in an industry can also
be gained through work (whether audit or consultancy services) undertaken
in other industries. Knowledge does not only spill-over between firms and
within an industry but also across industries. Some audit knowledge is quite
independent of industry; it can be generic.
CHAPTER 5. SIZE, SPECIALISATION AND MARKET SHARE 151
Craswell et al. (1995) determined auditor specialisation according to a
threshold of 10% of market share based on either the number of clients in
the industry or the percentage of total fees in the industry. They noted that
this 10% rule is arbitrary. In this study, based on 1179 listed companies in
the UK in 1991, auditors with more than 10% market share are shown in
Table 5.3. Both the number of clients and the percentage of total fees earned
are important in deciding audit specialists. Therefore, in this chapter, audit
specialist is determined according to a threshold of 10% of market share
based on both the number of clients in the industry and the percentage
of total fees in the industry (Table 5.4 on page 153). Based on this 10%
threshold, analysis showed that none of the medium sized or small audit
firms were audit specialists in any of the industries. Of the Big Six firms,
Arthur Andersen was not a specialist in any of the industries while Touche
Ross was only a specialist in 3 of the 20 industries. As a result of the
absence of small specialist audit firms, only hypotheses (1), (3), (4) and (6)
developed in Section 5.1 could be tested.
5.4 Data and Model Specification
5.4.1 Audit Fee Model
Chan et al. (1993) discussed in detail various possible determinants of audit
fees (See Chapter 4 Table 4.1 on page 91). As a result of data availability,
this study has only used some of the proxies listed in the Table: turnover for
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Table 5.4 Auditor Specialists
Number of Number of Clients
Industry Clients Specialists Specialist Big Six
Building materials k merchants 71 CL, EY, KPMG 40 53
Contracting k construction 66 CL, KPMG, TR 33 44
Electrical, electronic k engineering 232 CL, KPMG, PW 104 165
Motor, engineering 12 CL, EY, KPMG 6 9
Broadcasting, media 61 CL, KPMG 21 47
Household k office equipment 15 KPMG, PW 5 11
Breweries, wines k spirits 26 EY, KPMG, PW 16 18
Hotels k leisure 45 KPMG 8 23
Food manufacturers 37 CL, KPMG, PW 17 25
Paper, packaging k printing 48 CL, EY, KPMG, PW 31 38
Departmental stores 48 CL, KPMG, PW 26 35
Textile k apparel 70 EY, PW 21 44
Pharmaceuticals 46 CL, KPMG, PW 27 36
Wholesalers k distributors 68 CL, EY, KPMG, PW, TR 45 49
Industrial conglomerates 18 CL, EY, KPMG, PW 12 14
Utilities 24 CL, PW 14 20
Financial institutions 26 CL, KPMG, PW 11 14
Property 4 CL, KPMG, TR 2 2
Extractive industries 30 EY 3 28
Others 80 CL 8 47
Notes:
Based on 1179 companies in 1991
Audit specialist is determined according to a threshold of 10% of market share based on both the
number of clients in the industry and the percentage of total fees in the industry
CL: Coopers k Lybrand, EY: Ernst k Young, PW: Price Waterhouse, TR: Touche Ross
auditee size; inventory to total assets ratio, debtors to total assets ratio and
number of subsidiaries for complexity; return on equity and profit before
tax for ability to pay; year end dummy variable for timing of audit; Big Six
dummy variable for auditor size. Preliminary analysis reduced the model to
this form:
logFij = a0 + ailogSij + a2Subi^t + a3Gearitt
-\-a4R0Eii + a^Auditor + (5.7)
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where for auditee i at time t,
logFij = natural logarithm of audit fees
logSij = natural logarithm of turnover
Subij = number of subsidiaries
Gearitt — gearing ratio
RoEij = return on equity ratio
Auditorij = auditor dummy (= 1 if auditor was a Big Six or a specialist, = 0 otherwise)
eij = error term
ao = constant term
a\... <25 = coefficients
Estimations based on the above model can be used to calculate the Big Six
and specialist premium:
_ g^Coefficient of Big Six (specialist) variable _ ^ (5 8)
5.4.2 Data Sample
The data used was initially based on all fully listed and USM companies
(except investments trusts) in the UK in 1991. The final sample was ar¬
rived at on the basis of the following criteria. First, a company would be
included only if all the necessary information about the company was avail¬
able. Information on company auditors was extracted manually from the
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Hambro Company Guide, November issues 1991. Information on the num¬
ber of subsidiaries was also extracted manually from the Stock Exchange
Yearbook. Financial information of the companies - audit fees, total assets,
total sales, stock, debtors, profit before tax, return on equity and gearing
ratio, was downloaded from Datastream. In order to facilitate analysis by
audit firm, companies in the sample that had joint auditors were removed.
The resulting sample consisted of 1027 companies.
5.5 Results
As already mentioned, because of the absence of small specialist audit firms,
only hypotheses (1), (3), (4) and (6) developed in Section 5.1 could be tested.
Results of the regression analysis based hypotheses tests are presented in
Table 5.5.
5.5.1 Test of Audit Price Difference between L and S in Non-
Complex Industries
Hypothesis (1) predicts that in non-complex industries (in which there is no
audit specialist), large firms will charge the same audit fees as small audit
firms. However, the results of the regression analysis indicated that a large
firm premium existed. The coefficient of the Big Six variable was positive
and was statistically significantly different from 0 ('statistically significant')
at 5% level. The Big Six parameter of 0.116 suggested that, on average, Big
Six audit fees were 12% higher than those of non-Big Six auditors.
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Table 5.5 Regression Results
Coefficient t-statistic P-value Adjusted R2
Non-complex Industries
Constant -1.510 -6.845 0.000
Lo<?(Sales) 0.517 23.253 0.000
All companies No. of subsidiaries 0.023 7.509 0.000 0.835
(831) Gearing 0.001 1.821 0.069
Return on Equity 0.000 4.211 0.000
Big Six 0.116 2.865 0.004
Complex Industries
Constant 0.056 0.083 0.934
Log(Sales) 0.383 6.009 0.000
L* vs L No. of subsidiaries 0.024 2.997 0.003 0.619
(144) Gearing 0.002 2.238 0.027
Return on Equity 0.000 -0.112 0.911
Specialist -0.082 -0.571 0.569
Constant -0.052 -0.083 0.934
Log(Sales) 0.353 5.344 0.000
L* vs S No. of subsidiaries 0.026 2.855 0.005 0.688
(146) Gearing 0.003 2.789 0.006
Return on Equity 0.000 1.028 0.306
Big Six &; Specialist 0.314 2.471 0.015
Constant 0.117 0.245 0.807
Lop(Sales) 0.336 6.932 0.000
L vs S No. of subsidiaries 0.034 3.301 0.001 0.616
(102) Gearing 0.001 2.054 0.043
Return on Equity 0.000 -0.099 0.921
Big Six 0.385 2.839 0.006
Notes:
L* - Big Six specialist firm, L - Big Six firm, 5 - small firm
See table 5.2 for industry complexity classification
See Table 5.4 for audit specialist identification
Sample size in parenthesis
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5.5.2 Test of Audit Price Difference between L* and L in
Complex Industries
Hypothesis (3) predicts that in complex industries, large specialist auditors
will charge higher audit fees than large auditors. Results of the regression
analysis showed that there was no price difference between L* and L audits.
The coefficient was not statistically significant at 5% level.
5.5.3 Test of Audit Price Difference between L* and S in
Complex Industries
Hypothesis (4) predicts that in complex industries, large specialist auditors
will charge higher audit fees than small auditors. Results of the regression
analysis supported this hypothesis. The coefficient of the Big Six special¬
ist variable was positive and was statistically significant at 5% level. The
Big Six specialist parameter of 0.314 suggested that, on average, Big Six
specialist audit fees were 37% higher than those of non-Big Six auditors.
5.5.4 Test of Audit Price Difference between L and S in
Complex Industries
Hypothesis (6) predicts that in complex industries, large auditors will charge
the same audit fees as small auditors. However, results of regression analysis
indicated that a large firm premium existed in the audit price of complex
industries. The coefficient of the Big Six variable was positive and statisti¬
cally significant at 5% level. The Big Six parameter of 0.385 suggests that,
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Table 5.6 Regression Results - Non-Complex Industries
Coefficient t-statistic P-value Adjusted R2
Constant -1.670 -7.762 0.000
Lop(Sales) 0.547 26.251 0.000
L* vs L No. of subsidiaries 0.020 6.900 0.000 0.839
(578) Gearing 0.001 2.161 0.031
Return on Equity 0.000 -1.235 0.217
Specialist -0.053 -1.108 0.268
Constant -1.443 -5.525 0.000
Lop(Sales) 0.507 19.693 0.000
L* vs S No. of subsidiaries 0.026 9.311 0.000 0.843
(622) Gearing 0.001 0.936 0.349
Return on Equity 0.000 4.786 0.000
Big Six & Specialist 0.092 2.083 0.037
Constant -1.274 -3.779 0.000
Lop(Sales) 0.493 13.756 0.000
L vs S No. of subsidiaries 0.024 3.483 0.001 0.804
(462) Gearing 0.000 1.203 0.230
Return on Equity 0.000 5.514 0.000
BIG6 0.163 3.231 0.001
Notes:
L* - Big Six specialist firm, L - Big Six firm, S - small firm
See table 5.2 for industry complexity classification
See Table 5.4 for audit specialist identification
Sample size in parenthesis
on average, Big Six audit fees were 47% higher than that of non-Big Six
auditors.
Results of further analysis of the non-complex industries are presented in
Table 5.6. In this further analysis, the non-complex industries were analysed
as if they were complex industries. In other words, there were audit spe¬
cialists in those non-complex industries. Results were similar to the results
of the complex industry analysis. It was observed that (1) large specialist
auditors charged same audit fees as large auditors, (2) large specialist audi¬
tors charged higher audit fees (10%) than small auditors, (3) large auditors
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also charged higher fees (18%) than small auditors.
Results therefore, suggested that regardless of industry complexity and
audit specialisation, Big Six firms, on average, charged higher fees than non-
Big Six firms. This Big Six premium has been observed in many research
studies using data from different countries and different time periods. It
is a widespread and enduring phenomenon. Moizer (1997) noted that au¬
dit fees research studies in 12 countries, namely, Australia, Bangladesh,
Canada, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,
South Africa, UK and US, have identified top tier audit firms fee premium
varying between 16% to 37%. Craswell et al. (1995) considered that this
general brand name premium represented positive returns to brand name
development and maintenance.
Among Big Six firms, the results of this study indicated that there was no
difference in fees charged by specialists and non-specialists. These results
contradict the belief that, with perfect information, consumers (auditees)
would have to pay more for higher quality (Scherer and Ross, 1990, 592)
or indeed cast doubt on the idea that a quality advantage can be gained
from specialisation. The results also contrast with the findings of Craswell
et al. (1995) which identified a Big Six specialist premium. They concluded
that an industry-specific premium existed because of positive returns to
investment in industry specialisation by subsets of the Big Six above and
beyond general brand name investments.
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A possible explanation of the observed results relating to hypotheses (1),
(3), (4) and (6) concerns the inability of auditees to differentiate Big Six from
Big Six specialists. The inability of audit customers to differentiate the two is
likely because audit quality is unobservable. Without sufficient information
as to the quality of audits that auditors produce, auditees may well rely only
on the Big Six brand name. The implication of this auditee action is that
all Big Six firms, regardless of whether they are specialists or not, can in
fact, price their audits on the basis that they are specialists. If the market
believes that all Big Six firms are specialists, we can expect the following
results. First, we shall not observe higher prices by large specialist audit
firms relative to large audit firms as predicted under hypothesis (3). We shall
not observe any difference. Second, we shall not observe that in complex
industries, large auditors will charge same the audit fees as small auditors, as
predicted under hypothesis (6). We shall, instead, predict that in complex
industries, large firms will have higher audit fees than small auditors, that
is, the same prediction as in competition between large specialist firms and
small firms. The results obtained were consistent with this interpretation.
5.6 Methodology Issues
5.6.1 Replication of Craswell et al. (1995)
Craswell et al. (1995) 's classifications of complex industries and audit spe¬
cialist were used to see if different results would be obtained. The classifi-
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cation was arbitrary. An industry was complex (industries with specialist
auditors) if it had 30 or more observations, and if one or more individual
audit firms had a market share greater than or equal to 10%. Auditor spe¬
cialist was determined according to a threshold of 10% of market share based
on either the number of clients in the industry or the percentage of total
fees in the industry. Based on these criteria, only 5 of the 20 industries
were classified as non-complex. They were motor engineering, household
and office equipment, breweries, wines and spirits, industrial conglomerate
and utilities.
For non-complex industries, it was found that large firms charged the
same audit fees as small audit firms. No large firm premium was found.
Although the coefficient of the Big Six variable was positive, it was not
statistically significantly different from 0 at 5% level. Results for complex
industries were consistent with the results previously obtained. In complex
industries, (1) large specialist auditors charged same audit fees as large
auditors, (2) large specialist auditors charged higher audit fees (16% more)
than small auditors, and (3) large auditors also charged higher fees than
small auditors (19%).
5.6.2 Alternative definition of audit specialists
Sensitivity analysis on definition of audit specialists used in this study was
also tested. In Section 5.5, the results obtained were based on the classi-
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fication of audit specialist determined according to a threshold of 10% of
market share based on both the number of clients in the industry and the
percentage of total fees in the industry. In order to test for result sensi¬
tiveness to the definition, a threshold of 20% was used. All results were
similar to the obtained in Section 5.5 when the 10% threshold was used.
For non-complex industries, it was found that large firms charged higher
fees (12%) than small audit firms. In complex industries, (1) large special¬
ist auditors charged same audit fees as large auditors, (2) large specialist
auditors charged higher audit fees (40%) than small auditors and (3) large
auditors also charged higher fees (39%) than small auditors.
5.6.3 Industry and market concentration effects on audit
pricing
The results so far indicated that regardless of industry type, the Big Six
charged higher prices than small firms and that there was no price difference
between Big Six specialists and Big Six firms. Two questions are commonly
asked about industry type and audit pricing. First, does the nature of an
industry affect audit prices? Second, does auditor concentration within in¬
dustry affect audit prices? The first question arises from the belief that the
nature of an industry determines the complexity of it and hence the amount
of audit work required. The second question arises from the concern that
high auditor concentration within an industry leads to monopolistic pricing.
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) looked at the effect of auditor concentra-
CHAPTER 5. SIZE, SPECIALISATION AND MARKET SHARE 163
tion on audit pricing and reported that audit fees were negatively related
to auditor concentration within industry. They noted two possible limita¬
tions in their study: first, only two industries were examined and second,
the sample period covered a relatively short time period, during which the
concentration ratios exhibited limited variability in each industry.
In order to answer the two questions, the following fixed effect panel
data analysis technique was used:
logFitt = aqdi,i,t + £*2^2, i,t + •••+ c*kdk,i,t + ailogSij
+a2Subitt + a3Gearitt + aARoEitt + a5Conitt
+a§Specialistij + aTBigSixij + e^t (5-9)
where for auditee i at time t,
logFitt = natural logarithm of audit fees
logSij = natural logarithm of turnover
Subht = number of subsidiaries
Gearitt = gearing ratio
RoEitt — return on equity ratio
Conht = auditor concentration within industry to which auditee i belongs
BigSixij = Big Six dummy (= 1 if auditor was a Big Six, = 0 otherwise)
Specialistij = specialist dummy (= 1 if auditor was a specialist, = 0 otherwise)
ei,t — error term
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a\... 07 = coefficients
... otk = coefficients
d\,i,t ■ ■ ■ dk,i,t — k industry groups dummies (=1 if auditee i belongs to industry k)
Results of the panel data analysis are summarised in Table 5.7. Consistent
with our earlier findings, while a Big Six premium was observed, no specialist
premium was found. The industry concentration variable, as measured by
the Herfindahl index, did not have a statistically significant coefficient. This
result suggested that industry concentration did not affect the amount of
audit fees paid by the auditees. Thus, there was no evidence to support
the proposition that high industry auditor concentration may lead to higher
audit fees. Panel data analysis also revealed that industry group was an
important determinant of audit fees.
5.6.4 Limitations
In developing audit firm competitive strategies, it was assumed that there
are only four categories of firms: (large and specialist firm), (small and
specialist firm), L (large firm) and S (small firm). The within category
homogenous assumption may not be valid. For example, among the Big Six
(large firm) group, Moizer (1997) noted that many research studies have
shown that there were price differences among the Big Six. For example,
Price Waterhouse was found to have a fee premium in the 1980s in the US,
Canada and New Zealand. Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young had fee
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Table 5.7 Effects of Industry Type and Concentration on Audit Prices
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted R?
Log(Sales) 0.511 19.406*
Number of subsidiaries 0.021 6.605*
Gearing 0.000 2.381*
Return on Equity 0.000 1.339
Industry Concentration 0.004 0.014
Big Six 0.122 2.261*
Specialist -0.015 -0.288
Fixed Group Effect:
Building materials & merchants -1.329 -4.788*
Contracting & construction -1.688 -6.151*
Electrical, electronic & engineering -1.249 -4.922*
Motor, engineering -1.467 -5.519*
Broadcasting, media -1.416 -5.415* 0.822
Household & office equipment -1.668 -5.612*
Breweries, wines &: spirits -1.792 -6.000*
Hotels fc leisure -1.017 -3.364*
Food manufacturers -1.056 -3.785*
Paper, packaging & printing -1.529 -5.222*
Departmental stores -1.361 -5.326*
Textile & apparel -1.630 -6.286*
Pharmaceuticals -1.333 -4.895*
Wholesalers & distributors -1.253 -4.534*
Industrial conglomerates -1.268 -4.794*
Utilities -1.256 -4.070*
Financial institutions -1.621 -5.130*
Property -2.138 -5.146*
Extractive industries -1.594 -5.143*
Others -2.284 -6.532*
Notes:
* statistically significant at 5% level
Based on 1027 observations
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premiums in South Africa and Arthur Andersen in Norway. In Chapter 4, we
found a UK fee premium charged by Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst &; Young
and KPMG. No fee premium was found for audits of Arthur Andersen,
Price Waterhouse and Touche Ross. In addition, two simplifications are
made in developing the strategies. First, only one period strategy has been
considered. Second, strategies are also considered on a one firm category
to another firm category basis. More complex strategies could potentially
be developed for one firm category to the other three categories in a multi-
period context.
The empirical tests used in this study might have several weaknesses.
First, classifications of industry complexity and audit specialist are sub¬
jective. However, the similar results obtained for complex and non-complex
industries suggested that all industries should perhaps be considered as com¬
plex. Other definitions of audit specialists have been used in the study and
the results were consistent. Second, since the true functional form of the
audit fee model is not known, results obtained are subject to potential bias.
Third, the pricing strategies developed in this Chapter have implications for
auditor concentration. The test of changes in auditor concentration, how¬
ever, requires a much longer period of data. Given small changes in the
overall market auditor concentration from 1991 to 1995 as we saw in Chap¬
ter 3, it is unlikely that we would observe any significant change in auditor
concentration within industry. Finally, it is possible that audit pricing is
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influenced by other (non-studied) factors, for example, the consultancy fee
earnings and earnings potential of the auditor from the auditee.
5.7 Conclusions
This study has proposed that both the size of an audit firm and its specialist
knowledge of typologies of auditee are important dimensions of competitive¬
ness in the audit services market. Hypotheses were developed with regard to
strategies employed by audit firms to increase its market dominance and/or
to earn higher than normal industry economic profits. Empirical tests of the
hypotheses reveals the following:
1. The industry factor was a determinant of audit fees.
2. Auditor concentration within an industry was not a determinant of
audit fees. This result was different to that of Pearson and Trompeter
(1994). They found that audit fees were negatively related to auditor
concentration within industry.
3. Regardless of industry, there was no difference between the Big Six
specialist and Big Six audit prices. This result was consistent with the
results of Palmrose (1986) but contrasts with the results of Craswell
et al. (1995) which provided some evidence of Big Six specialist pre¬
mium.
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4. Regardless of industry, audit prices of the Big Six firms were higher
than that of small firms.
5. Regardless of industry, audit prices of the Big Six specialists were
higher than that of small firms.
6. The observed results in this Chapter might be explained by the inabil¬
ity of auditees to differentiate specialists from non-specialists, that is,
the auditees believed that all Big Six were specialists.
Nevertheless, this research represents only a first step in trying to explain
why audit price differences existed among firms and why auditor concen¬
tration has been changing. As indicated in the limitations, further under¬
standing can potentially be developed on diverse firm characteristics in a
multi-period model. The tentative conclusion that the market is not able to
distinguish audit quality suggests research should be carried out in several
directions. First, do firms actually produce different audit quality products?
Second, are there industry audit specialists? If there are audit specialists,
how can the market identify specialists? Can the market provide a solu¬




This dissertation has studied a number of aspects of the supply of audit
services in the context of the UK audit market during the period from 1991
to 1995. This Chapter summarises the conclusions which may be drawn
from the work undertaken and identifies further research opportunities.
6.1 Auditor Concentration
It has examined the issue of auditor concentration in the U.K. during the
period. This examination has shown that in 1995 the Big Six held 75% of
the total number of audits and collectively earned 92% of the total audit
fees. The audit market was dominated by the four largest firms, namely,
CL, KPMG, PW and EY. These four firms held 60% of the total number
of audits and collectively earned 79% of the total audit fees. Two other
auditors AA and TR had smaller but significant market shares while the
remainder of audit firms in the market were relatively small. There was
169
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 170
only a small increase in auditor concentration during the five year period,
resulting from companies switching from small audit firms to Big Six and
newly listed companies choosing a Big Six firm. There was evidence that
the Big Six had relatively more audits of larger companies, thus confirming
the general belief that large companies tend to appoint a Big Six auditor.
At a sectoral level, the Big Six had complete dominance over 5 industry
sectors and a highly dominant position in 29 others. The results do indicate
that in many of the industry sectors, auditor choice may well be effectively
restricted. However, it can be argued that although auditor concentration
was high at an industry level, there was still competition among audit firms.
Evidence to support this notion is apparent firstly because switching between
the Big Six firms represented 28% of the total auditor change during the
five year period, secondly because in 21 out of the 36 industries used in
this study, a reasonable choice of auditors existed to the extent that there
were 10 or more auditors active in the sector and thirdly an analysis of the
determinants of audit fees indicates that auditor concentration within an
industry was not a determinant of audit fees.
The audit services market structure is constantly changing. Not only
is there the consistent possibility of mega-mergers between the Big Five,
but also the likelihood of more mergers between medium sized audit firms.
Continual pressure for merger is underpinned by the fact that audit firms
no longer operate on national level, they provide services to international
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clients. Thus, interpretation of the results of analysis at a national audit
market level is rather restricted. A wider international perspective should be
considered as a basis for audit market studies and research in this direction is
to be encouraged. New developments are also apparent in the organisational
structure of audit firms. For example, incorporation of audit firms as limited
partnerships, addition of legal services provision and the splitting of audit
firm business from other activities. These developments may have impact,
yet to be seen, on the audit services market structure.
6.2 Audit Fees
This dissertation has also analysed changes in the audit fees of quoted public
limited companies in the UK during the period from 1991 to 1995. Analysis
of audit price change indicated that the audit market experienced a 9.0%
reduction in inflation adjusted fees over this five year period. The results
also provide evidence of overall fee reduction by each of the Big Six over
the five year period. On closer examination, a mixture of fee increases, de¬
creases and no changes were observed for auditees of the Big Six and for
the groups of medium sized and small audit firms involved. These results,
which pertain to a period when the Big Six held 75% of the total number
of audits, provide some amelioration of the worries of purchasers of audit
services that, in general, audit fees will rise in response to an increase in
dominance by a few big firms. The marked reduction in real audit fee in-
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come over the period is consistent with the existence of a price competitive
market. Alternative explanations include an improvement in audit firm ef¬
ficiency which was, at least in part, passed on to clients. The fact that
benefits may have been passed on to clients does, in fact, provide more sup¬
port for the price competitiveness of the market. It is also possible, however,
that the fee reduction reflects a deterioration in the quality of audit service
provided. Researching these options would assist in the determination of
the reasons underlying audit price movement but would require the use of
evidence which may be difficult to obtain. For example, an analysis of the
costs and revenues (profitability) of audit work would shed some light on
audit efficiency while detailed evidence on future litigation or retrospective
interviewing of those who are party to the audit process would be needed to
assess audit quality changes. The availability of this type of data to inde¬
pendent researchers is doubtful. However, public disclosure of the financial
performance of audit firms may eventually provide some further data which
can be used by researchers seeking to explain audit price variations.
Evidence is also presented that the Big Six gave higher discounts to
their larger auditees than they did to the smaller ones. The higher price
reductions enjoyed by larger Big Six clients may be indicative of greater
price competition in this segment of the market. It may also be that the
prestige and consultancy opportunities offered by large firms are influential
in this distinction.
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The audit price data presented reveals a variety and a complexity in
the pricing behaviour of audit firms. Although on average audit prices fell
there were price pattern differences apparent in individual years, across au¬
dit firms and in respect of client companies. Even the Big Six exhibited no
uniformity in their audit pricing. However, some analysis of the timing of
audit price changes by the Big Six over a longer period than five years might
be merited to determine whether a long-term price leadership pattern can
be determined. Also the variability in client treatment provides evidence
which, on investigation, would provide valuable insights into specific audit
firm pricing decisions. Those clients receiving consecutive price reduction
give an analytical benchmark for the comparison of the opposite treatment
of other clients by the audit firm. Investigation of the respective character¬
istics and circumstances of these clients could provide indications of factors
to which the level of audit fee is sensitive. For example, contrasts in the
circumstances of the individual auditor client relationship may become ap¬
parent as important determinants of audit fee.
6.3 Dimensions of Audit Market Competitiveness
Finally, this dissertation has proposed that both the size of an audit firm and
its specialist knowledge of typologies of auditee are important dimensions
of competitiveness in the audit services market. Hypotheses were developed
with regard to strategies employed by audit firms to increase their market
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dominance and/or to earn higher than normal industry economic profits.
Empirical results were obtained as follows. First, regardless of industry,
there was no difference between the Big Six specialist and Big Six audit
prices. Second, regardless of industry, audit prices of the Big Six firms were
higher than that of small firms. Third, regardless of industry, audit prices
of the Big Six specialists were higher than that of small firms. Some of the
results did not support the suggested hypotheses and this was indicative of
the possibility that auditees are unable to differentiate audit specialists from
non-specialists. They regard all Big Six as specialists. The results therefore
suggest a possible market failure where state intervention may be desirable.
This tentative conclusion that the market is not able to distinguish audit
quality suggests further research should be carried out.
This research represents only a first step in trying to explain why au¬
dit price differences existed among firms and why auditor concentration has
been changing. In developing audit firm competitive strategies, it was as¬
sumed that there are only four categories of firms: (large and specialist
firm), (small and specialist firm), L (large firm) and S (small firm). This
within category homogeneous assumption may not be valid. In addition,
two simplifications are made in developing the strategies. First, only one
period strategy has been considered. Second, strategies are also considered
on a one firm category to another firm category basis. Third, it is possible
that audit pricing is influenced by other (non-studied) factors, for example,
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the consultancy fee earnings and earnings potential of the auditor from the
auditee. More complex strategies could potentially be developed for one
firm category to the other three categories in a multi-period context.
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returnfoconsultancyfee .F rxample,ChristopherPe rce, financedirectorofR tokilIni ialandheaftheFD'sO HundredGroupconfirmedthfearsfuditfi cli n swhen heexpressedthvi wt athproposedmergerb twe n Coopers&LybrandanPriceWaterhouse'reducesomp tition andincreasesthpotentialf rco flictfinteres '(quotedi Accountancyge,25September,1997p.l). Concentrationisconventionallyregardedssig ificant dimensionofmarketstructureb c usiplaysi rtant roleindeterminingmarketpow randhencebusi ssb haviour andperformance(Bai ,1951nd1 6).Highconcentrationi anindustryincrea esthlikelihoodoft eforma ionfca tel comprisinganssociationffirwhichagrees,pe hapta tly,
toc -ordinatepro uctiona dpricingtoincre sethj inta d individualprofitsofitsmembersbyrestrictingoutput.H w ver, concentrationr sultingfrommergersayalsopermithe achievementofeconomiesfscaldutin r sesf rsize. Ithasbeenarguedhatesefficiencyinscanbr latedto concentrationformula(Debreu,1951;andFa rell,19 7).Thus, concentrationnthesupplyidehasthpo e tialinflu nce thevolume,pric ,vari tyandqualityofiservices. ThispaperseeksthroughninvestigationfUKauditmarket concentrationtoachievesev ralobjectives.Fi st,byan lysing auditorconcentrationfr m1991t19 5,iexte dstheUKw rk ofb thBeattiendFearnley(1994)a dPe l(19 7).S cond,it examinesthimpactofuditorchangesoconcent ation. Auditorchangesduringtfivyearp iodaren lysedi t thoseinv lvingaswitchfr ms allfirtoBSixfirm(a d viceersa),andthoseinv lvingaswitchwithinBS x.The analysisofauditorchangemongtB gS xi lsouchre detailedthanatofpr viousstu ies(B a tiendFe rnl y,1994; andMoizerandTurl y,1989).hisaspectofthanalysisf particularim ortancesevidencefn merouscli ntchanges amongtheBigSixwouldt r wsomelighttnaturef competitioninthealr adyhighlconcentratedauditma k t couldcastdoubtntheideafcar elform ionbythB gSix. Third,thepaperisalsonovelitanalysisfauditor concentrationwithindustrygroups(ZeffandFos um,1967;DanosandEiche seher,1980;ichenseherandD os,1981;and MoizerandTurl y,1989).Restrictioni choicefauditorswithin 0BlackwetlPublishersL d1999
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industrygroupwouldindica eaheightenedpotentialco fl ctf interestforauditorswhoprovidebothau itndma agement consultancyservicetowormorecompetingc pa i s.An th r importantissuerel tedtoaudi orc nc ntrationwi h nindustry groupsisthatfthea ditspecialist.Ic nbrguedth : auditorsdevelopin u tryspecialisationbyincre singtheircl enteles, specialistscouldalsoach eveproductioneconomiesa db ffic nt,lower-costproducersfaudit(Craswell,F ncisandT ylor,1995p..'!01). Thus,thespecialistbecomesadominantf rceithupplyof sectoralauditsndssuchhap tentialextendconsiderable influenceoverauditpricingwiththats tor.T sp per investigatesthincidenceofauditspecialistsbyapplving marketsharetestwithine chsector.T sm hodhb nuse inmanyofpreviousstudiesincludingC aswelltl.(1995)a d Palmrose(1986),buthasnotbeenappliedtcurr ntUKd a. Finally,thep perass ssesthmostcommonlyu dm thodsf concentrationm asuresi p rs udies.Thesemethodsll involvethse ectionfanauditmarket(pop lationof companies),ae surefmark tow rndconcentration index.Methodsc senbyresearchersmayth r forediff r considerablyandco s quentlythresultsfre earcht di sma lackcomparability(MoizerandTurl y,1987).How ver,thisissu isoftennegl ctedithinterpretationofher sultsfon¬ centrationstud es. 2.LITERATUREREVIEW Yardley,K uffman,CairneyandAlbrecht(1992)have summarisedtheanystudiesofauditorconcentrationithe US(e.g.BurtonandRoberts,1967;Z ffa dFossum,1967;Rhode,WhitsellandKelly,1974;SchiffandFri ,1976;Dopuch andSimunic,1980;EichenseherandD os,1981;Da osnd Eichenseher,1982;TomczykandRea ,1989;ndTo ge Wootton,1991).IntheUKs udiesfauditorc ncentrationave beenl sscommon.TheajorstudiesarBri tondKe slie (1985),MoizerandTurley(1987and9),BeattiendFearnley(1994)andPeel(19 7). Yardleyetal.identifiedsev rallimi ationsi previousUS studies.First,therewasadefinitionalpr blemc cerningh ©BlackwellPublishersLid1999
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Fearnley,1994)ndthelevelofauditf es(M iz ranTurley, 1989).Auditfeeincomewasconsi eredbvthem st appropriatemeasureofthesizm rketathirepresents goodmeasureoftheutp tauditor.Howev r,sinclarg r companieswouldtendhavelargerfe s,measureb s do numberofa ditswillunder-statthereav l eoftfirms' marketsh es(MoizerandTurley,1987).Ameasubas do thenumberofauditsdoes,how v r,facilitatanaly isfshifti concentrationdutauditorcha gesndisalsoconsiste withtheregulatoryregimedevelopedbyththChar ered Institutes,"whichfocusesonhabsoluten mb rflis dclients ofeachauditfirm(BeattieanFe r ley,1994). MoizerandTurley(1989)alsolookettheffec sfdiff r t concentrationindi s.Th ymeasuredauditorconc ntra i ni termsofmarketsharbvthelargestfir(C„)andth Herfindahlindex(IT): n x> c"=-r- i k wherekisthotalnumberfa ditfirmsmark t,ithe numberoflargestfirmand,S,isthizefuditfi. Concentrationindex„m asuresarketsh rbytlarg firms.Sinceaconcentrationind xaimstsu aristh numberandsizedistrib tionofcompetitorswithinaindus ry, HisbetterthanCas„onlyt kesintoacc untmarks arbv thenlargestfirmandthuignorestffir market.Inaddition,theresomfurtherdesirablprop rti s ofaconcentrationindex.5Alth ughH rfindahli dex satisfiestherequirementsoallthdesi blpropertiesw C„doesnot,nistillwidelyus dbecausfitsimp icity calculationanditsmeaninge svounderst n .However, 0BlackwellPublishersLtd1999
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and1,401companies.Auditfeep idv r edamongth companies,fr mbelow£1,000t9ill on.Interestingly,th averageuditfeep rcompanyhasdecr a edov rthfiv r period,from£295,000in1 91t£275, 0i1 95whilethe averagesizeofcompanyh sin re edfr m£825illioin1991
to£955millionin1 9 . Datacollectionproceededasfoll ws.Accountingdataf m Datastreamw recollect dncalendary ab sis(b don accountingvearendd te).Whilet isreatedhpoten alf r cut-offproblemwh nthdataw rematch dithauditor informationntheHa broCompanyGu de(Novemberissu ) whichasbasedonl testpubli hedaccounts,5therewas,if ct onlyasmallnumberfauditorchangesi e chofthyears underinvestigationandthus,ov alla ditorconcentration measureswernotsignificantlyaffected.N tllthcompanies listedntheHambroCompanyGui ew reavail bleinDatastr am andtherefore,theresultingpopulationsizf achfthy ars hasbeenreduced(Tabl2).h erewasnomergerb tw nh BigSixauditfirmsduring1991to5.D ringtheper od,t ere wereafewsmallerauditfirms' ergersincludingBak rTillynd Longcrofts,MooreStephenandOve tonalt,dFin ie StoyHavwardin1992;BrewersanCoopersLancaster,nd ChantreyVelloacottin1993;dBDOinderHamly 7andS o Haywardin1995. Usingthefivyeardat t,concentrationratioswere calculatedforthye rsrom1991to5.Auditfin me andnumberofau itengagementsw res dsproxiesf siz andmarketpow rfau itfirms.Degr efconcent ationas measuredbyC4andQ,marketsharetl rg stfo rndix firmsrespectively.Markethareh ldbe choft p15fi ms wasalsocomputedf re chyear.Thch ngeinditor concentrationduri gthefivyearp riodw sth nanaly ed andclassifiedccor ingtoi causes( ompanywitchinguditor, newlylist dcompaniesancompaniesr mov dfr mst ck exchange).Usingauditf eincomestsizemeasure, Herfindahlindiceswerealsocomputedf eachfthf vy ars
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0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 2.0
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.5
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 3.0
2.5 4.0 0.0 4.0 2.5
5.0 7.0 2.5 3.0 20.0 2.5 40.0 13.0



























































































































































































































































































































































































EffectsofPopulationSize,MeasurendC nc ntrationInd x PopulationSir*(No.ofLarg atC mpanies) populationw sthe1,400largestc mp n es.Thesr sultsugg t thatwhenauditfe sus dsizeme sure,populat onf thelargest500companiesproducaconcentrationawhich wouldbeareasonableestim tofthaf rlistec mp nies. Theresultsaredutofact atl rgc mpaniesnd appointBigSixndlsoayhigheruditfees.Consequendv, whenthsampleizeincreas s,C4orQ;oulddecreaseb u smallercompaniesarmorlikelytp ointnoBigSixfir . Thiseffectwouldbmodifiedsom whath nf srathertha numberofauditswerusedsba ifthconcentrationrat os assmallercompaniestypicallyp ya l rauditfees.Sinlarg auditsw lllwayscomprisegre erproporuonftht l populadonffees,abasemeasurewillhowgr ter consistencybetweensampleizthanmeasurbas dh numberofa dits. Toinvesdgatetheffectfcompanyiznaudi or concentration,thsamplewasr nkedaccordingosiz
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wasdividedinto14groups.Eachfthefi st3groupsh100 companiesandthe14thgrouph01companies.F re chf the14groups,marketsharebytBigSix(CBigSlx),bas dn eithernumberofauditsuditf e ,wacalculated.By stratifyingthesampleonco paniesco parablesiz ,T bl 7confirmsthatCBigsixbasednnumberfauditswas larto CBigsixbasedonaud tfees.Overage,BigS xb sedonaud t feeswasabout4%higherth nCBigiXb s donumberfa d ts. Thisfindingsconsi tentw hthproposidont at,g vehze andcomplexityfco any,BigSixau itorwouldchar et companyhigherauditfeest ant o echarg dbysmalleraudit firms.Aexpected,thauditorconcen rationfthfirstgroup, whichconsistedft elargest100companies,w sv ryhig .The CBigSixwasabout98%basedoneitherau itf sn mberf audits.CBigSiXforeachofthenextfivgroupsf100companies werealsohigh,va yingfrom81%to90b dnnumberf auditsndfrom85%to92b sednauditfee .Theextfiv groupssh wedalightlysmallerCBigsixwhilethl t r e groups,compri ingthesmalle t301c m an es,hadsignif ca t decreaseinCBig.?ixvaryingfrom39%to66 . ©BlackwellPublish rsLtd1999
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relativelysmallincreaseconcentration(5%whenmeasuredbv numberofa ditsnd3%whenmeasuredbya tfe )nthi representsama k dslowdowinthr tfincre s concentrationobs rvedinprioryea sthUK.Thisc ange wasbecausethernomergert enlargauditfiri theperiodofstudy.Th s,companiesswitchingfro llaudit firmstoheBigSixandnewlylistco paniesosingi Sixauditorccountedfortheincreas dcon entra ionrring from1991t 5. Atasectorallevel,thBigSixh dcompletedominancov fiveindustrysectorsandhighlydominantpositi n29other . Theresultsdoindicatetm nyofti us rsectors, auditorcho cemaywellbeffectivelyr stricted.Ho ev ,ic n bearguedthataltho ghuditorconcentradonw shigh industrylevel,therewastillcompetitiona ngud tf r , firstlybecauseswitchingtweenhB gSixirmepr sented 28%ofthet talauditorchangedur ngfivye rpe iodan secondly,becausein21o tfthe36ndustriess distudv, choiceofauditorsexis edt tenthatt erw e10 moreauditorsct vinthesector. Theanalysisu dertakenlsoexamin dt ff ctsof populationsize,measureandconcentraindi esth resultsofconcentrationstudies.Th rwaevidencethB g Sixhadrelativelymoreu i soflargercomp nie .Fexample, theyhad98%ofuditsp100c mpanies,87t e nextlarg s500companies,71%fthetl r est companiesandly53%fthesmallest301co p ni s.This confirmedthegen ralbeli fatlargmpani se d appointBigSixud tor.Thestudyhowst atbas sof measuringconc ntrationanaffectresult .Wh etba isis auditfees,theyrnots nsitivepopulationiz .Ic trast, whenthnumberofa ditsisbasimeasurem nt, populationsizedoesignif cantlyaffectthconce tr ion measure.Finally,bothCnandHerfindahlconcentrationind es gaveconsist ntre ultsnaud torconcentrado . NOTES IConcentrationianndustryr ferstohext ntwhichc nomica tivity iscontrolledbylargefirms. ©BlackwellPublishersLtd1999
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2TheInstituteofChar eredAccoun antsiEngl dandW es,ThInstitute ofCharteredAccoun antsinIrela dandTheInstituteofChar ered AccountantsfScotla d. 3SeeChakravarty(1995,c pter1). 4Accordingthecompanyguid ,informat onw sco pilefropri e sourcesanddr wnmai lyfromthec pany'soweportsandaccount , andeache tryw ssubmittedforverificatiothc mpa yconcerned priortopublication. 5Suchproblemwou docc r,f example,whenacom anyh dyearen dateof31stDecemberandh dauditorch ngeduri gtheye r.T HambroCompanyGuidewouldnlgivea d torinformatias Novemberfthatv randthus,w ln thavthenewaudi r information. 6ThiswabecauseDatastreamdidnoth vinform ti nfallthde d companies.Thismightunderstatetactualnumb rsofnewlylistea d delistedcompaniesduri gthefivyearp ti d. 7OnlypartofBDOindeHamlymergedwithStovHay atforBD StoyHavward.Therem iningp actice,continuedasBinderHamly , subsequendymergedwithArth rnders n. 8(29+13.5251)/2 4. . 9145/(146+205),basedonT ble7fBe ttiandFe rnl y(1994).
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